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Abstract 
In the UK 27 million working days are lost due to work-related illness or injury; at an estimate of £13.4 
billion to the economy. Over the last 30 years researchers have examined safety culture and its 
relationship to poor safety performance. An organisation in the high hazard construction industry 
wanted to understand the factors that shaped and influenced safety performance and safety culture. 
This thesis details a research project which addresses that aim. A multi-method, triangulated approach 
was adopted combining both qualitative (focus groups and interviews) and quantitative (safety climate 
questionnaire) methods. The results of the qualitative studies informed the development of the safety 
climate questionnaire that included a measure of self-reported accidents and near misses. 
The qualitative studies identified 6 main themes; Communication, Leadership, Employee Engagement 
& Involvement, Safety Prioritisation, Job Demands and Culture. Quantitative study results show, 
Upward Communication, Perceived Organisational Support (POS), Employee Engagement. Leader 
Member Exchange (LMX) and Organisational Commitment demonstrate a significant relationship with 
Safety Climate. Safety Climate, POS had a Significant, positive, predictive relationship with both 
accidents and near misses reported. Upward communication had a significant. negative, predictive 
relationship with accidents and near misses. LMX and Organisational Commitment show a Significant, 
negative, predictive relationship with accidents reported only. 
Results can be explained in the context of social exchange relationships. Reporting behaviour is being 
measured, this can be conceptualised as organisational safety citizenship behaviour. The probability of 
increasing or reducing reporting behaviours is shaped by social exchanges such as; a) the degree that 
employees feel supported by the organisation, b) and their manager, c) the safety climate, d) their 
commitment levels e) and opportunities to raise safety concerns. Interventions should aim to develop 
leaders and organisational practices to be more supportive, to increase reporting behaviour and to 
create a more accurate picture of safety performance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the concept of safety climate and culture, organisational safety performance 
and its real world significance. The chapter outlines the emergence of the Ph.D. thesis and details the 
sponsor organisation where the research was conducted. The chapter also outlines the challenges of 
industry, academic collaborations in the context of this thesis. The chapter concludes with the overview 
of the general aims of the thesis and the thesis structure. 
1.2. Emergence of the Ph.D. 
The author spent a number of years working in industry as a consultant for Right Management, part of 
the Manpower Group, a global consultancy providing workforce solutions. During her time there she 
built up a number of relationships with key personal in large PLC's. Driven by her passion for research 
to practice, she decided to undertake a Ph.D. at the Institute of Work Health and Organisations at the 
University of Nottingham. It was through her existing relationship with the Health and Safety Director of 
the sponsor organisation, that an opportunity for some 'real word' research was identified. The Health 
and Safety Director wished to understand the factors that were influencing safety culture and safety 
performance in the sponsor organisation. The Ph.D. developed as a collaborative research project 
between at the Institute of Work Health and Organisations and the sponsor organisation. The sponsor 
organisation operated in a high hazard construction engineering industry. The following sections 
discuss the real world significance of the research followed by an overview of the sponsor organisation. 
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1.3. Preface 
Every day globally 6,300 people die as a result of occupational accidents or work-related diseases. 
There are 317 million accidents at work annually with 2.3 million deaths per year as a result of 
workplace accidents. Loss of life is compounded by the financial cost of incidents and accidents. The 
estimated economic burden of poor occupational safety and health practices is estimated at 4 per cent 
of global Gross Domestic Product each year (ILO). 
According to the Health and Safety Authority (HSE) each working day in the UK, at least one person will 
lose their life as a direct result of their work activities (HSE, 2009). In the UK, 27 million working days 
are lost due to work-related illness or injury, and workplace injury and ill health cost the UK an 
estimated £13.4 billion (HSE, 2012). Whilst there have been reductions in the number and rate of 
injury in the construction industry over the last 20 years, in the UK it still remains a high risk industry. 
While the industry only accounts for about 5% of the working population, in the UK it is still responsible 
for 22% of all fatal injuries (HSE, 2012). 
The last 30 years has seen a shift in focus for occupational safety. There has been a move away from 
the technical explanations of accident causation to examining the organisational causes of incidents 
(Reason, 1990) in particular an organisation's safety culture. This shift in focus was as a result of some 
high profile far reaching industrial accidents such as; Chernobyl (Choudhry et aI., 2007) the Herald of 
Free Enterprise (Sheen, 1987), Kings Cross (Fennel, 1988), Piper Alpha (Cullen, 1990), Grangemouth 
(HSE, 2003) Texas City (Baker, 2007) and more recently Deepwater Horizon (Safina, 2011), where the 
BPlTransocean rig sank in the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven workers were killed and 205 million gallons of oil 
were leaked into the Gulf of Mexico. 
Many of the investigations into these industrial accidents made reference to poor safety culture. For 
example, the accident investigation of Chernobyl revealed many irregularities in organisational safety. 
The International Nuclear Safety Group's (INSAG) summary report on the Post-Accident Review 
Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident used the term 'safety culture' for the first time to describe a set of 
factors related to the organisational aspects of safety (Choudhry et aI., 2007). The Lord Cullen report 
(1990) on the Piper Alpha disaster was highly critical of the company's safety culture. 
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The Center for Catastrophic Risk Management's report (DSSG, 2011 p.98) concluded: ' ... these failures 
(to contain, control, mitigate, plan, and clean-up) appear to be deeply rooted in a multi-decade history 
of organizational malfunction and shortSightedness. There were multiple opportunities to properly 
assess the likelihoods and consequences of organizational decisions (Le. Risk Assessment and 
Management) that were ostensibly driven by the management's desire to "close the competitive gap" 
and improve bottom-line performance. Consequently, although there were multiple chances to do the 
right things in the right ways at the right times, management's perspective failed to recognize and 
accept its own fallibilities despite a record of recent accidents in the U.S. and a series of promises to 
change BP's safety culture.' The cost to BP so far is 42 billion dollars, with claims still to be settled in 
from some local and state governments. BP has had to sell off many of its assets to foot the bill. These 
industrial accidents not only resulted in significant loss of life but huge financial penalties for the 
organisation. 
There are also legal consequences for fatalities caused by poor safety in organisations. In the UK, the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 is designed to establish corporate criminal 
liability, where it can demonstrated that the wayan organisation's activities were managed or organised 
by its senior management was a substantial element in causing a person's death, amounting to a gross 
breach of a duty of care owed to that person. The Act aims to target the behaviour of companies but, in 
the prosecutions to date, senior management have also found themselves in the dock alongside their 
organisations. The Act requires the police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to consider the 
position of the individuals at a senior level in the organisation that may have been at fault, when 
examining the organisations potential manslaughter liability. There have only been a handful of 
prosecutions to date. As with all new legislation, the cases have been slow to result in prosecution, but 
as the police and CPS gain confidence in using this legislation, more case organisations will be 
targeted and prosecuted. 
The law is not just relevant in the private sector. The Francis Enquiry report (Francis, 2013) detailed the 
results of a public inquiry that investigated Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, a large UK hospital 
where thousands of patients are thought to have died unnecessarily due to poor care. The report 
identified the culture of the hospital had a negative influence on patient care and described the culture 
as one that tolerated poor standards and risks to patients. The HSE, in light of these findings 
investigated the death of one of the patients in 2007 and concluded there is sufficient evidence and it is 
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in the public interest to bring criminal proceedings in this case under the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act (2007). 
BP as a result of Deepwater Horizon also received much negative publicity and remains in the global 
press three years on. BP was found guilty of criminal misconduct in the USA. Four current or former BP 
employees have been indicted on separate criminal charges, including seaman's manslaughter and 
involuntary manslaughter. This is the single largest criminal case in U.S. history. 
As can be seen from the examples highlighted above, the cost of poor safety is far reaching. Poor 
safety performance can result in huge finical costs for the organisation, negative publicity and legal 
action not only for the organisation but also its management. Hence poor safety culture and safety 
performance can represent a significant risk for the sponsor organisation and its management in terms 
of financial and legal risks and the negative publicity a fatality could generate. 
1.4. Introduction of the Sponsor Organisation 
For over 80 years the sponsor organisation has operated in the high hazard, power distribution 
construction industry, maintaining the high-voltage overhead lines and steel lattice towers, required for 
electricity transmission and distribution throughout the UK. Key activities include power transmission 
and distribution, end-to-end lifecycle services for high voltage power lines. Many of the power lines 
need to be upgraded to meet both the UK's future demand and renewable energy targets set by the EU 
for 2020 (2009/28/EC). The sponsor organisation was at the time of the research one of the leading 
contractors, upgrading the power lines, for the major energy suppliers in the UK. The sponsor 
organisation was supported by a nationwide supply chain, storage and logistics service. 
The sponsor organisation employed managers, project managers, designers, engineers and field teams 
of foremen, charge hands and Linesmen based at different client sites across the UK. These field 
teams worked and lived on site for up to three weeks at a time, working on projects commissioned by 
the main electricity suppliers in the UK, maintaining and upgrading the electricity pylons. The 
organisation employed approximately 400 employees with half of these based on site. 
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In the 1930's the sponsor organisation designed and constructed steel lattice towers for the new 
National Electricity Scheme which aimed to bring electrification to the whole of Great Britain creating 
National Grid (see Figure 2). The sponsor organisation was a small family ran business which grew 
substantially due to a huge post war growth in electricity demand. Attitudes to safety were very different 
during this period and protective clothing was almost non-existent (see Figure 2), risk taking was 
normal and only extreme hazards were managed. Accidents were seen as an inevitable consequence 
of working in a dangerous industry. 
~ ~
. I 
Figure 1: Early Steel Lattice Tower 1930's Figure 2: Post War Working 
The regulatory requirements, PPE, and working practices have changed significantly over the years to 
virtually illuminate fatalities and serious accidents in the industry. The sponsor organisation is no longer 
a small family run business but part of a large PLC. However the risks, working at height and working 
with high voltage electricity still remain. Safety is a key priority for the sponsor organisation. The Health 
and Safety Team had spent a significant amount of time revising and updating the organisation 's safety 
policies and procedures and sponsor organisation safety statistics were improving year on year (see 
Table 1). 
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Table 1: Sponsor Organisation Accident Statistics 
2008109 2009110 
Number of 
rate Number of rate injuries injuries 
Total Injuries 69 3.62 45 2.15 
RIDDOR 4 0.21 4 0.19 
In order to understand the underlying influences of safety culture and safety performance the sponsor 
organisation sought to collaborate with the Institute of Work Health and Organisations. The three 
studies and methodological approach undertaken to do this form the basis of this thesis. The next 
section outlines some of the challenges to conducting collaborate research in the context of this thesis. 
1.5. Real World Research 
Collaborative 'real world' research projects can be challenging. Buchanan et al. (1988) argue that 
researchers should adopt an opportunistic approach to applied 'real word research' in organisations. 
Tensions can arise in between what is theoretically desirable on the one hand and what is practically 
possible on the other. In an ideal world it is desirable to ensure a representative sample and adequate 
data collection across a range of topics to be explored etc., however the practical reality is during the 
timeframe of the research many factors can compromise the desirable scenario, for example, 
participants refusing to take part, members of the organisation blocking access to information, 
organisational change such as mergers and acquisitions creating redundancies and loss of key 
stakeholders. Right from the conception of the research idea, it was important to ensure the research 
was able to meet the dual purpose of the project. The purpose of the research was for the findings to 
theoretically contribute to the safety climate and culture literature and for the sponsor organisation to 
gain practical knowledge and an in-depth understanding of the factors that affect safety performance in 
the company, in order to inform and benchmark any future safety interventions. 
Academia and industry often have contradicting goals and this can create challenges for any 
collaborative research projects. Frequently there was a continued negotiation between the researcher 
and sponsor organisation's key stakeholders, as to what was reasonably practical whist still retaining 
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the methodological robustness and integrity of the thesis. The researcher held regular monthly 
meetings with the key stakeholder in the sponsor organisation to keep them informed of the project 
developments, this also served to highlight any conflicting priorities and gave both parties an 
opportunity to identify mutually agreeable solutions. Another key aspect to ensuring the continued 
support of the sponsor organisation and the participation of its employees in the research studies was 
the familiarisation process. The researcher worked closely with the marketing manager to put together 
a marketing and communication campaign (see Figure 3.) to raise awareness of the research project 
and keep the employees regularly updated. 











Figure 3: Update Article in the Internal Magazine 
Second, the researcher took part in numerous safety meetings, site visits and attended winter training 
with the front line workers. This ensured the researcher became a 'familiar face' in the sponsor 
organisation, gaining trust and 'buy in' from the employees. A further objective achieved through this 
process was that the researcher gained an in-depth understanding of the employees, their job roles and 
the challenges they faced . More details on this process can be found in Chapter 4. The next section 
outlines the overall thesis aims and concludes with a summary of the thesis structure, with a brief 
description of each chapter. 
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1.6. Thesis Aims 
The thesis aims are twofold: 
1) To identify the factors that shape safety culture in the sponsor organisation 
2) To identify the factors that shape safety performance in the sponsor organisation 
The thesis had both an academic and practical purposes; the academic purpose to theoretically 
contribute to the literature on safety culture and climate, the practical purposes to identify factors 
shaping safety culture and safety performance in the sponsor organisation. This information can then 
be used to inform the development of future safety initiatives and provide quantitative data to provide a 
benchmark for improvements in safety culture and safety performance. 
In order to achieve the study aims, the historical development of safety culture and climate as a 
concept was examined (Chapter 2) and a review of the systematic reviews and meta-analysis on the 
topic was conducted (Chapter 3) to inform the development of the studies. Three exploratory studies 
were conducted, two qualitative (Chapter 5 and 6) and one quantitative (Chapter 7) using a triangulated 
methodology (Chapter 4) to assess the factors shaping safety culture and safety performance in the 
sponsor organisation. The in-depth understanding of the contextual factors affecting safety 
performance in the sponsor organisation informed the development of the quantitative study, a safety 
climate questionnaire. Finally the results of the three studies are summarised and discussed in the final 
chapter (Chapter 8), where the knowledge gained from the research is made clear along with the 
implications for theory and practice. 
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1.7. Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1: this chapter outlines the emergence of the Ph.D. thesis and details the sponsor 
organisation. The chapter describes the real world significance of safety culture and climate research 
and describes the challenge of academic, industry collaborations in this context. The chapter concludes 
with the overall thesis aims and thesis structure. 
Chapter 2: details the background and historical development of organisational culture and climate 
research, their different epistemological stand points and associated methodologies. The chapter goes 
on to describe the historical developments of safety culture and climate, their definitions, conceptual 
similarities and differences. Finally the concept of organisational subcultures and the influence of 
managers and supervisors are discussed. Concluding with how these subcultures might function in the 
construction industry, which the sponsor organisation operates in. 
Chapter 3: reports a review of the recent systematic reviews and meta-analysis of safety culture and 
climate dimensions, antecedents and outcomes. The chapter then goes on to examine the antecedents 
and outcomes of safety culture and climate identified in the reviews in more depth. The conclusions of 
this chapter inform the qualitative (Chapter 5 and 6) and the quantitative studies (Chapter 7). 
Chapter 4: details the different methodical approaches, both quantitative and qualitative, to measuring 
safety culture and climate. The chapter outlines the methodological approach in this thesis, a multi-
method, triangulated approach. Triangulated approaches combine both qualitative (focus groups and 
interviews) and quantitative (safety climate questionnaire) methods and are advocated in the literature, 
to study complex phenomenon such as safety climate. The four phases of the thesis are detailed: 
Phase 1, Literature Review, Phase 2, Familiarisation and Focus Groups, Phase 3, Interviews and 
Phase 4, Safety Climate Questionnaire. 
Chapter 5: describes the comprehensive familiarisation process undertaken by the researcher to 
familiarise herself with the sponsor organisation, its employees and their job roles. This process also 
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served to familiarise the employees with the research project and increase participation rates. The 
chapter then reports the first qualitative study, focus groups (n=7) conducted with front line site based 
employees (n=49). The methodology and analytical process is reported along with the main themes 
identified from the thematic analysis. 
Chapter 6: reports the second qualitative study, semi-structured interviews (n=27) with a cross section 
of employees from front line workers to senior management. The chapter describes the methodology, 
the sample and the sampling procedure. The chapter then details the analysis procedure - template 
analysis, and the themes and sub themes identified from the analysis. The main themes identified from 
both quantitative studies (Chapter 5 and 6) inform the development of the final study (Chapter 7) a 
quantitative safety climate questionnaire. 
Chapter 7: reports the third quantitative study, a safety climate questionnaire. The chapter describes 
the development of the safety climate questionnaire including how the measures and questions were 
selected in line with the findings of the qualitative studies (Chapter 5 and 6). The administration process 
and ethical considerations is detailed. The chapter then goes on to test a number of hypotheses 
relevant to thesis aims. The statistical analytical procedures and the rational for their use are outlined. 
The results in relation to safety climate antecedents and safety outcomes are reported. 
Chapter 8: discusses the results of the studies (Chapter 5, 6 and 7) in more detail. The knowledge 
gained from the research is made clear along with the implications for theory and practice. Strengths 
limitations and suggestions for further research are discussed. 
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Chapter 2: Background and Development of 
Safety Culture 
2.1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 described the background and context to the thesis. Work related illness and injury 
represents a huge cost to the UK, over 13 billion pounds annually (HSE, 2012) and each day on 
average at least one person will lose their life as a direct result of their work activities (HSE, 2009). 
Reducing injuries and improving safety performance remains a key focus for organisations particularly 
in high hazard industries such as the construction industry. The last 30 years has seen a shift in 
occupational safety management from a focus on identifying technical failures to understanding the 
organisational causes of accidents predominantly by examining an organisation's safety culture. 
Although there is a wide literature on the topic of safety culture there is still a debate around the 
definitions, constructs, measures, antecedents and outcomes. One of the aims of this thesis is to add to 
the evidence base on organisational culture with regard to its antecedents and outcomes. The purpose 
of this chapter is to gain an understanding of safety culture examining its background and historical 
development. The chapter firstly discusses the development of organisational culture and climate, their 
differences and crossovers. The following section gives an overview of the historical development of 
safety culture and climate and the conceptual similarities and differences. Finally the concept of 
organisational subcultures and the influence of managers and supervisors are discussed, concluding 
with how safety climate and culture are translated in the construction industry. 
2.1.1. Organisational Culture and Climate 
Organisations have been examined from a culture perspective as early as the 1930s (Trice and Beyer, 
1993). However organisational culture did not become a popular area of study until the 1980s. Climate 
was introduced in the 1960s primarily based on the theoretical concepts proposed by Kurt Lewin (1951) 
and empirical research conducted in organisational settings (e.g. Litwin and Stringer, 1968). There is no 
universal definition of culture or climate and a number of different theories and constructs have been 
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developed. There is a debate as to whether constructs of culture and climate are different, the same or 
interrelated (Denison, 1996; Payne, 2000; Schein, 2000). Many theorists suggest that culture and 
climate can be viewed as two complementary and overlapping constructs, each with distinguishable 
features (Schneider, 2000). 
2.1.2. Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture research is grounded in anthropology and is heavily reliant on qualitative 
methods such as; interviews, observations and examination of historical organisational information to 
understand how culture provides a context for understanding individuals. Organisational cultural 
research can be traced back to the human relations movement of the 1930s. In particular the works of 
Elton Mayo (1933) and Chester Barnard (196B) whose writings highlight the importance of informal 
social structures when trying to understand human behaviour in organisations (Parker, 2000). During 
the 1930s the Hawthorne studies were being conducted in the Western Electric Company. These 
qualitative studies attempted to investigate work organisations in cultural terms (Trice and Beyer, 1993). 
Although these studies results have been questioned, it represents one of the first set of qualitative 
studies of individual and group behaviour. Despite this early research the topic of organisational culture 
did not gain momentum until the 1980s after a series of seminal management books on the topic. 
Pettigrew (1979) suggested that organisational cultures consist of cognitive systems explaining how 
people think, reason, and make decisions. Schein (1992) offers a more comprehensive definition of 
organisational culture and describes it as: 'A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group 
learned as it is solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems,' (p.12) 
Despite a wealth of research in the field, there is no universally accepted definition or model of 
organisational culture; it has a variety of meanings and connotations. For example Van der Post et al. 
(1997) refer to over 100 dimensions of organisational culture while Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1963) 
describe 164 definitions. Part of the reason there are many theoretical approaches and definitions of 
organisational culture is due to the fact that culture researchers come from a variety of different 
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disciplines such as sociology, psychology and management and often use different epistemologies and 
methodologies to investigate the phenomenon. 
Despite the different definitions and models, theorists have proposed that organisational culture is 
composed of a number of layers or levels that vary along a continuum of accessibility and subjectivity 
(Hofstede et aI., 1990; Rousseau, 1990, Schein, 1992). Schein, a well-known theorist in the area (1985, 
1992), proposes that there are three fundamental layers at which culture manifests itself; observable 
artefacts, espoused values and basic underlying assumptions (Figure 4). Artefacts represent the 
visible manifestations of organisational culture such as the physical environment, technology, patterns 
of behaviour, symbolic manifestations and the use of language. Values include philosophies, morals 
and ideologies which serve to underlie and influence behaviour, while basic assumptions and enshrined 
beliefs underlie and drive these unconscious and internalised values and behaviours. 
Level 1 : Artefacts and Creations 
Technology 
Art and symbolic manifestation 
Visible and audible behaviour patterns 
l 1 
Level 2: Values 
Philosophies, morals and ideologies 
Testable in the physical environment 
Testable only by social consensus 
l 
Level 3: Basic Assumptions 
Enshrined beliefs 
1 
Relationship to environment 
Nature of reality, time and space 
Nature of human nature 
Nature of human activity and relationships 
Visible but often not decipherable 
Greater level of awareness 
Taken for granted 
Figure 4: Levels of Organisational Culture (adapted from Schein, 1985) 
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Much of the literature on organisational culture conceptualises the various dimensions within these 
levels. For example Ott (1989) develops the model further by subdividing the artefact level into visible 
and behavioural manifestations and Hawkins (1995) expands it to five levels that include artefacts; 
behaviour; mindset; emotional ground and motivational roots (Table 2). 
Table 2: Hawkins (1997) Organisational Culture (p. 426) 
Level 1: Artefacts Policy statements. Mission statements. Dress codes, furnishings, buildir}gs, PR, etc. 
What do people do and say. What is rewarded. 
Level 2: Behaviour How is conflict resolved. 
How mistakes are treated, etc. 
Organisational 'world view' - ways of thinking the constrain 
Level 3: Mindset behaviour. 
Organisational values-in-use, basic assumptions, etc. 
Level 4: Emotional Ground Mostly unconscious emotional states and needs that create a context within which events are perceived. 
Level 5: Motivational Roots Underlying sense of purpose that links the organisation and the individuals. 
In general there has been some consensus in the literature as to what the common characteristics of 
organisational culture are. Hofstede et al. (1990) conclude that across different definitions and models 
of organisational culture the commonalities are; that organisational culture includes multiple layers 
(Schein, 1992), aspects (Le. cognitive and symbolic), layers of organisational context (Mohan, 1993), 
organisational culture is a socially constructed phenomenon, influenced by spatial and historical 
boundaries (Rowlinson and Procter, 1999; Schein, 2000) and the concept of 'shared' meaning is central 
to understanding an organisations cultured. 
In his extensive review of the organisational cultural literature Guldenmund (2000) concluded that 
organisational culture had six main features: 
• It is an abstract concept 
• It is relatively stable 
• It is shared by groups of people 
• It consist of a variety of aspects i.e. different types of cultures can be distinguished within one 
organisation such as a service culture, innovation culture or safety culture 
• It is made up of layers 
• It is functional i.e. it supplies a frame of reference for individual behaviour 
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The numerous definitions and theoretical models of organisational culture suggest there is no 
universally accepted definition or model. However as discussed authors have identified some key 
underlying features of safety culture, (Hofstede et aI., 1990; Guldenmund, 2000) and some theoretical 
models such as Schein's (1992) have been more widely accepted, developed and built upon. The next 
section will discuss the historical and conceptual development of organisational climate. 
2.1.3. Organisational Climate 
Climate literature has its roots in Kurt Lewin's (1951) Field Theory. Lewin and his colleagues were 
interested in examining the climate atmosphere created by different leadership styles and the 
consequences these different climates had on behaviours and attitudes of the group members. Field 
theory suggests behaviour (B) is a function of (n a person (P) and environment (E) i.e. B= f(P,E). Thus 
the environment is created by, or a construct that is separate from the people who operate within it 
(Roberts, Hulin and Rousseau, 1978; Denison, 1996). Climate can be described as abstraction of the 
environment, the sum of patterns of behaviour and experiences that (Schneider, Bowen, Ehrhart and 
Holcombe, 2000) the agents (e.g. management or leaders) and the factors that create the climate (e.g. 
strategy, structures and practices) are either assumed or not directly studied (Denison, 1996). Climate 
is perceived by employees yet can be measured separately from them. This perspective has continued 
to dominate much of the climate research literature. 
The formation of climate has usually been regarded as an individual level process based on cognitive 
representation and sense making in organisations (Schneider and Reichers, 1983). This process is 
viewed as interactive and reciprocal (Ashforth, 1985). Climate can be defined as the perceptions of 
formal and informal organisational policies, practices, and procedures (Reichers and Schneider, 
1990).Jones and James (1979 p.205) describe organisational climate as a 'set of perceptually based, 
psychological attributes' that are distinct from job related attitudes and satisfaction but there is a 
'dynamic interrelationship' between the two. Organisational climate assessments tend to use 
quantitative methodologies such as questionnaire and surveys which are similar to attitude 
measurements, assessing the aggregated attitudes of an organisation's members (Eagly and Chaiken, 
1993). Early climate researchers focused on developing global or molar concepts of climate, under the 
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assumption that individuals develop global or summary perceptions of their organisation (e.g. 
Schneider and Bartlett, 1968; James and Jones, 1974). 
Many researchers attempted to identify the different dimensions of organisational climate (e.g. Likert, 
1967; Litwin and Stringer, 1968; Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler and Weick, 1970). By the early 1980s 
there were a large number of dimensions identified as relevant. New dimensions were being added to 
the conceptualisation of climate every time a researcher thought it could be valuable for understanding 
a particular phenomenon (Schneider, 2000). Schneider (1975, 1990) concluded that the molar concept 
of climate was too vague, inclusive, and multifaceted to be of any use and that climate research should 
shift from a molar, inclusive, abstract perspective to linking climate to a specific criterion or outcome i.e. 
a climate for something. The concept of a strategic criterion or a climate-for approach has gained 
common acceptance, addressing issues such as service (Schneider, 1990), innovation (Klein and 
Sorra, 1996) and safety (Zohar, 1980). The next section will discuss the crossovers and similarities 
between organisational culture and climate. 
2.1.4. Overlap between Culture and Climate 
As organisational climate focuses on its members perceptions of behaviour, policies, and practices 
(Sleutel, 2000) it can be perceived as a subset of the broader area of organisational culture (Bell and 
Koziowski, 2003) and understood as 'the perceived quality of an organisation's environment' (Glendon 
and Stanton 2000 p.198). Some theorists suggest safety climate precedes safety culture research, and 
climate is culture in the making (Glick, 1985; Schein, 1992). Others believe organisational climate 
influences and is influenced by organisational culture {McMurray and Scott, 2003}. 
In an attempt to distinguish the concepts of organisational culture and climate Ekvall (1983) makes the 
distinction between organisational climate and culture by dividing an organisation's social systems into 
1} organisational culture, i.e. values and beliefs about the organisation shared by the organisational 
members, 2) social structure, i.e. the informal organisation, 3) organisational climate, i.e. the common 
characteristics of expression of feelings and behaviour exhibited by the organisation's members, and 4) 
work relations in particular the relationships between employees and management. He argues that all 
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four categories are related but distinct. Reichers and Schneider (1990) in their review of organisational 
culture and climate as concepts concluded that 'culture exists at a higher level of abstraction than 
climate, and climate is a manifestation of culture' (p.29). 
Despite this lack of clarity around the two concepts, Denison (1996) notes that cultural research tends 
to lean towards the evolution of social systems whereas climate focuses more upon the impact that 
organisational systems have on groups and individuals (Denison, 1996). In his review Denison defines 
the difference in the research perspectives in organisational culture and climate research. These 
differences are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Denison contrasting culture and climate prerpectives 
Element Culture Climate 
Epistemiology Contextualised and idiographic Comparative and nomothetic 
Point of view Emic (native point of view) Etic (researcher's point of view) 
Methodology Qualitative field observations Quanitiative survey data 
Level of analysis Underlying values and Surface-level manifestations 
assumptions 
Temporal orientation Historical evaluations A historical snapshot 
Theoretical foundations Social construction; critical Lewinian field theory 
theory 
Discipline Social anthropology Psychology 
Noting the differing perspectives Denison concluded that culture and climate represent 'differences in 
interpretation rather than differences in phenomenon' (Denison, 1996, p. 645). 
2.1.5. Summary 
In summary organisational culture and climate focus on how an organisation's members experience 
and make sense of their organisation (Schneider, 2000) and are the fundamental building blocks for 
describing and analysing this organisational phenomena (Schein, 2000). Although culture and climate 
have been approached from different perspective and have their roots in different disciplines, they are 
both about understanding psychological phenomenon in organisations and there are overlaps and 
26 
crossovers. Both concepts rest on the assumption of shared meanings and understanding of the 
organisation context. Organisational culture and climate research has shifted from a 'catch all' molar 
perspective to linking climate to a specific criterion or outcome such as; innovation, service and safety. 
The next section will describe the development of safety culture and climate as a concept, its 
background and history. 
2.2. Safety Culture and Climate 
This section outlines the foundations and historical development of safety culture and climate. As with 
the organisational culture and climate research a number of different definitions and concepts have 
been theorised. There is still no consensus on these definitions of safety culture and climate, a brief 
overview of these different definitions, distinctions and epistemology is defined. The evidence of the 
possible influence managers and supervisors have on safety culture is examined. Concluding with the 
application of safety culture in the construction industry, which is directly relevant to the sponsor 
organisation. 
2.2.1. Background and History 
The development of safety culture research is grounded in accident causation research and born out of 
a need to understand the non-technical causes of accidents in terms of root causes and system 
failures. The development of accident causation research has advanced historically in a number of 
stages. The first stage, the 1940s to 1960s, focused on machine and hardware improvements, due to 
the rapid development and implementation of new machinery and automations in the workplace when 
many accidents were attributed to mechanical malfunctions (Cooter and Luckin, 1997). The second 
stage from 1960s to 1980s, focused on human factors and human machine interactions. During this 
period employees were perceived as the weakest link in the system (Gordon, Flin, Mearns and 
Fleming, 1996). The third stage from the 1970s to 1990s, considered the interaction of human and 
technical factors (Cooter and Luckin, 1997). The most recent stage from the 1980s onwards considered 
organisational culture an influential factor in accident causation (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Cox and Cheyne, 
2000; Wiegmann et aI., 2oo2a). 
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lohar (1980), based on the organisational climate research of Schneider (1975) developed the concept 
of safety climate. In the first paper on the topic, Safety Climate in Industrial Organisations: Theoretical 
and Applied Implications, Zohar defined safety climate as 'a summary of molar perceptions that 
employees share about their work environments ... which acts as a frame of reference for guiding 
appropriate and adaptive task behaviours' (p.96). In this study Zohar developed a multi-factorial safety 
climate structure which showed a strong relationship with safety programme effectiveness (lohar, 
1980). 
This publication led to a number of studies using lohar's scale with some minor alterations (Brown and 
Holmes, 1986; Dedobbeleer and Beland, 1991; Coyle et aI., 1995; Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996). A 
number of further safety climate scales were developed (Rundmo, 1992; Lee, 1993; Cheyne, Cox, 
Oliver and Tomas, 1998; Cox and Cheyne, 2000) broadening the safety climate literature. 
At around the same time as lohar was developing the concept of safety climate there were a number 
of large scale nuclear accidents such as the Three Mile Island in the USA (1979) and Chernobyl in the 
Ukraine (1986). The accident investigation of Chernobyl revealed many irregularities in organisational 
safety. Chernobyl occurred at a time of nuclear investment and expansion in the UK (Reason, 1997), 
leading to nuclear safety being a key political area of focus. The International Nuclear Safety Group's 
(INSAG) summary report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident used the 
term "safety culture" for the first time to describe a set of factors related to the organisational aspects of 
safety (Choudhry et aI., 2007). However INSAG's publication made no reference to the academic 
literature on safety climate at the time. This suggests that the term 'safety culture' in this context was 
not developed on the basis of safety climate of culture studies (Choudhry et aI., 2007). The terms 
meaning was left open to interpretation. Following on from this 'safety culture' was cited in other major 
accident investigation reports, such as the King's Cross Underground fire (Fennel, 1988), the Clapham 
Junction disaster (Hidden, 1989) and Piper Alpha, (1988). Historically, the two concepts of 'safety 
culture' and 'safety climate' were developed separately: 'safety climate' had its origins in the subject 
research literature and 'safety culture' was used arbitrarily by accident investigators with no reference to 
any scientific source of information (Choudhry et aI., 2007). 
The concept of safety culture captured the interest and imagination of researchers and safety 
practitioners alike, with safety culture and climate research gaining increased momentum in 1980s and 
19905. Frequent research publications and numerous references in major incident/accident 
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investigations illustrate the significance of the concept. Safety climate and safety culture are used 
interchangeably as these two concepts are not explicitly distinguishable, despite this there is confusion 
between safety culture and safety climate a concept and researchers have attempted to distinguish 
between the two terms. The next section discusses these similarities and differences. 
2.2.2. Safety Climate and Safety Culture Definitions 
Safety culture and safety climate are used interchangeably in the literature to describe a similar 
phenomenon. The distinction between safety climate and safety culture can be seen as similar to that 
of organisational climate and organisational culture, the former relating to attitudes towards safety and 
later being the strong beliefs held within the organisation underlying these attitudes (Guldenmund, 
2000). Within the field of safety culture research both terms, safety climate and safety culture, are still 
used often interchangeably. Safety culture can be defined as 'the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and 
values that employees share in relation to safety' ( Cox and Cox, 1991 J p.93) and climate can be 
defined as 'the objective measurement of attitudes and perceptions toward occupational health and 
safety issues' (Coyle et aI., 1995, p. 247). Many researchers in the field of safety advocate the retention 
of both terms (Cox and Flynn, 1998, Glendon and Staton, 2000, and Guldenmund, 2000). 
Safety climate is associated with words such as 'snapshot' (Flin et aI., 2000, p. 178), 'superficial' 
(Glendon and Stanton, 2000, p. 198) and 'state' (Cheyne et aI., 1998, p. 256) and can be described as 
the surface features of the safety culture derived from the workforces' attitudes and perceptions at a 
given point in time, as indicator of the state of the safety culture and the safety of the organisation (Flin 
et al., 2000). Climate is seen as directly measurable whereas culture is too abstract to be measured 
directly (Meams et aI., 2003). Safety culture is referred to as 'trait' (Cheyne et aI., 1998, p. 256), 'deep' 
(Hale, 2000, p.5) and 'quantitative' (Guldenmund, 2000, p. 220). Climate can be described as a 
manifestation of culture at a particular point in time (Hale, 2000). Wiegmann and colleagues (2002) 
analysed 18 articles that provide 'safety culture' definitions and 12 articles that provide definitions of 
'safety climate'. They suggest a hybrid definition for the two terms: 'Safety culture is the enduring value 
and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone in every group at every level of an 
organisation. It refers to the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility 
for safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt 
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and modify (both individual and organisational) behaviour based on lessons learned from mistakes, and 
be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values' (p. 8). 
'Safety climate is the temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among 
individual perceptions of the organisation. It is therefore situationally based, refers to the perceived 
state of safety at a particular place at a particular time, is relatively unstable, and subject to change 
depending on the features of the current environment or prevailing conditions' (p.10). 
Despite many conceptual papers on the topic, there is still no common agreement on these definitions 
and the terms are still being used interchangeable in the literature. Thus in this thesis the assumption is 
directed by the evidence that safety climate and safety culture are facets of the same phenomenon and 
both terms will be used. The next section will discuss the distinction between management and 
supervisors and highlight why this distinction is particularly important in the construction industry, which 
the sponsor organisation operates in. 
2.4. Management and Supervisors 
Organisational culture can be investigated at various levels in the organisation, for example 
organisational, or sub unit and group. Clarke (2000) identified that there are layers of management 
within almost all organisations, and each layer of management has distinct but inter-related roles and 
responsibilities. Senior management for example may be responsible for developing and populating the 
health and safety policy, whilst middle management identifies the necessary requirements to deliver the 
policy. Then it falls to the supervisors to understand, apply and enforce these policies on a daily basis. 
Clarke (2000) recognised the critical role of the supervisor when examining the influence of safety 
culture on behaviour. Clarke's model differentiates senior managers, line managers, supervisors and 
workers. However the author noted that many studies (Cox and Cox 1991; Cheyne et aI., 1998) tended 
to included supervisors and managers in one broad leadership category or fail to make the distinction 
between the two leading to a 'paucity of information about the role of supervisors in promoting good 
safety culture' (Clarke, 2000, p. 83). 
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Recognising these differences in management levels some authors draw a distinction between 
supervisors and management in their safety climate questionnaires. Flin et al. (2000) in their review of 
27 safety climate questionnaires identified four safety climate tools with separate factors relating to 
supervision; HSE, Niskanen (1994), Mearns et al.,(1997) and Budworth (1997). Both the HSE and 
Niskanen included separate supervisor items while Mearns et al. (1997) and Budworth (1997) had a 
section dedicated to supervisors embed in a single questionnaire. 
Some researchers have examined the level of agreement of supervisor and workforce attitudes in 
relation to safety. Niskanen (1994) found a degree of agreement between supervisors and workers 
attitudes, both felt safe working practices improved production and the prevention of accidents is 
everybody's responsibility. There was however some disagreement as supervisors felt they gave safety 
instructions more frequently than perceived by employees. Thompson, Hilton and Witt (1998) analysed 
the differences between management and supervisor support for safety and found management 
support mediated the relationship between organisational politics and safety conditions, whereas 
supervisor support mediated the relationship between perceived fairness and safety compliance. 
lohar (2002) developed an intervention to enhance supervisory practices to improve safety 
performance. His intervention lasted eight weeks and differentiated between supervisors and 
departmental managers. The intervention aimed to modify supervisors monitoring and rewarding of 
workers safety performance (lohar, 2002). Baseline rates for micro accidents, safety climate scores 
and supervisory interactions were collected prior to the intervention. Feedback was given to supervisors 
and section managers over the eight weeks. This feedback comprised of cumulative frequencies of 
reported interactions between the workforce and supervisors where safety was the approval or 
disapproval criteria. Supervisors were fed this information individually but the managers could access 
information about all supervisory actions. The intervention increased the number of supervisor/operator 
safety orientated interactions, reduced minor incident rates, increased PPE use and improved safety 
climate scores (lohar, 2002). 
The evidence suggests that supervisor's behaviours and actions can, in turn, drive those of others 
(Cheyne et aI., 2002). Supervisors can have a direct and indirect effect on employee's safety 
behaviour; directly by modelling unsafe behaviours and reinforcing these through monitoring and 
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control or indirectly by establishing the norms of safety behaviour through accepted practice. These 
actions influence the expectations and motivations of employees and as a consequence the likelihood 
that a particular safety behaviour will be repeated or suppressed (Flin and Yule, 2004). Unsafe 
practices for example, may be naturally reinforced when there is pressure on managers to meet tight 
deadlines. This is not uncommon in the construction industry operating in competitive environments. 
The next section will discuss safety culture and climate in the context of the construction industry. 
2.5. Safety Culture and Climate in the Construction Industry 
The construction industry is a highly complex, dynamic environment. Typically contracts are won 
through price sensitive competitive tenders and often office and site functions are independent of each 
other with workers moving from site to site, making them difficult to supervise and manage centrally 
(Rowlinson, 2004). These complex working relationships and competitive environments can have 
negative consequences for health and safety (Mayhew and Quinlan, 1997). The distance between 
office and site functions limits opportunities for face to face communication. Many construction 
organisations contract to a client and are based on the client's site this can lead to competing priorities 
and influence from both the client and the employing organisation. This can result in the contracting 
organisation having limited power and influence to shape a sites safety culture. 
Supervisors have been shown to have the power to shape the safety culture (Zohar, 2002), as a result 
site managers and supervisors can have a large influence over the culture and climate of their site. 
Organisational culture can be investigated at various levels, e.g. organisational, sub-unit and group. 
Top level managers develop and establish policies and procedures, and group level managers carry 
out these policies in the form of safety practices. By comparing how these policies are implemented by 
different site managers and supervisors and observing how higher level management supports 
decisions made by site managers, employees are capable of perceiving the difference between the 
procedures established by top managers and their own site managers (Zohar, 2003). This is particularly 
relevant in construction industry as typically there are many regulatory requirements to adhere to so 
numerous health and safety policies and procedures are produced. Yet these may not manifest 
themselves in the practices of the front line workers, as site managers and supervisors can mediate this 
process by either directly or indirectly reinforCing or inhibiting safety behaviour. 
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2.6. Summary 
Organisational culture and climate research was derived from two different epistemological positions; 
organisational culture research is grounded on anthropological qualitative methodologies whereas 
safety climate research is based on quantitative approaches. Nevertheless, organisational culture and 
climate focus on how an organisation's members experience and make sense of their organisation 
(Schneider, 2000). There are many crossovers between culture and climate; both concepts assume 
shared meanings and understanding of the organisational context. Organisational climate research 
moved from a 'catch all' phenomenon to researching a 'climate for something'. Zohar (1980) was one of 
the fore founders of safety climate research building on the organisational climate research of 
Schneider (2000). The origins of safety culture research were driven from large scale accident 
investigations that recognised the organisational context and influence on accident causation. There is 
no universal definition of safety climate or culture and the terms are used interchangeably in the 
literature, however safety climate can be seen as a 'snapshot' (Flin et aI., 2000) of safety culture. 
Further work has examined the differences between manager and supervisor influence on safety 
climate and this is particularly relevant in the construction industry where supervisors and workers are 
site based and supervisors are influential in implementing and monitoring safety polices and 
performance. The next chapter presents a review of the systematic reviews and meta-analysis on 
safety climate and culture and goes on to discuss safety climate dimensions, antecedents and 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 3: Evidence Synthesis 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 described the development of organisational safety culture and climate. As can be seen from 
the previous chapter there is a wide literature on the topic of safety culture spanning over 30 years. 
However there is still debate as to its dimensions, antecedents and outcomes. One of the aims of this 
thesis is to add to the evidence base on organisational culture and climate, with regard to its 
dimensions, antecedents and outcomes in the particular context of the construction industry which the 
sponsor organisation operates in. Due to the large number of studies over the last three decades on 
safety climate and culture, a number of researchers have sought to draw conclusions about the 
dimensions of safety climate through systematically reviewing the literature on the topic (e.g. Flin et aI., 
2000; Seo et aI., 2004; O'Connor et aI., 2011). Recently researchers have used meta-analytical 
principles to understand the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes (Clarke 2006; 
Christian et aI., 2009; Beus et aI., 2010), and wider organisational psychosocial factors (Clarke, 2010; 
Nahrgang et aI., 2010). The purpose of this chapter is to gain an understanding of a number of reviews 
and meta-analyses of safety culture and climate to inform the development of a safety climate measure 
for use in the sponsor organisation. 
3.1.1. Dimensions of safety culture, climate and safety outcomes 
Since the 1980s there have been hundreds of studies of safety culture and safety climate. A number of 
reviews and meta-analysis have attempted to identify common dimensions of safety climate and 
culture, its outcomes and antecedents. Given that there have been a number of reviews of the 
phenomenon it seems valuable to systematically review these reviews to allow the findings to be 
compared and contrasted to provide a greater insight into safety culture and climate commonalities, 
antecedents and outcomes, then explores this evidence. 
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3.1.2. Method 
A systematic approach was adopted to review the recent reviews and meta-analysis in the field of 
safety culture. In order to identify systematic reviews and meta-analysis for inclusion a systematic 
search strategy was used. Online databases Ovid, PsycArticles, Embase, Medline and PsyclNFO were 
searched for relevant articles using the following search terms 'safety climate' AND 'review', 'safety 
culture' AND 'review', 'safety climate' AND 'meta-analysis', 'safety culture' AND 'meta-analysis'. In 
addition, other experts in the field were consulted (n=2) and the references of all articles located were 
scanned for further relevant references. No date or language restrictions were applied. 
This search generated 207 articles. Only non-healthcare systematic reviews and meta-analyses of 
safety climate and safety culture were included. Healthcare climate and culture reviews and non-
systematic reviews (or the systematic process was not detailed in the published paper) were excluded. 
All articles were evaluated by the author. This resulted in eight papers that met the inclusion criteria. An 
overview of the results can be found in Table 4. 
3.1.3. Results - Systematic Reviews 
In one of the earliest systematic reviews of safety climate measures Flin et al. (2000) reviewed 18 
published articles of safety climate questionnaires. Authors and industries included in the review are as 
follows; energy and chemical industry, Rundmo (1990,1994), Cox and Cox (1991), Ostrom et al. 
(1993), Donald and Canter (1994), Alexander et al. (1995), Budworth (1997), Mearns, et al. (1997), 
Carroll (1998), Lee (1998), manufacturing, Zohar (1980), Browns and Holmes (1986), Philips et al. 
(1993), Janssen et al. (1995), Williamson et al. (1997), transport, Diaz and Cabrera (1997), 
construction, Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991), Niskanen (1994) and generic HSE (1997). The inclusion 
criterion was that the sample size was above 100, the report was in English and only industrial sectors 
were included (Le. excluding retail, clerical, health etc.). Fifty percent were from the 
energy/petrochemical sector. One hundred themes were extracted and re-categorised into a smaller 
number (n=35) of simplified themes. A wide range of climate features were assessed, these were 
mainly workforce perceptions and attitudes towards safety and in some cases others measured 
individual dispositions, personality or self-reported work behaviours. Three themes appeared in two 
thirds of the questionnaires; these related to management. Safe systems and risk appeared more than 
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once in some questionnaires. Two other themes occurred in a third of the questionnaires, these were 
competence and work pressure. Flin et al. (2000) detailed the identified dimensions of safety climate as 
follows: 
• Management: This dimension refers to management attitudes and behaviours in relation to 
safety as well production, or other issues (selection, discipline and planning). This dimension 
appeared in 13 of the studies. 
• Safe system: The second dimension was identified in 12 of the studies. This was defined as 
the different aspects of the organisations safe management system including safety officials, 
safety committees, permit to work systems, safety policies and safety equipment. Generally 
respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with these aspects. 
• Risk: This dimension refers to self-reported risk taking, attitudes towards risk and safety and 
perceptions of risks and hazards on the worksite, this was apparent in 12 of the questionnaires. 
• Work pressure: This dimension refers to the workplace, workload and pressure for production. 
This appeared in six of the questionnaires. 
• Competence: This dimension refers to the workforce's perceptions of the general level of 
workers qualifications, skills and knowledge. This is apparent in six of the questionnaires. 
• Procedures/rules: This dimension refers to perception of safety rules, attitudes to rules, 
compliance or violation of procedures. This theme related to risk taking behaviours and this 
dimension only emerged in three of the studies reviewed. 
Flin et al. (2000) concluded that there are a number of common themes or dimensions safety climate 
measures use. The most common relates to management, safe systems and risk followed by work 
pressure and competence. However the authors concluded that the components of each dimension are 
variable and are likely to be industry or organisation specific. 
Seo et al. (2004) tested a five factor structure of a safety climate scale developed through an extensive 
literature review. The selection and inclusion criteria of the safety climate scale development studies 
included in the systematic review was that the study should be published on an electronic database in a 
refereed journal, presented in English and based on a sample greater than 150 employees. Sixteen 
studies were included in the review, these were; Zohar (1980), Brown and Holmes (1986), Cox and. 
Cox (1991), Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991), Niskanen (1994), Coyle et al. (1995), Diaz and Cabrera 
36 
(1997), Williamson (1997), Cheyne et al. (1998), Mearns et al. (1998), Brown et al. (2000), Cox and 
Cheyne (2000), Lee and Harrison (2000), Glendon and Litherland (2001) and O'Toole (2002). 
The systematic review found that leadership support, including management commitment to safety and 
supervisor safety support was the most common dimension identified in the review. This dimension 
appeared in two-thirds of the questionnaires. The next most common dimension was employee 
participation appearing in seven questionnaires. A third of the questionnaires included pressure, hazard 
level in the work environment, and competence level. Others were co-worker safety support, perceived 
risk and barriers to safety. Seo et ai, (2004) concluded that amongst these nine dimensions, 1) 
management commitment to safety, 2) supervisor safety support, 3) co-worker safety support, 4) 
employee participation in safety-related decision making and activities and 5) competence level of 
employees with regard to safety are the five constructs that constitute the core of the generic safety 
climate concept. This review also provided evidence of a significant relationship between organisational 
safety climate and injury involvement. 
O'Connor et al. (2011) reviewed studies that examined safety climate within commercial and military 
aviation industry. The authors conducted a computerised search of the literature using PsycINFO, 
Google Scholar, Medline, and Defence Technical Information Centre. Keywords used in the search 
were 'aviation' with 'safety climate' or 'safety culture'. The reference lists of published aviation safety 
climate studies were also examined. From this methodology 23 studies were identified, of these 48% 
were published in peer reviewed journals. The studies included in the review were; Diaz and Cabrera 
(1997), Patankar (2003), Gill and Shergill (2004), Gibbons et al. (2006), Evans et al. (2007), Gordon et 
al. (2007), Kao et al. (2008), CSAS and MCAS. Nine safety climate measures were identified. The 
authors measured construct validity of the questionnaires by examining whether the dimensions 
identified by each are consistent with the wider safety climate literature and whether these dimensions 
converge upon a universal set of safety climate themes that are consistent across all of the 
questionnaires. The dimensions identified were categorised into eight broad safety climate themes and 
these were broadly in line with other reviews of safety. These were: 
• Management/supervision: This dimension was apparent in all of the questionnaires included in 
the review. 
• Safe system: This dimension was apparent in eight of questionnaires included in the review. 
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• Procedures/rule: Procedure and rule compliance was apparent in four of the questionnaires 
included in the review. 
• Risk: Perception of risk was a dimension apparent in three of the questionnaire included in the 
review. 
• Training and Education: This referred to the workforce's perceptions of the general level of 
workers qualifications, skills and knowledge this dimension was apparent in two of the 
questionnaires included in the review. 
The authors identified another three dimensions which were particularly relevant to aviation these were: 
• Communication: Four of the questionnaires included in the review had dimensions concerned 
with communication. As the aviation industry consists of a number of different occupational 
groups that are not co-located, this creates particular challenges to communication as these 
groups are not able to engage in informal and spontaneous interaction. 
• Resources: Three aviation safety climate questionnaires had dimensions characterised as 
resources. This is concerned with the availability of resources for safety; the author 
hypothesises that this may not be an aviation specific issue but may be more a recent 
economic development due to the fact it was included in the three most recently developed 
questionnaires. 
• Operational personnel: This dimension was included in five of the questionnaires and is 
concerned with the commitment of operational personnel to safety. 
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Table 4: An overview of the systematic reviews 
Author(s} N Countries Industries Safety Climate/Culture Dimensions 
and Year 
Flin et a/. 18 UK Energy Management /Supervision (13) 
(2000) Norway Chemical Safety Systems (12) 
USA Transport Risk (12) 
Israel Construction Work Pressure (6) 




Seo et a/. 16 Israel Factories Management Commitment/Supervisor 
(2004) USA Manufacturing Support (11) 
Finland Australia Gas distribution Employee Participation (7) 
Europe Road Work Pressure (5) 
UK Administration Hazard Level (5) 




Oil and Gas 
Nuclear 
O'Connoret 23 Australia Commercial and Military Management/supervision (9) 
a/. (2011) USA Aviation Safe Systems (8) 
Taiwan Operational Personnel (5) 
Spain Procedures/Rules (4) 
Sweden Communication (4) 
Resources (3) 
Risk (3) 
Training and Education (2) 
3.1.4. Summary 
These reviews suggest there is some conceptual ambiguity when it comes to safety climate 
dimensions, however despite the variations, the results reveal some commonalities. Management 
attitudes and behaviours in relation to safety seems to be a key dimension included in at least two 
thirds of the safety climate measures reviewed. Safe systems, risk and work pressures are also 
identified in about a third of the safety climate measures. O'Connor et al. (2011) also identified 
communication as a key dimension in almost half of the questionnaires included in the review. The 
authors suggested that communication is a specific issue in the aviation industry due to different 
occupational groups who work together not being based at the same location which means they are not 
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able to engage in informal spontaneous communication. This may also be a particular issue in the 
construction industry which the sponsor organisation operates in, as many employees are based out on 
remote sites away from the main office functions. The next section will describe the meta-analysis 
included in the review. Meta-analyses can allow a more objective appraisal of the evidence than 
traditional systematic reviews. 
3.1.5. Results- Meta-analysis 
There were five meta-analytic studies identified through the review processes. Three of the meta-
analytic studies sought to understand the predictive validity of safety climate and safety outcomes 
(Clarke, 2006; Christian et aI., 2009; 8eus et aI., 2010). A further two, and examined safety climate in 
the wider organisational context; in relation to the Job Demand Resource (JD-R) model (Nahrgang et 
aI., 2010) and psychological climate and work attitudes (Clarke, 2010). An overview of the meta-
analysis studies included in this review can be found in Table 5. 
In the first meta-analysis on safety climate and safety outcomes Clarke (2006) examined the 
relationship between safety climate and safety performance. The author distinguished between 
retrospective designs (accidents or injuries assessed before safety climate assessments) or 
prospective designs (accidents or injuries after safety climate assessments). The author conducted a 
systematic literature search of the PsyclNFO, and other electronic databases using the following search 
terms: 'safety climate', 'safety culture', 'safety attitudes', 'safety perceptions' and 'safety compliance'. 
This systematic search was supplemented by a manual search of articles included in Flin et al. (2000) 
and Guldenmund (2000). The inclusion criteria was that the article must contain both a measure of 
safety climate and a criterion measure in terms of occupational accidents, injuries, safety compliance or 
safety participation, and a measure of occupational injuries or accidents. A total of 35 articles were 
identified. Statistical analysis of the studies found that safety climate shows a small positive correlation 
with occupational accidents and injuries (p=.22), indicating that the more positive the safety climate, the 
lesser the rate of injuries and accidents. Results showed that the relationship between safety climate 
and accident involvement was moderated by the study design. 
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Christian et al. (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of the role of person and situational factors in relation 
to safety performance behaviours and safety outcomes (accidents and injuries) . Christian et al. (2009) 
clarified the concept of safety performance and concluded that the term safety performance can be 
used to refer to two separate concepts; a metric for safety outcomes, such as number of injuries per 
year or a metric of safety related behaviour of individuals (e.g . Neal and Griffin, 2004) . The authors felt 
it was important to distinguish between these two concepts as each might have a different relationship 
with the antecedents and considered safety performance behaviours and safety outcomes to be 
separate. In contrast to safety performance behaviours, safety outcomes are tangible events or results 
such as accidents, injuries or fatalities. The authors suggest that conceptual ising safety performance as 
individual behaviours creates a measurable criterion which is more closely related to psychological 
factors, than safety outcomes (accidents and injuries) . These can be predicated with better accuracy 
than safety outcomes that have a low frequency and skewed distributions. 
Christian et al. (2009) built on Neal and Griffins (2004) conceptual model that the antecedents of safety 
performance are safety climate and personality, this directly affects safety motivation and knowledge, 
that in turn affects safety performance behaviours which relate to safety outcomes such as accidents 
and injuries. They used a modified version of this model to examine the safety literature, see Figure 5. 
They classified antecedents as person related and situation related . More distal person related 
antecedents included; measures of personality and propensity for risk taking . Situational related 
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Figure 5: An integrated model of workplace safety (from Christian et aI. , 2009 p. 1105) 
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The authors conducted a search to identify all peer reviewed published articles about predictors of 
occupational safety performance and outcomes. Included in their definitions of safety outcomes were 
accidents, injuries and fatalities as well as safety performance behaviours. Key words in the literature 
searches included combinations of 'safe(ty) climate'; 'safe(ty) behaviours'; 'safe(ty) performance', 
('workplace', 'organisational', or 'occupational') and ('injuries', 'accidents', or 'fatalities'). A number of 
electronic databases were searched including PsycINFO, Social Science Citation Index, and MEDLINE. 
In addition manual searchers were conducted of major journals relevant to industrial-organisational 
psychology and occupational safety (e.g. Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Journal of Safety Research, Journal of Occupational Health 
Psychology, Accident Analysis and Prevention and Safety Science) to locate articles that did not 
surface in the database searches as well as hand searching the reference sections of the reviewed 
articles to identify additional studies. 
Driving outcomes were excluded as these studies did not differentiate between work related driving with 
personal driving. Ninety studies and 1,744 effect sizes were identified for meta-analysis, 477 of these 
were used in the predictor-criterion analysis. The authors found that criterion variables safety outcomes, 
accidents and injuries were often treated interchangeably with regard to their predictors, so computed 
an overall composite of accidents, injuries and safety performance. This was conceptualised as either 
at an individual level or aggregated (e.g. group of workers). Safety performance was defined as safety 
compliance and safety participation (cf. Neal and Griffin, 2004). 
Results of the meta-analytical relationships are presented in Figure 6. The authors found consistency 
with the theoretical framework proposed by Neal and Griffin (2004) (Figure 5), that is variables that 
were more proximally related were more highly correlated than distal variables. Safety climate was 
positively related to both safety knowledge (p=.24) and safety motivation. Leadership was related to 
safety performance (p=.31) and the authors found that group climate was significantly correlated (p=-
.39) to safety outcomes (accidents and injuries). 
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Figure 6: Maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the hypothesised model. Standardised path 
coefficients p. <.001 (from Christian et al., 2009 p.1123) 
8eus et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of safety climate and injuries. The authors built on the 
classifications included in Clarke's (2006) meta-analysis which distinguished between retrospective 
designs (accidents or injuries assessed before safety climate assessments) or prospective designs 
(accidents or injuries after safety climate assessments) but did not disaggregate psychological and 
organisational climate. The authors hypothesised that previous retrospective studies purporting to 
measure the effect of safety climate on injuries have instead assessed the influence of injuries on 
safety climate i.e. injury ~ ~ safety climate. Their meta-analysis examines the relationship between 
safety climate ~ ~ injury and injury ~ ~ safety climate, whilst still retaining the distinction between 
psychological and organisational climate. The definitions were similar to Christian et al. (2009) where 
psychological safety climate was conceptualised as reflecting individual perceptions of safety policies, 
procedures, and practices in the workplace, whereas organisational safety climate was seen as the 
collective perceptions regarding the same. The authors hypothesised that safety climate informs 
behaviour outcome expectancies, a supportive safety climate in which safe behaviour is reinforced, is 
associated with fewer injuries, whereas an unsupported climate in which safe behaviours are not 
reinforced is associated with more frequent injuries. 
The authors conducted an on-line literature search of PsyclNFO, PubMed and dissertation databases 
using the key words 'safety climate' and 'injury', 'injuries', 'accident' or 'accidents'. In order to locate 
unpublished studies an additional search of Society for Industrial and Organisational Psychology, 
Academy of Management, and Human Factors and Ergonomics Society conference programmes from 
2003 to 2009 was conducted. Additionally, requests for published and unpublished safety climate 
studies were posted on three listservs. Further researchers in the field of safety climate and injuries 
were contacted directly seek unpublished studies. Studies were eligible for inclusion if they reported the 
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relationship between a measure of safety climate and a measure of workplace injuries and included an 
appropriate effect size. The meta-analysis was conducted using Hunter and Schmidt's (1982) meta-
analytic approach. The authors examined a) organisational safety climate -+ injury b) injury-+ 
organisational safety climate; and c) injury -+ psychological safety climate meta-analytically and 
proposed moderators hierarchically. Results revealed that the predictive effects of injuries on 
organisational safety climate (p=-.29) was stronger than that for psychological climate effect on 
predicting injuries (p=-.24) Further the injury -+ safety climate relationship was stronger for 
organisational climate (p=-.16) than psychological safety climate. The length of time over which injuries 
were assessed was found to be a Significant moderator of the organisational safety climate -+ injury 
relationship, with long time frames yielding weaker relationships. 
Supplemental analysis revealed that perceived management commitment to safety is the safety climate 
dimension with the most robust association with future injuries (p=.30). Injury operationalization was not 
found to be a moderator for any of the safety climate injury relationships. Their findings suggest that 
injuries have a greater predictive effect on safety climate than safety climate has on injuries but the 
magnitude of this difference is very small. Safety climate's effect on workplace injury does not appear to 
be substantively different from the effect of injuries on safety climate. Although safety climate is most 
frequently hypothesised to affect injuries, these results suggest that injuries have a very similar and 
even slightly stronger effect on organisational safety climate. 
Nahrgang, Morgeson and Hofmann (2010) examined the relationship between job demands, resources 
and burnout, engagement, and safety outcomes in the workplace based on the theoretical concept of 
the Job Demand-Resource model (JD-R) model (Bakker and Demerouti, 2007), The authors utilised the 
JD-R model to organise the various working conditions relevant for workplace safety and then 
explained the mechanisms through which job demands and resources relate to safety outcomes. Their 
theoretical model is illustrated in Figure 7. This meta-analysis builds on the meta-analysis of Clarke 
(2006) and Christian et al. (2009) by utilising the JD-R model to connect various job demands and 
resources to their potential impact on safety outcomes and to conceptualise how the health impairment 
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Figure 7: Job Demand-Job Resource Models of Workplace Safety (from Nahrgang et aI. , 2010 p. 2). 
The authors conducted searches of online databases PsyclNFO (1887 to 2009), lSI Web of Science 
(1970 to 2009), and Medline (1950 to 2009) to identify articles, search terms included 'workplace 
safety', 'safe behaviour', 'safe behaviour', 'safety performance', 'safety climate', and 'safety culture'. 
This resulted in 2,134 articles. The electronic search was supplemented with a manual search of 
reference lists of key empirical and theoretical articles on safety, conference programmes, and personal 
communication with safety researchers. Abstracts and articles were examined (960 studies) for 
appropriate content. If the study had sufficient information (e.g. effect sizes, description of variables, 
and description of sample) to code, it was included in the meta-analysis. The final set resulted in 179 
studies, with 20 articles reporting more than one independent sample for a total of 203 independent 
samples (n= 186,440). The samples were considered independent if participants in one sample were 
not participants in the other sample. The authors coding in relation to the JD-R model is as follows: 
• Job demands were coded as; risks and hazards (perceived risk, level of risk, number of 
hazards, and perceptions of safety and perceptions of safety was reverse coded); physical 
demands (physical demands, workload , and work pressure or high work pace) and complexity 
(cognitive demands, task complexity, and ambiguity) . 
• Job resources were coded as; knowledge (employee understanding of safety, policies, rules 
and procedures, as well as safety training); social support ( involvement and support from co-
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workers, teamwork, and co-worker support for safety); leadership ( styles of leadership, 
relationships between leaders and workers, trust, and supervisor support for safety, variables 
were coded so that the construct represents positive leadership); safety climate (the overall 
perceptions of the safety climate, the perceptions of management's involvement in safety, and 
proactive management of safety). 
• Burnout included worker anxiety, health, and depression, and work-related stress. 
• Engagement was coded as; engagement (worker participation in safety as well as safety 
communication and information sharing with workers), compliance (compliance with safety and 
preventative measures such as personal protection equipment and housekeeping), and 
satisfaction Gob and organisational satisfaction and organisational commitment). 
• Safety outcomes were coded as; accidents and injuries (accident and injury rates and injury 
severity), adverse events (near misses, safety events, and errors), unsafe behaviour (unsafe 
behaviours, absence of safety citizenship behaviours, and negative health and safety). Safety 
outcomes were coded such that a higher score on the variable represents increased frequency 
of occurrence. 
• Industries were based on the sample deSCription, the four primary industries represented were; 
construction, health care, manufacturing/processing, and transportation. 
The authors findings displayed in Figure 8 are consistent with the JO-R model job demands such as 
risks and hazards and complexity impair employees' health and lead to burnout. Job resources such as 
knowledge, autonomy, and a supportive environment motivate employees toward higher engagement. 
Job demands were found to hinder an employee's progress toward engagement, whereas job 
resources were found to mitigate burnout. The authors found that burnout was detrimental to working 
safely but that engagement motivated employees toward working safely. Tests of mediation suggest 
that the health impairment process and the motivational process proposed by the JO-R model are both 
mechanisms through which job demands and resources influence safety outcomes. The authors found 
that across industries, risks and hazards were the most consistent job demand in terms of explaining 
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variance in burnout, engagement, and safety outcomes. A supportive environment, whether from social 
support, leadership, or safety climate, was also consistent in explaining variance across these safety 
outcomes. 
-. 1 • 
Figure 8: Hypothesised path model. Values represent standardised coefficients. *p<.05 **p<.01 (from 
Nahrgang et al., 2010 p.13) 
In the final study identified in the review, Clarke (2010) conducted a meta-analysis to test an integrative 
model linking safety climate to psychological climate, work attitudes and safety outcomes. The study 
combined a meta-analysis to estimate a matrix of true score correlations, and structural equation 
modelling. 
The author conducted an online systematic search of the PsyclNFO database with the key search 
terms 'safety climate' , 'safety culture', 'safety attitudes', 'safety perceptions'; or 'accidents', 'injuries', 
'safety behaviour', 'safety compliance', 'safety participation' to identify relevant studies. Safety climate 
was defined as any measure which reflected employees' perceptions that safety was valued as a high 
priority within an organisation, this included studies which did not explicitly use the term safety climate. 
In addition, articles in press were sought via the websites of relevant journals including; Safety Science; 
Journal of Safety Research; Accident Analysis and Prevention; Journal of Applied Psychology; Journal 
of Occupational and Organisational Psychology; Journal of Organisational Behaviour; and the Journal 
of Occupational Health Psychology. A total of 55 relevant studies were identified, 51 met the inclusion 
criteria (data must be measured at the individual level). These studies examined relationships between 
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psychological climate, safety climate, organisational commitment, job satisfaction, general well-being, 
safety behaviour, and occupational accidents. 
The author conducted a further online systematic search of the published literature to identify studies 
within the literature on psychological climate. Criteria for inclusion were that the study must include; 
either two or more dimensions of psychological climate (Le. role, job, leader, work group, or 
organisation), or at least one dimension of psychological climate and at least one of organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, or psychological well-being. In addition, all variables had to be measured 
at an individual level. The search was restricted to 2000 to 2005 as prior to this two large reviews were 
conducted in this area (Carr et aI., 2003; Parker et aI., 2003) and results of these were included. This 
resulted in 62 relevant studies. Overall a total of 113 studies and 120 independent samples were 
identified to be included in the meta-analysis. 
Clarke (2010) used James and Jones (1979) taxonomy dimensions of psychological climate to code the 
studies. This resulted in five categories: job (e.g. autonomy, challenge and variety; job importance); role 
(e.g. role ambiguity; role overload; role conflict; subunit conflict; lack of organisational identification); 
group (e.g. work group cooperation; reputation for effectiveness, work group friendliness and warmth; 
esprit de corps); leader (e.g. leader trust and support; leader interaction facilitation; leader goal 
facilitation; psychological influence; hierarchical influence); and organisation (e.g. management 
awareness; innovation; openness of information). Measures of psychological well-being included: 
general health questionnaire scores (GHQ-12), sleep complaints, physical complaints, stress 
symptoms, psychological symptoms, burnout and tiredness. 
Although safety behaviour is often measured along two dimensions (Neal and Griffin, 2000) in this 
study the author combined safety compliance and safety participation into one category of safety 
behaviour. The accidents category included all measures of occupational injuries and accidents and 
their immediate antecedents: unsafe behaviours, violations, near-misses, and incidents. 
The author used the procedure by Hunter and Schmidt (1990) to conduct the meta-analysis and 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was conducted using the AMOS 6.0 programme (Arbuckle, 2005), 
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the model is illustrated in Figure 9. The author found that safety climate had a significant association 
with psychological climate (particularly perceptions of organisational attributes) , organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, and general wellbeing. A partial mediation model was supported which 
demonstrated the relationship between safety climate and safety behaviour was partially mediated by 
work related attitudes (organisational commitment and job satisfaction) and the relationship between 
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Figure 9: Model linking psychological climate, safety climate, work attitudes, and individual safety 
outcomes (from Clarke, 2010, p. 555) . 
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Table 5: An overview of the meta-analysis included in the review 
Author(s) Meta-analysis N Country Industry Outcomes 
and Year 
Clarke Meta-analysis of the 35 UK Manufacturing Organisational safety climate is 
(2006) relationships Israel Construction related to employee safety 
between safety China Aviation compliance and strongly related to 
climate, safety Australia Chemical safety participation. Safety climate 
performance and USA Energy demonstrates weak link to accident 
occupational Turkey Oil and Gas involvement. The relationship 
accidents and between safety climate and accident 
injuries. involvement is moderated by the 
study desion. 
Christian Meta-analysis of the 90 UK Food Services Safety knowledge and safety 
et al. roles of person and Australia Manufacturing motivation are strongly related to 
(2009) situation factors that Israel Steel Mills safety performance behaviours. 
affect workplace USA Hazardous 
safety. Norway Waste Psychological safety climate and 
Finland Healthcare group safety climate is related to 
China Power safety performance, compliance and 
Taiwan generation accidents and injuries. Group safety 
Japan Construction climate has the strongest association 










Beus et Meta-analysis to 53 UK Transport Injuries are more predictive of 
al. (2010) examining the Israel Healthcare organisational safety climate than 
safety climate -+ USA Military safety climate is predictive of injuries. 
injury and injury -+ Finland Manufacturing The injury -+ safety climate 
safety climate Demark Chemical relationship is stronger for 
relationship for both Europe Energy organisational safety climate than 
organisational and China safety climate is predictive of injuries. 
psychological Taiwan Management commitment to safety is 
climate. Japan the strongest predictor of 
occupational injuries. 
Nahrgang Meta-analysis of the 203 USA Construction Job demands such as risks and 
et al. relationship Europe Healthcare hazards and complexity significantly 
(2010) between job Demark Manufacturing! impair employee's health and 
demands and Finland Processing positively relate to burnout. Job 
resources and Israel Transportation resources such as knowledge, 
burnout, UK autonomy, and a supportive 
engagement, and Europe environment positively relate to 
safety outcomes in China engagement. Job resources 
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the workplace Japan negatively relate to burnout. Burnout 
based on the JO-R Australia negatively relates to working safety 
model. Taiwan but engagement positively relates to 
Sweden working safely. 
Clarke, Meta-analysis of 113 Construction Psychological climate is significantly 
2010 perceived safety Healthcare associated with safety climate. The 
climate to Manufacturing! relationship between safety climate 
organisational Processing and safety behaviour is partially 
antecedents and Transportation mediated by work-related attitudes 
individual (organisational commitment and job 
outcomes. satisfaction), and the relationship 
between safety climate and 
occupational accidents is partially 
mediated by general health and 
safety behaviour. Safety climate is a 
partial mediator in the relationship 
between psychological climate and 
safety behaviour. 
3.1.6. Summary 
As can be seen from all three systematic reviews of the literature on safety climate and culture, 
management attitudes and commitment are identified in at least two thirds of safety climate measures 
regardless of industry (Flin et aI., 2000; Seo et aI., 2004; O'Connor et aI., 2011). Safety systems, risk 
and work pressure were identified in approximately a third of the safety climate studies reviewed. The 
more recent meta-analysis progressed from looking specifically at the safety climate dimensions to 
identifying the relationship between safety climate and its outcomes such as safety participation, 
compliance and accident involvement (Clarke, 2006), Further authors went on to build on this meta-
analytical approach by defining safety climate as personal, group or organisational (Christian et aI., 
2009; Beus et aI., 2010) defining the safety climate -+ injury, and injury -+ safety climate relationship 
(Beus et aI., 2010). These meta-analyses reveal safety climate offers a strong prediction of objective 
and subjective safety criteria across industries and countries. 
The last two meta-analysis examined the relationship between safety climate and outcomes in a 
broader organisational context and found leadership, engagement and a supportive environment were 
related to working safely (Nahrgang et aI., 2010) where safety behaviour was mediated by 
organisational commitment and job satisfaction (Clarke, 2010). The reviews and meta-analysis identify 
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that leadership and management attitudes are important dimensions of safety climate and safety 
climate is a robust predictor of safety outcomes. These results suggest that the wider organisational 
context, job resources, engagement, organisational commitment and a supportive environment are also 
important influences on safety outcomes. The next section will go on to discuss the antecedents and 
outcomes of safety climate in more depth. 
3.2. Safety Climate Antecedents 
As it can be seen from the systematic reviews and meta-analysis identified in the previous section, 
there are a number of antecedents of safety climate. However there is limited empirical research on the 
antecedents of safety climate with one author noting there is a lack of investigation into the influence of 
organisational and social norms on safety climate and safety outcomes (Clarke, 2010). The next 
section will aim to summarise the literature on safety climate antecedents. This section will identify the 
main research supporting the relationship between safety climate and its proposed antecedents 
commencing with the main research supporting the relationship between leadership and management 
and safety climate, safety behaviours and safety outcomes. The section will go on to describe other 
antecedents of safety climate, perceived organisational support, engagement and organisational 
commitment in the context of the social exchange relationship (Blau, 1964). 
3.2.1. Leadership 
There has been a long-held proposition that 'leaders create climate' throughout the history of safety 
climate research (Lewin et aI" 1939). The concept of leadership as a climate antecedent has been 
constant ever since despite the limited empirical work (Kozlowski and Doherty, 1989; Ostroff et aI., 
2003; Dragoni, 2005).This idea has been reflected in safety climate research. As can be seen from the 
systematic reviews and meta-analysis, leadership and management is a key dimension of safety 
climate (Flin et aI., 2000; Seo et aI., 2004; O'Connor et aI., 2011). Results also suggest that leadership 
acts as an antecedent to safety climate, safety behaviours and outcomes (Christian et aI" 2009; 
Nahrgang et aI" 2010; Clarke, 2010) in particular management commitment to safety which 
demonstrates a strong association with injuries (Beus et al., 2010). 
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Interest in leadership as an antecedent of employees' safety perceptions, attitudes and behaviour has 
increased over recent years (e.g. Barling, Loughlin and Kelloway, 2002; Zohar and Luria, 2004; 
Kelloway, Mullen and Francis, 2006; Conchie and Donald, 2009). There is widespread agreement 
between academics, safety practitioners and regulators that leadership is a key component of a safe 
organisation. The two theoretical models of leadership that have been most researched in relation to 
safety are Transformational Leadership and Leader Member Exchange (LMX). 
3.2. 1. 1. Transformational Leadership 
Transformational leadership as a concept has been researched in relation to both safety culture and 
safety outcomes. Bass (1985) conceptualised leadership style as a continuum ranging from 
transformational to transactional or laissez-faire. Transformational leaders act as role models and 
mentors, inspiring and challenging their subordinates. This style of leadership evokes changes in 
subordinates' value systems to align them with organisational goals. Unlike transformational leaders, 
transactional leaders' influence focuses on motivating subordinates to meet task objective and 
performance standards in exchange for rewards. They are less concerned with inspiring subordinates 
or understanding to their individual needs. Finally the very end of the continuum lies laissez-faire 
leadership which can be defined as an absence of leadership i.e. a complete avoidance of any leader 
responsibilities (Bass, 1985). 
Transformational leadership encompasses the dimension of individualised consideration i.e. a leader 
that shows an interest and concern for subordinates' personal and professional development and 
listens to followers' concerns and needs. Leaders are conceptualised as influencing subordinates 
through two ways; firstly idealised influence, where the leader behaves in admirable and commendable 
ways and instils confidence in the subordinates this in tum them makes the followers identify with them, 
and secondly inspirational motivation, where the leader inspires others towards achieving goals by 
articulating a vision which is appealing and inspiring, provides meaning this generates optimism and 
enthusiasm in others (Bass, 1985).These leader behaviours affect subordinates through the 
psychological mechanisms of personal identification with the leader and social identification with the 
work group (Kark, Shamir and Chen, 2003;). This results in the subordinates adopting the values 
espoused by the leader as their own and aligns their own self-concept with that of the group. 
Transformational leaders also employ intellectual stimulation such as challenging assumptions, taking 
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risks and encouraging subordinates to be creative to influence others. This results in subordinates 
developing cognitive (as opposed to affective) processes to develop new ways of solving problems and 
feel confident and supported in questioning the status quo (Bass, 1985). 
The literature suggests transformational leadership is associated with reduced levels of occupational 
injuries (Barling et aI., 2002), positive perceptions of safety climate (Clarke and Flitcroft, 2008; Mullen 
and Kelloway, 2009), safety citizenship behaviours (Conchie and Donald, 2009), higher levels of 
employee safety participation (Innes et aI., 2010) and safety compliance (Lu and Yang, 2010). These 
findings also suggest transformational leaders influence subordinates both directly and indirectly. 
Indirect effects include enhanced safety knowledge and fostering perceptions of a positive safety 
climate (Barling et aI., 2002; Kellowayet aI., 2006; McFadden et aI., 2009). Similarly, studies on 
transactional leadership have shown that a transactional leadership style is related to reduced accident 
rates, improved safety behaviours and higher perceptions of safety climate (Zohar, 2002a; Zohar and 
Luria, 2003; Luria et aI., 2008). 
The effects of both transformational and transactional leadership styles have been shown to predict 
safety participation and compliance (Clark and Ward, 2006; Lu and Yang, 2010) Zohar, (2002) found 
transformational and transactional leadership were associated with a reduction in injury rates through 
the promotion of a positive safety climate, and the benefits of a transactional leadership style are 
enhanced when safety is perceived to be a priority across different management levels. In contrast 
Laissez-faire, passive leadership has demonstrated negative effects on safety compliance, participation 
(Mullen, Kelloway and Teed, 2011) and higher injury rates (Kelloway et aI., 2006). 
3.2.1.2. Leader Member Exchange 
Social Exchange Theory (Blau, 1964) implies that if one party acts in a way that benefits another party, 
an implicit commitment for future reciprocity is produced (Gouldner, 1960). Zohar (1980, p.10) noted in 
his initial study on safety climate that management commitment to safety 'is a major factor affecting the 
success of safety programmes in industry' and that this commitment can become apparent through 
training programmes, management participation in safety committees and considering safety in job 
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design. Zohar argued that these management actions shape employees perceptions of the safety 
climate of the organisation. These safety related exchanges can be conceptualised from an exchange 
perspective (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996). 
Social exchange theory has been used to explain the relationship that develops between employees 
and their leader, this is known as Leader Member Exchange (LMX) (e.g. Liden, Wayne and Stilwell, 
1993; Settoon, Bennett and Liden, 1996). LMX is acted out through a process of social exchange with 
subordinates. That is subordinates develop a mutual preference and trust in exchange for leaders' 
concern for their safety and well-being. The quality of this relationship influences a number of affective 
and behavioural subordinate outcomes (Glendon et aI., 2006). High quality LMX is characterised by 
trust, mutual respect and support. Research has found that high quality LMX relationships are related 
to organisational outcomes such as higher levels of organisational commitment, job satisfaction and 
enhanced job performance (Graen et al., 1995; cited in Northouse, 2010). 
Hofmann et al. (2003) examined the relationship between LMX and safety climate, safety citizenship 
role definitions (Le. the extent that safety was seen as part of workers job role) and safety citizenship 
behaviours (Le. the frequency with which workers got involved in safety activities, made safety related 
recommendation, took part in safety committees, protected others from safety hazards and initiated 
safety improvement changes). The sample was 94 workers across 25 military teams. Results 
suggested that in high quality LMX relationships, workers were more likely to view safety as part of their 
job role, which in tum resulted in higher levels of employee safety citizenship behaviours. In addition, 
the findings showed that workers were more likely to view safety as part of their job role when the 
supervisor promoted a positive safety climate (Hofmann et aI., 2003). Empirical studies have also found 
that high levels of LMX leads to lower levels of accident involvement, fewer safety-related incidents 
(Hofmann and Margeson, 1999; Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck and Ray, 2006) and higher levels of 
upward safety communication (Kath et aI., 2010). 
3.2.2. Communication and Leadership 
The social exchange relationship has been used as the conceptual foundation for much of the LMX 
research. One aspect of this relationship that has received attention in the literature is how high-quality 
LMX's foster more open and constructive communication, for example Fairhurst (1993); Fairhurst and 
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Chandler (1989) found that high quality LMX's involve more open dialogue around non routine 
problems, strong value congruence, more joint decision making and minimal power distance between 
the leader and subordinate (Fairhurst, Rogers and Sarr, 1987). 
Edmondson (1996) found that positive safety climates resulting from management demonstrating a 
committed and non-punitive approach to safety management, promotes more open communication and 
a free-flowing exchange of information about safety-related issues. However in negative safety 
climates, workers are more wary of raising safety issues for fear of retribution, blame and punishment. 
Edmondson (1996) suggested in negative safety climates when workers are forced to confront safety 
related issues, they will most likely look for the easiest way to placate their supervisors in order to 
escape getting the blame. This style of communication over time results in norms for communication 
that hamper the free flow of information, as the primary aim of the workers will be to protect themselves 
from any repercussions, blame or punishment. This type of communication has been referred to in the 
communications literature as defensive communication (Gibb, 1961; Eadie, 1982; DeSalvo and 
Zurcher, 1984; Mas, Alexander and Turner, 1991). Linked to this is the concept of upward 
communication. Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) define upward communication as the freedom employees 
feel to discuss safety issues with management. Upward safety communication has been linked to 
improved safety commitment as well as decreased injuries (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996; Hofmann and 
Morgeson, 1999). According to previous research there are at least three broad predictors of upward 
safety communication, these are LMX, perceived organisational support, and safety climate (Hofmann 
and Stetzer, 1996; Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999). 
Michael et al. (2006) examine the impact of LMX among supervisors and workers and safety 
communication on injuries safety-related event in a sample of 598 workers from five wood products 
manufacturers. Archival data on OSHA record abies was gathered from company records as this was 
seen as a more objective measure of safety-related events. Results showed that high quality LMX was 
negatively linked to self-report safety-related events but not to OSHA record abies. However safety 
communication was not related to either self-report safety-related events or OSHA recordables. The 
authors suggest that safety communication alone is not sufficient to ensure a low incident rate. 
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Kath et al. (2010) examined the factors that predict upward safety communication in a sample of 548 
Canadian rail workers using a cross-sectional survey to examine the relationship between LMX, 
perceived organisational support (POS) and job safety demands (Le. tension between job demands 
and safety) and upward safety communication. The authors found a positive association between LMX 
and upward safety communication suggesting that employees were more likely to discuss their safety 
concerns when there was a high quality relationship with their supervisors. Results also demonstrated a 
positive association between upward safety communication and perceptions of management safety 
attitudes (Kath et aI., 2010). 
It can be seen from the empirical research that upward, positive communication is important for good 
safety performance (Edmondson, 1996; Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996; Michael et aI., 2006). Research 
has showed that poor communication is a key reason for reduced safety performance (Hofmann and 
Morgeson, 1999). Safety climate dimensions also appear to have a strong association with upward 
communication (Kath et aI., 2010). By encouraging effective safety-related information sharing and 
giving feedback supervisors can develop an effective communication culture in the organisation which 
can influence safety practices and safety performance. 
3.2.3. Summary 
There is consistent evidence that leadership is related to a number of safety related outcomes. 
Transformational leadership research has demonstrated a relationship with occupational injuries, safety 
climate, safety participation and safety compliance (e.g. Barling et aI., 2002; Kelloway et aI., 2006; 
Clarke and Flitcroft, 2008; Innes et aI., 2010; Lu and Yang, 2010). Studies that have focused on LMX 
have shown that the quality of the leader subordinate relationships influences safety performance 
(Michael et aI., 2006). High quality LMX relationships, characterised by openness, trust and respect, 
are associated with higher levels of upward safety communication (Kath et aI., 2010b) and safety 
citizenship behaviours (Hofmann et aI., 2003) and safety outcomes (Hofmann and Margeson, 1999). 
The next section will discuss other antecedents of safety climate and safety outcomes in the context of 
the social exchange perspective. 
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3.2.4. Perceived Organisational Support 
Another aspect of social exchange theory, Perceived Organisational Support (POS), has been linked to 
safety behaviours and outcomes. Eisenberger et al. (1986) defined POS as 'global beliefs concerning 
the extent to which the organisation values employees' contributions and cares about their well-being' 
(p. 501). POS develops due to employees' tendency to give humanlike characteristics to their 
employing organisation (Eisenberger et aI., 1986). POS focuses solely on the employer's side of the 
exchange as perceived by the employees (Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2005). Social goodwill can be 
gained (or lost) by employees through the extent that the behaviour is perceived to meet (or fails to 
meet) informal exchange obligations. When behaviour is perceived as meeting social obligations, the 
exchange process is generative and the cycle continues. 
The concept of social exchanges occurring between an organisation and its member's has been well 
researched. Moorman (1991) and Konovsky and Pugh (1994) found that implied obligations arising 
through social exchanges could be reciprocated through employee citizenship behaviour. Eisenberger 
and colleagues (1986, 1990) suggested that when employees perceive their organisation values and is 
committed to them i.e. high POS, an implied obligation develops for future reciprocity aimed at 
benefiting the organisation. These beneficial actions have been shown to include engaging in 
organisational citizenship behaviours, making suggestions to improve the organisation, and performing 
better (Eisenberger et aI., 1990, Wayne, Shore and Liden, 1997). 
Construct definition and measurement for LMX and POS are fairly well-established (Eisenberger et aI., 
1986; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Wayne et aI., 1997). Past research has explored the link between 
LMX and POS (Wayne, Shore, and Liden, 1997) and found that LMX and POS were distinct but 
strongly correlated. LMX involves a social exchange between employees and managers or supervisor 
and POS involves a social exchange between employees and the organisation as a whole. Rhoades 
and Eisenberger (2002) conducted a meta-analysis which examined the antecedents and 
consequences of POS. Their results indicate that there are three major categories of antecedents that 
help to develop perceived organisational support; (1) fairness treatment and the quality of the 
interpersonal relationship in how resources are distributed among employees; (2) the degree to which 
supervisors care about employee well-being and value employee contributions and (3) the 
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organisational recognition and reward of employee efforts together with the general work conditions in 
the organisation. 
While the positive impact of POS as a desirable organisational outcome has been well researched, 
there is less empirical research examining the relationship between POS and safety climate and safety 
outcomes. Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) examined the effects of POS on safety communication, 
safety commitment and accidents. The study compared the safety perceptions of workers with high 
POS and low POS perspectives with job satisfaction, compliance with safety management policies and 
accident frequency. The authors found reciprocal actions resulting from high POS included raising 
safety concerns or increased upward communication, organisational citizenship behaviour, 
organisational commitment and safer behaviours. However Kath et al. (2010) was unable to replicate 
the finding that POS Significantly predicted upward communication. 
Shannon et al. (1997, p. 15) found that management practices that reflected a 'genuine concern of 
management about their workforce' rather than 'tinkering' with policies and procedures were seen as 
the most effective by employees. Mearns and Hope (2005) found evidence to suggest that employees' 
perceptions of organisational support for their health and well-being led to lower levels of unsafe 
behaviour and increased organisational commitment. Higher levels of POS have been shown to predict 
better safety citizenship behaviour (Mearns and Reader, 2008). Mearns et al. (2010) suggested that 
services which are seen as discretionary by employees such as organisational health investment 
practices that go beyond mandatory requirements can be conceptualised as POS and demonstrated 
this resulted in reciprocal behaviour from employees including increased organisational commitment 
and safety climate. Gyekye and Salminen (2007) in a sample of 320 Ghanaian industrial workers found 
that high POS were related to positive perceptions concerning workplace safety. High POS was also 




While there has been less research in relation to POS and safety and the results are somewhat mixed, 
the exchange relationship suggests that when an organisation shows concern for employee wellbeing 
this can increase the likelihood that workers will be more committed and improve safety climate 
perceptions (Hope and Mearns, 2005; Gyekye and Salminen Mearns et aI., 2010) and this can 
increase workers and participation in safety-related activities, increase upward communication and 
reduce accident frequency (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999). The next section will describe 
organisational commitment in the context of safety outcomes as a social exchange relationship. 
3.2.6. Organisational Commitment 
Organisational commitment can be defined as the employee's involvement and identification with their 
employing organisation (Porter, Steers, Mowday and Boulian, 1974). The authors identified three 
components of organisational commitment; 1) employee belief in and acceptance of the organisation's 
values and goals; 2) the desire to exert extra effort for the organisation and 3) a want to remain with the 
organisation. This definition goes beyond loyalty to the organisation. Commitment is made up of 'an 
active relationship with the organisation such that individuals are willing to give something of 
themselves in order to contribute to the organisation's well being' (Mowday et aI., 1979, p. 226). 
Organisational commitment can be explained through the theory of 'social exchange' (Blau, 1964) and 
the 'norm of reciprocation' (Gouldner, 1960), that workers are likely to reciprocate positive concern and 
regard from the organisation for their wellbeing with commitment to the organisation. 
Organisational commitment, which reflects an individual's emotional attachment and identification with 
the organisation (Meyer, 1997), has been shown to have a significant influence on a range of work 
behaviours, including compliance with procedures (Shore and Wayne, 1994) and organisational 
citizenship behaviours (Organ and Ryan, 1995). A positive safety climate, in which employees perceive 
that safety is prioritised and that managers are committed to safety, is likely to increase employees' 
feelings of commitment to the organisation, and this will in tum affect safety behaviour and outcomes, 
this is described as a 'positive spillover' (Morrow and Crum, 1998, p. 130). There has been little 
research examining the relationship between organisational commitment and safety climate or safety 
behaviours and outcomes. However Mearns et al. (2010) found that a positive safety climate is related 
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to increased organisational commitment and Clarke (2010) in the meta-analysis identified in the 
previous section found that the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes was partially 
mediated by work related attitudes including organisational commitment. 
3.2.7. Employee Engagement 
Employee engagement can be conceptualised in a number of ways. It can be conceptualised as a set 
of resources such as support and recognition from and supervisors and colleagues, opportunities for 
learning and development, performance feedback, and opportunities for use of skills. This approach 
has been particularly popular in industry with organisations using the 'Gallup-12' questionnaire to 
measure employee engagement. Harter, Schmidt and Hayes (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of 
studies using the measure in 36 companies their results showed that high levels of employee 
engagement were positively related to business-unit performance including safety. 
Based on the work of Kahn (1990), Rich, Lepine and Crawford (2010) suggested that when employees 
are engaged in their jobs this results in desirable job performance outcomes. Engagement is 
conceptualised as an organisational members' willingness to 'harness their full selves in active, 
complete work role performances by driving personal energy into physical, cognitive, and emotional 
labours' (Rich et aI., 2010, p. 619). In contrast, disengaged employees 'withhold their physical, 
cognitive, and emotional energies, and this is ref/ected in task activity that is, at best, robotic, passive, 
and detached' (Rich et aI., 2010, p. 619). 
Employee job engagement can be applied to safe job and task completion, and Rich et al. (2010) refer 
to the term 'safety-specific job engagement' for this function. Engaged employees are those who are 
intrinsically motivated to attain excellence in their work. Through emotional, cognitive and behavioural 
engagement, employees are more likely to carry out their work tasks safely. Engaged employees are 
more likely to be involved in the safety aspects of work and are hence more likely to be associated with 
a positive and strong safety culture. In the context of safety, barriers to engagement may be 
characterised as a lack of influence over safe work practices, a lack of commitment shown by 
management during the implementation of safety practices, poor safety knowledge, and a lack of 
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understanding about the risks inherent to the work or distractions that cause employees to lose physical 
and cognitive focus on job tasks (Rich et aI., 2010). 
Employee engagement can also be conceptualised through the JO-R model (Bakker and Oemerouti, 
2007) as a positive organisational outcome i.e. a fulfilling, positive, affective-motivational state of work-
related well-being that is the opposite of job burnout (Maslach, Schaufeli, and Leiter, 2001). A number 
of studies have demonstrated links between employee engagement with organisational outcomes such 
as extra role behaviour (Schaufeli, Taris and Bakker, 2006), intention to leave, organisational 
commitment (Schaufeli and Bakker, 2004). In the meta-analysis highlighted in the previous section 
Nahrgang et al. (2010) found burnout was negatively related to working safely but engagement 
motivated employees and was positively related to working safely. 
3.2.8. Summary 
Researchers have started to link social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) to safety related outcomes 
(Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann, Morgeson and Gerras, 2003; Michael et aI., 2006; Kath et 
al.,2010b). A supportive environment (POS) indicates to the employees that they are valued and that 
the organisation is committed to them (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Meams and Hope, 2005). As a 
result employees will more engaged, committed and motivated to engage in more upward safety 
communication, increase involvement in safety activities and safety compliance, and be more satisfied 
with their work (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999). Organisational commitment and employee 
engagement can be seen as the employee's reciprocal behaviour for high perceived supportive 
relationships with the organisation and/or their leader. Some studies have found support for this, 
positive safety climates demonstrates increased organisational commitment (Mearns et aI., 2010) and 
employee engagement is positively related to safety outcomes (Nahrgang et aI., 2010). The next 
section will describe the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes. 
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3.3. Safety Climate Outcomes 
Researchers have demonstrated that organisational safety climate has a significant relationship with 
safe practice (Zohar, 1980), accidents (Mearns et aI., 1998,2003) and unsafe behaviour (Hofmann and 
Stetzer, 1996; Cabrera and Isla, 1998; Tomas et aI., 1999; Brown et aI., 2000). There is less 
understanding regarding the mechanisms underlying the link between organisational safety climate and 
accidents (Griffin and Neal, 2000; Seo, 2005). The meta-analysis described in the previous section 
have sought to address this relationship and the predictive validity of safety climate and objective and 
subjective safety criteria across industries and countries and found safety climate to be a strong 
predictor of accidents and injuries (Clarke, 2006; Christian et aI., 2009; Nahrgang et ai, 2010; Beus et 
aI., 2010). There are a number of outcome measures used to assess the effects of safety climate on 
safety performance, these include unsafe behaviours (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996), minor injuries or 
'micro accidents' (Zohar, 2000), involvement in safety activities (Cheyne et aI., 1998), near misses 
(Morrow and Crum, 2004), observations of safe behaviour (Cooper and Phillips, 2004; Glendon and 
Litherland, 2001) or safety compliance (Neal et aI., 2000). The next section will provide an overview of 
safety climate outcomes and their limitations. 
3.3.1. Safety Compliance and Safety Participation 
Safety compliance refers to employees adhering to the rules and regulations and conscientiously 
following safety procedures, and taking hazard precautions (such as wearing PPE). Research has 
found violations or lack of safety compliance are common place in the construction industry (Alper and 
Karsh, 2009). Violations are usually not employees deliberately taking risks but taking short cuts which 
make the work quicker, more efficient or more convenient, and these are naturally reinforced i.e. the 
consequences of doing so are immediate and positive (task completed in less time) (Reason et aI., 
1994). Whereas punishment may be delayed, infrequent (injuries are rare and often minor) (Sulzer-
Azaroff, 1978). These behaviours can be reinforced by the immediate positive gains or the priorities the 
organisation and managers place on productivity over safety (Cox, Jones and Rycraft, 2006). 
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Safety participation can be seen as more voluntary than safety compliance which is in part an aspect of 
an employee's role, including behaviours beyond the formal role such as organisational citizenship 
behaviour (Griffin and Neal, 2000), when managers show concern for employees wellbeing and 
demonstrate a commitment to safety, employees are likely to reciprocate with safety related 
organisational citizenship behaviours (Hofmann, Morgeson and Gerras, 2003), as previously identified 
in the literature reviews, management commitment to safety is a key dimension of safety climate, as a 
result safety climate can promote safety participation through employees reciprocation of perceived 
management of safety (Flin et aI., 2000). Griffin and Neal (2000) found that participation motivation and 
safety knowledge were significant predictors of safety partiCipation. Barling and Hutchinson (2000) 
highlighted the benefits of a commitment based approach to safety, including higher productivity and 
lower tumover. This approach uses management practices to create trust and affective commitment 
among workers to ensure safe performance rather than a control based approach to safety, which 
emphasises compliance. Management practices which improve safety commitment and decrease 
occupational injuries (Zacharatos, Barling and Iverson, 2005) have been found to enhance trust in 
management. 
3.3.2. Accident/Injury 
The relationship between safety culture/climate and injury rate is unclear and complex due to 
measurement issues and different studies using different levels of analysis. Self-report measures of 
injuries and accidents are common place in the safety literature (e.g. Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996; 
Tomas, Melia and Oliver, 1999; Bjerkan, 2010; Nielsen, Rasmussen, Glasscock, and Spangenberg 
2008), however other authors use information from organisations internal accident databases (e.g. 
Varonen and Mattila, 2000; Wallace, Popp and Mondore, 2006). 
Clarke (2000) identified several limitations in the consistency of accident and injury measures including; 
comparing two groups of employees (high level and low level injury rates) within one organisation, 
aggregating climate scores across different employee groups or business units; comparing high and 
low injury rated organisations on aggregated climate scores; and differing definitions of injury i.e. injury 
as lower severity and accidents as high severity. In addition different organisations collect and record 
64 
accident and injury rates in different ways and there are different regulatory and legal requirements for 
reporting injuries and accidents across countries. 
Despite these limitations there have been a number of studies and meta-analysis, as identified in the 
review demonstrate a relationship between safety climate and accidents and injuries (Guldenmund, 
2000; Zohar, 2003; Neal and Griffin, 2004; Clarke, 2006a; Christian et aI., 2009; Beus et al.,2010). 
Models that have tried to establish a relationship between safety climate and injury rate/accident rate 
with varying results. Accident rate has been found to be directly predicted by safety climate (Wallace et 
aI., 2006) and the relationship is mediated by safety behaviour and hazards (Tomas et aI., 1999; Oliver, 
Cheyne and Tomas, 2002). Clarke (2006) found that the more positive the safety climate, the lesser the 
rate of injuries and accidents. The further meta-analysis conducted by Christian et al. (2009) 
demonstrated group safety climate offers a strong prediction of accidents and injuries. Beus et al. 
(2010) replicated these finding and demonstrated that safety climate predicted injuries and 
management commitment to safety had the most robust association with injuries. Despite the 
limitations cited above there is a positive effect (direct or indirect) of safety climate on the 
injury/accident rate across industries and countries. 
Whilst there is growing body of evidence to support the safety climate accident injury relationship, 
Thompson et al. (2007) suggests accident rates are not a good measure of an organisation's safety 
performance as accidents are usually rare so the frequency of accidents can be statistically unreliable 
due to the restriction of variance and accidents are not always accurately or consistently recorded. 
There is also evidence to suggest that with regard to organisational data accidents are often under 
reported. Probst and Estrada (2010) found that for every reported accident there were on average 2.48 
unreported accidents. Van der Schaaf and Kanse (2004) in a review of under reporting in all industries 
found from the perspective of workers there are a number of factors that act as barriers, these are in 
order of influence: 
1) Fear of disciplinary action and reprisals, embedded in a culture that seeks to blame individual 
employees for safety incidents 
2) An overall acceptance of risk, a perception that these events are part of the job are not 
preventable coupled with in some industries a macho culture 
3) Lack of feedback safety issues reported 
4) The perception that data collection and management is difficult and time consuming 
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It has been widely accepted that accidents are just the tip of an iceberg. Heinrich (1950) suggested that 
it is estimated that 90.9% of all accidents produced no injuries, while 8.8% resulted in minor injuries and 
0.3% caused major injuries. Similar conclusions were drawn in research by Bird and Germain (1996). 
Thus near miss reporting may be a more accurate reflection of an organisation's safety performance. 
The next section will describe near misses in relation to safety climate. 
3.3.3. Near Miss Reporting 
Near misses are unplanned events that did not result in injury, illness, damage to property but had the 
potential to do so. Only a lucky break in the chain of events prevented a fatality, injury or damage 
occurring. Near misses are usually referred to as the precursors of accidents (Bier and Mosleh, 1990) 
Many organisations use the reporting and management of near misses as one a key indicators of 
safety performance (Bird and Germain, 1996; Jones, Kirchsteiger and Bjerke, 1999). 
As near misses occur much more frequently than accidents, they may indicate important areas for 
improvement in safety management (Van Der Schaaf, 1995; Hinze, 1997, 1999; Reason, 1997). 
Additionally using near misses to inform safety management can help strengthen the safety culture 
(Cooper, 2000; Glendon and Stanton, 2000), especially if workers are motivated to take part in the 
identification, analysis and understanding of those events (Reason, 1997). While there has been limited 
research linking safety climate to near misses, as they occur more frequently, they may represent a 
more accurate reflection of an organisation's safety performance. 
The next chapter will discuss the different approaches to assessing safety culture and climate both 
qualitative and quantitative and the advantages and disadvantages of each. The chapter then outlines 
the methodology and research design of the overall thesis. The methodology is conducted in four 
phases and each phase will be summarised. 
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Chapter 4: Method 
4.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2 workplace safety climate can be conceptualised as facet or 'snapshot' of 
organisational culture (Flin et aI., 2000) and relates to the 'shared perceptions among members of an 
organisation with regard to organisational policies, procedures, and practices' (lohar, 2000, p. 587). As 
shown in chapter 3 reviews of safety climate measures identify management and leadership as a key 
dimension, and further meta-analysis identified a positive safety climate is associated with significantly 
better safety outcomes (Clarke, 2006; Christian et aL, 2009; Beus et aL, 2010) and that safety climate 
and safety outcomes is influenced by wider organisational factors such as engagement, job resources 
and organisational commitment (Clarke, 2010; Nahrgang et aL, 2010). There have been a number of 
different approaches to measuring safety performance in organisations. This chapter will outline these 
approaches and discuss the overall research deSign and methodological approach to the thesis. 
4.1.1. Leading and Lagging Indicators 
In recent years there has been a move away from safety measures solely based on retrospective data 
or 'lagging indicators' such as loss time accidents, incidents, fatalities and compensation costs. These 
traditional approaches measure historical safety events and tend to be reactive or relatively infrequent 
which means the success of safety management is often measured by system failures (Flin et aI., 
2000). These lagging indicators do not appear sensitive enough to provide useful information about the 
safety problems of specific worksites and they do not provide a satisfactory means to evaluate risk 
exposure of employees (Glendon and McKenna, 1995). 
More modern approaches advocate using more proactive measures or 'leading indicators' such as 
measurement of safety climate (Flin et aL, 2000; Mohamed, 2002). These approaches focus on current 
safety activities to establish the success of safety management rather than system failures. Safety 
climate measures; can offer information about safety issues before they develop into accidents and 
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injuries (Lutness, 1987), are a tool for identifying trends in an organisation's safety performance, 
identify areas on which focus safety interventions (Cox and Cheyne, 2000) and provide both internal 
and external benchmarks (Coyle et aI., 1995). When compared to other means of accident prevention, 
such as safety audits, safety climate questionnaires are much less costly and labour intensive (Sea et 
aI., 2004). Approaches to measuring safety climate can be quantitative, such as surveys or 
questionnaire or qualitative such as observations and interviews or a combination of both. The next 
section will describe the different approaches to measuring safety climate. 
4.1.2. Quantitative Approaches 
In safety culture research the safety climate questionnaire has been the predominant measurement 
instrument (Guldenmund, 2000; Collins and Gadd, 2002) these are typically comprised of a series of 
questions that measure employees' beliefs, values, attitudes and perceptions along dimensions of 
safety thought to be important to the development of a safety culture (e.g. management commitment). 
One of the first safety climate questionnaires was developed by Zohar (1980) who developed a 
questionnaire based on seven dimensions that were found to discriminate between high and low 
accident rate companies. 
These questionnaires are usually administered to the whole organisation, a sample or part of it. The 
results of the questionnaire are processed and are either subjected to factor or principal component 
analysis (PCA) or used to assess the organisation safety climate against existing scales already 
established in previous research. Both approaches are found in the safety culture and climate literature. 
This research has resulted in a large number of scales (e.g. Flin et aI., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). 
Furthermore, as in this thesis, researchers using safety climate questionnaires have been interested in 
the correlation between one or more scales and some criterion outcome variable, such as accidents, 
near misses or safety-related behaviour, possibly with reference to different subgroups (Guldenmund, 
2007). 
Solely using a safety climate questionnaire has some benefits and drawbacks. Questionnaires can be 
easily distributed among large groups of people in a relatively short timeframe. However, the possibility 
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to control unwanted influences affecting the responses is limited and for that reason the results could 
include a lot of random 'noise'. Large numbers of responses can cancel the effect of the unwanted 
influences as these are averaged out over the responses, provided that the unwanted influences are 
unsystematic and normally distributed. 
Safety climate questionnaires are also very useful for measuring changes pre and post interventions 
and generating a broad picture of an organisation's safety issues. Their limitations can include; a lack of 
an in-depth understanding or explanation of results, low response rates due to misinterpretation of the 
objectives of the questionnaire or understanding of the questions, fear of reprisals or blame and low 
levels of employee literacy. This is particularly prevalent in the construction industry which the sponsor 
organisation operates in, where communication has been traditionally driven by verbal communication 
(Guldenmund, 2(07). 
4.1.3 Qualitative Approaches 
Qualitative approaches to measuring safety climate can include observations, interviews, group 
discussions and document analysis (Cooper, 2000). Qualitative methodologies can provide rich, in 
depth, detailed information. Questionnaires aimed at determining the safety climate of the organisation 
can provide a generic, generalisable overview of the safety climate perceptions of the organisation's 
employees at that particular point in time, however qualitative approaches aim to understand why that 
climate exists and to identify the specific factors and dimensions of that safety climate (Farrington-
Darby et aI., 2005). There are some limitations of interviews such as a lack of objectivity as perceptions 
are shaped by the individual participants and the researcher who codes and records them. Using 
multiple raters to check inter-rater reliability and checking coded themes with participants are ways of 
increasing validity and objectively. 
Questionnaires can be viewed as objective due to the distance between the researcher and the 
respondents. However this distance can also explain why questionnaire responses rates can 
sometimes low. Through using face to face qualitative methodologies a relationship between the 
researcher and participants develops, which can encourage openness and honesty. Especially if the 
partiCipants believe the researcher is trustworthy, objective and independent from the sponsor 
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organisation. Additionally when there is a need to understand contextual factors in undefined areas 
qualitative methods are superior to quantitative methodologies (Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997). 
4.2. Research Design 
The research design is in general a guideline indicating the research strategy and informing research 
actions. It helps specify what kind of evidence is to be gathered, from where, and in what ways it will be 
interpreted. The section below introduces the epistemological paradigms, and the overall research 
methodology. 
4.2.1. Research Objectives 
The primary aim of this Ph.D. thesis was to understand the variables that affect safety culture and 
safety performance at the sponsor organisation. The research project was carried out in a subsidiary of 
a large PLC where the main function of the business is to maintain the electricity power distribution 
networks for the main electricity suppliers in the UK. The research question for the research was 'what 
are the factors shaping safety culture in the organisation' and 'what are factors shaping safety 
outcomes'? 
4.2.2. Epistemology 
In the literature there are two main approaches to researching safety culture/climate, qualitative and 
quantitative. The quantitative approach is the most popular approach to measuring safety 
culture/climate. This approach can be described as positivist paradigm. Paradigm can be defined as a 
philosophy (rather than a methodology) on how the research is conducted (Kuhn, 1970). This then 
determines what the research questions are and how these should be answered. The positivist 
approach adopts scientific method as a means of knowledge generation. 
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The converse to this is the constructivist (anti-positivist) paradigm. The constructivist approach 
emphasizes that social reality is viewed and interpreted by the individual according to the ideological 
positions they possess. Thus, knowledge is personally experienced rather than acquired from or 
imposed from outside. The constructivist approach suggests that reality is multi-layered and complex 
(Cohen et aI., 2000) and a single phenomenon that has multiple interpretations. This approach 
emphasises that the verification of a phenomenon is adopted when the level of understanding of a 
phenomenon is such that the concern is to probe into the various unexplored dimensions of a 
phenomenon rather than establishing specific relationship among the components, as it happens in the 
case of positivism. 
Particular paradigms with their assumptions about knowledge and reality identify their preferred 
methods of inquiry. The positivist paradigm with methods allowing for quantifiable results dominates the 
field of safety culture research. Qualitative methods are rarely used in safety culture research, often this 
is due to the large amount of time it takes to analyse the results and sometimes access to the 
participants can prove to be difficult. Many within the safety culture area advocate using both the 
positivist paradigm (quantitative approach) and constructivist paradigm (the qualitative approach) as 
these offer valuable insights into different elements of measuring and constructing safety culture (Cox 
and Cheyne, 2000; Cooper, 2000). Gilner and Morgan (2000) suggest the choice of methods should be 
based on the purpose of the research. Lack of methodological triangulation probably stems from the 
general fact that most organisational researchers have been trained in either quantitative or qualitative 
methods (Martin, 2002) The following section will discuss a triangulated methodology and how it will be 
applied in this thesis. 
4.2.3. Triangulation Methodologies 
Using the general principles of Bandura's model of Reciprocal Determinism (Bandura, 1977) Cooper 
(2002) argued that the relationships between internal and external factors of safety climate should be 
considered dynamic and responding to changes in the three core elements; situation, behaviour and 
the individual. Cooper (2000) suggested these relationships should allow for triangulation and thus a 
multi-faceted view of safety culture. Cooper (2000) presented a number of ways in which the reciprocal 
model could be investigated; for behavioural elements - peer observations, self-report and outcome 
safety measures - for the situational elements - an investigation of the safety management system or 
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other management investigation techniques such as ergonomic investigation and workflow systems -
and for the psychological elements - safety questionnaires, surveys and analysis. 
Triangulation is a research approach that recommends using two or three different methodologies and 
study designs in order to double or triple check results and avoids the methodological limitations of 
using a single approach (Jick, 1979). Triangulation usually mixes qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies. Within the safety culture literature there is a consensus that using a multi-
method/triangulated approach should be adopted to establish and measure safety culture (Cooper, 
2000), despite this few studies use this approach. A triangulated method allows for a mUlti-level 
analysis of safety culture by using both qualitative (focus groups, interviews, document analysis and 
observations) and quantitative methodologies (questionnaires, audits, accident, injury and near miss 
data) (Cox and Cheyne, 2000). 
In response to the gaps in the literature Cox and Cheyne (2000) used a triangulated methodology to 
develop the Safety Climate Toolkit at Loughborough University. Part of a jOint industry and Health and 
Safety Executive research project to assess safety culture in offshore environments. The Safety 
Climate Questionnaire included in the Safety Climate Toolkit was developed using a multi-method 
triangulated approach. The stages were: 
1. A series of focus group discussions (n=40) were conducted with both offshore and onshore 
personnel exploring employees' understanding and perception of 'safety culture'. These 40 discussion 
groups involved 375 employees in groups ranging between 3 and 12 individuals. The shared 
understandings underpinning constructs together with a review of the literature on safety culture 
assessment informed the development of safety climate questionnaire. 
2. Cox and Cheyne (2000) also reviewed the safety attitude questionnaire surveys that had been 
carried out in the organisations participating in the research project (e.g. Alexander et al., 1994; 
Fitzpatrick, 1996) and the common items and themes from the three survey instruments were identified. 
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3: Other safety attitude measures were reviewed; in the offshore industry (Lee, 1995; Donald, 1995), 
other industries (e.g. lohar, 1980; Brown and Holmes, 1986; Cox, 1988; Dedobbeleer and Beland, 
1991; Cox and Cox, 1991; Cooper and Philips, 1994; Cheyne and Cox, 1994; Cox et aI., 1998; Mearns 
et al., 1998) and the HSE attitudinal indicator of safety climate (Byrom and Corbridge, 1997). 
A pilot Questionnaire was developed with 47 items covering Management Commitment, 
Communication, Priority of Safety, Safety Rules and Procedures, Supportive Environment, Involvement, 
Personal Priorities and Need for Safety, Personal Appreciation of Risk and Work Environment. The 
Questionnaire was piloted in two offshore locations. Sixty completed Questionnaires were returned, 
comments and feedback was addressed. This resulted in a 43-item Questionnaire which was tested on 
a larger pilot population. The Questionnaire was distributed to 350 employees on three offshore 
installations. Two hundred and twenty one Questionnaires were returned giving a 63% response rate. 
The data was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis. A nine factor model was tested but indicated a 
relatively poor fit for the data (CFI=0.78) so then the six constraints identified in the model modification 
statistics were released. This involved six of the items being associated with different factors. This 
improved the model fit (CFI=0.85). Each item was significant at the 0.05 level. The authors note that 
items with relatively low factor loadings may not be entirely indicative of the factor, but such items could 
be usefully consulted individually and in any summing up of factor scores these loading could be used 
to weight individual items. 
The authors examined two forms of reliability these were internal-scale reliability and alternate-forms 
reliability. Internal reliability for each of the factors reported was in the range of a = 0.53 through to a = 
0.84, the lower ones being consistent with the low loading factors. Alternate-forms of reliability involved 
comparing two different versions of the same measure, (Dane, 1990) where 30 subjects completed the 
Questionnaire and after a gap of at least 18 hours were asked 17 randomly chosen of Questions in an 
interview format. All items were Significant apart from three, this indicated good overall reliability. 
Given that a multi-method approach is advocated in the safety literature (Cooper, 2000) and the choice 
of methodology should suit the purpose of the research (Gliner and Morgan, 2002), it can be argued 
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that a triangulated/multi-method methodology is likely to generate rich insights into the factors or 
variables affecting safety culture and safety performance and as such would be the preferred approach 
as opposed to a purely qualitative or quantitative approach. For that reason it was decided to develop a 
triangulated approach in this thesis and combine different methods, including a safety climate 
questionnaire, interviews and focus groups. 
4.2.4. The Uniqueness of the Ph.D. Research 
In contrast to the preferred psychometric approaches that dominate safety culture research this thesis 
uses an embedded approach. The researcher had access to all employees and spent a large 
proportion of the time in the sponsor organisation, working from the training department. The 
researcher took part in safety meetings, all site based employee training programmes and undertook 
site visits. The following chapter (Chapter 5) discusses this in more detail. This degree of 
embedded ness offered a unique level of exposure to the organisational complexities that characterise 
the overall organisational culture and safety culture of the sponsor organisation. 
The researcher was able to access all the employees in the different locations across the business and 
this allowed for the application of the mixed methods. The researcher spent much time on site with the 
frontline employees and taking part in their annual training both classroom and site based (Walker, 
2010). This provided an opportunity for informal conversations, individual interviews and focus groups 
with font line employees and management, followed by the administration of a safety climate 
questionnaire (Cox and Cheyne, 2000). This embedded perspective is based on the premise that safety 
culture and climate assessments benefit from being bespoke and rooted in contextualised inSights. 
4.3. Stages of Methodological Approach 
This section will provide an overview of the methodological approach undertaken in order to achieve 
the research objectives. This was carried out in four main stages: Literature Review, Familiarisation and 
Focus Groups, Interviews and Safety Climate Questionnaire. 
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Phase 1: Literature Review (Chapter 3): A review of previous systematic reviews and meta-analysis 
to identify the main dimensions of safety climate, safety climate antecedents and outcomes. 
Phase 2: Familiarisation and Focus Groups (Chapter 5): Familiarisation was twofold, first to 
familiarise the researcher with the sponsor organisation and its employees, second for the organisation 
and its employees to familiarise themselves with the researcher and the research project. This was 
achieved by firstly the researcher attending; safety meetings, job related training and site visits to gain 
an in-depth understanding of the job roles, and the safety challenges faced by the organisation and its 
employees and secondly through devising and implementing an ongoing communication and marketing 
campaign to raise awareness and understanding of the research project and to encourage participation. 
Then a number of focus groups (n=7) were conducted with a cross section of front line workers (n=49) 
to: 
• Identify individuals perceptions and attitudes towards safety 
• Identify factors that shape safety in the organisation 
• Identify areas to be explored further in the 1:1 interviews 
Phase 3: Interview (Chapter 6): Semi structured interviews were conducted with a cross section of 
employees (n=27). Participants were selected using a purposeful sampling strategy, to select those 
who have a direct involvement in safety. The sample included front line operational site based staff, line 
managers, middle managers and senior managers. Interview questions were developed from the 
results of the focus groups in consultation with safety regulatory and academic experts in the field 
(n=3). The questions were divided into six main sections:-
1. Safety Leadership 
2. Prioritisation of Health and Safety over Production 
3. Engagement & Involvement 
4. Two-way Communication 
5. Organisational Learning 
6. Attitude to Blame 
Phase 4: Safety Climate Questionnaire (Chapter n: The constructs identified in the initial focus 
groups and interviews informed the development of a tailored safety climate questionnaire specific to 
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the sponsor organisation. The resulting questionnaire was an assemblage of existing validated 
measures of the constructs identified as influencing safety performance, these measures included: 
• Safety Climate Toolkit (Cox and Cheyne, 2000) 
• Upward Communication (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999) 
• Employee Engagement (Harter et al., 2(02) 
• Leader Member Exchange (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995) 
• Perceived Organisational Support (Eisenberger et al., 1986) 
• Organisational Commitment (Allen and Meyer, 1990) 
4.5. Questionnaire Administration 
There has been a considerable amount of research into the potential advantages or disadvantages of 
internet based versus paper based questionnaires (Cook et aI., 2000; Solomon et aI., Sax et a!., 2003). 
The advantage of internet questionnaires includes quicker turn-a-round time, reduced expense, and 
easier data management than traditional paper-and-pencil questionnaires (Jones and Pitt, 1999). 
Research suggests that internet based data collection response rates may differ from traditional 
methods. Pealer et a!. (2001) found no significant difference in response rates of internet based 
questionnaires when compared to paper based questionnaires. The Internet version generated a 
response rate of 62% compared to 58% for the paper-and-pencil version. Knogsved et al. (2007) in a 
randomised control trial of online versus paper based survey administration found the paper based 
version generated a response rate of 17% before a reminder. After a reminder this rose to 73% 
response rate. When an e-mail reminder was sent to the online group response rate rose from 64% to 
76%. Knogsved et al. (2007) conclude that to maximize response rates internet versions can be 
combined with traditional paper based versions and followed up with reminder e-mails to encourage 
completion. 
In order to maximise the response rates in line with Knogsved et a!. (2007) findings and 
recommendations, two forms of the questionnaire were developed, a paper-based version and an 
online version. Half the employees in the sponsor organisation (n=201) were based on site. Often there 
was only one computer in the site office which only the site foreman or site engineer had access to. Any 
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information sent around bye-mail had to be printed and circulated to the front line workers by the site 
foreman or site engineer. Historically this method had generated very low responses to organisational 
questionnaires. As previously mentioned in Chapter 5 those employees based on site took part in their 
annual training over the winter months as the weather conditions were too hazardous for them to work 
on site. In order to maximise the response and completion rate, the researcher administered the paper 
based questionnaire to the site based employees at the start of the winter training sessions over a four 
week period. The researcher was present during administration to brief and debrief participants and to 
answer any questions regarding completing the questionnaire. 
The online version of the questionnaire was an exact replica of the paper based questionnaire. This 
version was e-mailed to all office based employees (n=207) with details of the purpose of the study and 
a link to the online questionnaire. This was open for a four week period. During this time the office 
based employees were sent two follow up reminder e-mails encouraging them respond. 
Overall the breakdown of the results suggests there are no significant differences in response rates 
between the paper based and online version. One hundred and twenty employees completed the paper 
based questionnaire, a 58% response rate. One hundred and thirty five completed the online version, a 
65% response rate with no overlap. 
4.6. Ethical Considerations 
The qualitative (focus groups and interviews) and quantitative (questionnaire) studies were was 
conducted, designed and administered in line with the British Psychological Society's (BPS, 2004) 
guidelines. All interviewees gave their written consent to taking part in the interviews and focus groups. 
The voluntary participation, confidentiality of the data and the right to withdraw was highlighted through 
a standardised informed consent document that all partiCipants were asked to read and sign prior to 
commencing the interview. The researcher also read through standardised informed consent 
instructions at the beginning of the interview (see Appendix 3). 
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The questionnaire was approved by the Institute of Work Health and Organisations Ethics Committee of 
the University of Nottingham and approved by the sponsor organisation's senior management. Both 
versions of the questionnaire included a brief outlining the purpose of the study, anonymity of the 
information, and the right to withdraw. Informed consent was gained by participants completing 
following questions at the beginning of the questionnaire. 
1. In order to participate you will need to give your informed consent. By ticking the boxes you are 
indicating that you understand the nature of the survey and that you agree to participate in the 
research. Please tick the following points if you agree to take part. 
r I understand that all information I provide will remain anonymous and kept in accordance with the 
Data Protection act (1998) 
r I understand that I have been provided with an explanation of the survey in which I am 
participating in and have been given the name and telephone number of an individual to contact if I 
have questions about the research 
r I understand that participation in the survey is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any time 
On the online version participants could not move onto the next section of the questionnaire if all boxes 
were not checked. 
4.7. Summary 
Safety climate research typically uses quantitative approaches such as questionnaires and surveys to 
measure safety climate. The first safety climate scale was developed by Zohar in 1980 since then a 
number of different safety climate measures have been developed (see Flin et aI., 2000; Guldenmund, 
2000). Qualitative approaches include observations, interviews group discussions and document 
analysis (Cooper, 2000). There are advantages and limitations to both these approaches. An 
alternative to either a quantitative or qualitative approach is to adopt a triangulated approach using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Cooper, 2000). This approach was adopted in this thesis. Using 
this combined approach should circumvent the methodological limitations of using a single 
methodology. The results of qualitative (Chapters 5 and 6) and quantitative studies (Chapter 7) are 
discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5: Familiarisation and Focus Groups 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 outlined the overall methodology of the thesis and described the benefits and limitations of 
the different approaches to measure safety culture and climate and the rational for adopting a 
triangulated approach. The sponsor organisation operates in the high hazard construction sector. The 
primary aim of the thesis was to understand the organisational factors that shape safety culture and 
safety performance in the sponsor organisation. Given that the construction industry is complex and 
dynamic and there was a desire to understand the contextual factors influencing safety culture and 
safety performance, thus a qualitative methodology was adopted for the first study. The first study 
corresponds to the second phase of the research and is detailed in this chapter. This chapter starts by 
outlining the initial period of familiarisation undertaken by the researcher and then details exploratory 
focus groups conducted with frontline workers. This chapter goes on to present the thematic analysis of 
the focus groups and concludes by linking this to the previous research on safety climate and culture 
identified in the previous chapters (Chapter 2 and 3). 
5.1.1. Study Aim 
To understand in depth the contextual and organisational factors that shape safety culture, and safety 
performance in the sponsor organisation. 
5.1.2. Study Objectives 
• Familiarisation with the sponsor organisation, its employees, their job roles and the safety 
challenges. 
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• Use a grounded qualitative methodology to understand the central factors that shape safety 
performance in the sponsor organisation. 
• Identify the main themes which influence safety culture and safety performance. 
5.2. Familiarisation Process 
It was important for the researcher to familiarise herself with the range of activities undertaken by the 
sponsor organisation relevant to the research. This was done by familiarisation with the different types 
of documentation, including safety policies and procedures and reviewing incident reports and safety 
statistics. The researcher, given their limited knowledge of the industry which the sponsor organisation 
operates in, felt it was important to understand the organisation, its practices and employee roles as 
much as possible before carrying out the research. This is in line with the view of Dawson (1997) who 
advocates researchers 'get their hands dirty' by experiencing and engaging in the practices of the 
organisation and drawing close to the subject of their research. This active approach (Patton, 1990) 
included participating in safety meetings, observations of the roles being carried out on site and 
attending the winter training with site based staff. The following section will describe these in more 
detail. These stages were conducted simultaneously and were complementary to each other. 
5.2.1. Familiarisation with the Safety Documentation 
The written documentation of the sponsor organisation contained a wide range of information that 
guided safety management and employees in their daily tasks and set a framework for decision making 
when dealing with safety issues. The organisation had over the previous two years dedicated a 
considerable amount of time updating and reviSing their safety policies and procedures. Legally the 
organisation had an obligation to keep and maintain certain documents. These included: 
A Health and Safety Policy: This is essentially a plan detailing how the sponsor organisation will 
manage health and safety issues. The content is beyond the scope of this thesis but in general it 
contains the following three sections. 
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1. The 'statement of intent', the organisation's commitment to managing Health and Safety 
effectively. 
2. The 'organisation', who in the organisation is responsible for what aspects of safety 
management 
3. The 'arrangements' section containing details of what will be done in practice to achieve the 
aims set out in the statement of intent. 
This policy is a requirement of UK legislation (Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974). 
5.2.2. Accident Database 
A computer based accident reporting system had recently been installed in the sponsor organisation. 
This included reporting of all accidents, injuries, incidents and near misses as well as recording data on 
RIDDOR's (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations). The organisation 
also had a small call centre which was responsible for, amongst other things, taking calls from 
employees on site who raised or reported safety concerns; these were put on the system to be 
actioned. 
There were a number of ways the accident reporting database could be updated; usually by the Health 
and Safety team, inputting the details of accident investigations, site inspections and safety audits or by 
those onsite with access to a computer (usually the site foreman), or by the staff in the call centre. 
Data was not recorded anonymously. Those who filled out the online system also record their name 
and the names of those involved in the safety incident. These accidents, incidents and near misses 
were then assigned to someone within the organisation to be resolved or escalated, the severity of the 
case determined who in the organisation was made accountable from the foreman to the Health and 
Safety Director. 
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A report was then compiled of all the accidents/incidents and near misses, their locations and reported 
back to the Board of Directors once a month. The overall accidents statistics show that on the whole 
the rate of accidents was declining year on year. The researcher also familiarised herself with a number 
of accident reports. These were compiled by a member of the health and safety team in response to an 
accident or incident. Those involved were interviewed by the Health and Safety team and a report was 
created attempting to identify the root cause and any possible solutions. 
5.2.3. Attending Safety Meetings 
The accident, incident and near misses reports generated by the computer based accident database 
and were discussed at the monthly safety meetings. These were attended by both representatives from 
management and site. The researcher attended several of these with the purpose of understanding the 
nature of the accidents, incidents and near misses in more depth. The meetings also served as an 
opportunity to promote the research project to key stakeholders within the sponsor organisation. This 
allowed the researcher to become a familiar figure and through this alleviate any concerns people in the 
organisation may have had about the research project. It was important for the researcher to be seen 
as independent from the management of the organisation in order to gain 'buy in' to the research 
project. 
Additional to the safety meetings there were biweekly TOFFS (Timeout for Safety) meetings. These 
were less formal than the safety meetings. Topics discussed were generated from the frontline staff. 
During these sessions information about the accidents and incidents that occurred in the sponsor 
organisation and in the wider industry were disseminated. The researcher attended a number of these 
TOFFS meetings with the aim of familiarising herself with the employees of the wider organisation and 
to additionally gain common acceptance of the research project. 
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5.2.4. Site Visits 
Over half the employees in the organisation were based on sites across the UK. It was important for the 
research to understand the nature and work tasks of each of the different roles onsite. This was 
achieved by visiting a number of sites throughout the UK. Due to the high hazard nature of most of the 
site based roles that included working at height and working with high voltage electricity it was not 
possible for the researcher to directly observe these roles but through observation on the ground and 
informal conversations with the site based employees the researcher gained a good understanding of 
their roles and the challenges they faced. 
5.2.5. Attending the Winter Training 
During the winter months all frontline site based employees were put on standby. This was due to the 
adverse weather during the winter months, creating conditions that were too hazardous to work in. This 
allowed the organisation to get all site based employees in over two week periods to conduct the 
annual training. Annual training ensured each linesman was signed off as competent to do the job and 
understood the relevant legal safety requirements they had to adhere to. In order to understand the site 
based employees' roles in more detail and to meet and build a rapport with as many of the site based 
frontline employees as possible the researcher undertook part of the winter training with each 
gang/team. This included both classroom based and site based activities. The majority of classroom 
based training included updates on the legal safety requirements for the role, this included working at 
height, working with high voltage electricity and first aid training. The majority of site based training 
included using the equipment for the role this included; tractor training, winch and pull lift training, pylon 
training and tower rescue. Being with the frontline site based employees over three months undertaking 
this training allowed the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of their roles and build up a good 
rapport with them gaining their trust and commitment to the project. 
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5.2.6. Publicity and Regular updates 
The researcher worked closely with the marketing manager in the sponsor organisation to ensure that 
employees were informed of the scope of the project and frequently updated on its progress. This was 
done through regularly putting articles in the quarterly in-house magazine, which was em ailed to all 
employees with computer access and posted to the home of those site based employees who did not 
have computer access. This ensured the research project and its progress was clearly visible and the 
researcher was seen as a 'familiar face' in the organisation. 
5.2.7. Summary 
Access to organisations typically takes time, relationships are fragile and are built on mutual trust and 
researchers are reliant on the good will of the 'gatekeepers' or key 'stakeholders'. The familiarisation 
stage was fundamental to enhancing the researchers' knowledge of the sponsor organisation and its 
employees and to build up the trust with the partiCipants and key stakeholders to increased partiCipation 
rates in the safety culture assessment studies. 
5.3. Methodological Issues 
There is a debate over the relevant merits of the individual or group interviews (focus groups) and their 
capacity for eliciting data from participants. Advocates of individual interviews (Fisch hoff, Bostrom, 
Jacobs and Quadrel, 1997; Lynn, 1999) argue that group dynamics may suppress the expression of 
opinions from those individuals who do not feel confident or feel inhibited to express their views in a 
social setting. While supporters of group interviews suggest that these can actually facilitate and 
stimulate disclosures which may otherwise remain unarticulated (Frith, 2002). 
The fact that participants may feel inhibited to discuss personal and intimate details in group interviews 
can be seen as a disadvantage of the method (Fisch hoff et aI., 1997). However there are also a 
number of advantages to the approach these can include; a rapid way of gathering data from a large 
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number of participants (Wilkinson et aI., 2004), the dynamic discussion which takes place in group 
interviews is more akin to a naturalistic conversation such as storytelling, joking, arguing, teasing and 
disagreement (Jarret, 1993) this many also evoke vernacular responses (Bers, 1987) and the group 
interactions allows respondents to react and build upon the responses of the other group members 
creating a 'synergistic effect' (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). This may lead to more elaborate 
insights about the phenomenon under study. This effect is supported with the emotional involvement of 
participants which is less common than in one to one interviews (Gillham, 2005). 
While there are many benefits of group interviews, it is important to try and mitigate the potential 
disadvantage of participants feeling inhibited to disclose personal or intimate details. In order to try and 
minimise this doing the focus groups were homogenous (Morgan, 1997). This was thought to be 
particularly important for conducting focus groups with the frontline site based staff. It is well 
documented in the safety culture literature that leadership and management practices have an effect on 
safety culture and safety performance (Flin et aI., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Cheyne et aI., 2002; 
Zohar, 2003; Flin and Yule, 2004). Including management in these groups could have discouraged 
open and honest discussions around the factors that affect safety in the organisation. In this particular 
organisation these groups were used to working and living on site in groups. These individuals felt 
comfortable in each other's presence and in order to encourage participation and facilitate an open and 
honest discussion it was felt that keeping the groups in their gangs/teams where they felt comfortable 
was important. 
In summary there is good evidence that in the right context group elicitation techniques offer a number 
of advantages to the individual interview (Gillham, 2005). Focus groups are widely regarded as an 
effective tool for exploratory purposes that can relatively quickly and easily provide a good 
understanding of the range of views, attitudes and experiences of participants on a given subject. 
Hence focus groups were chosen as the most suitable method for exploring factors that affect safety 
performance with this particular group, site based frontline employees. 
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5.3.1. Sample 
Focus group participants were purposefully not randomly sampled. Purposive sampling techniques 
(Patton, 1990) are primarily used in qualitative studies and can be defined as selecting units (e.g. 
individuals, groups of individuals or institutions) based on specific purposes associated with answering 
the research questions. Sampling in which, 'particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately 
selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other 
choices' (Maxwell, 1997 p.44). As the focus group discussions aimed to explore contextual aspects of 
safety performance and safety culture in the sponsor organisation frontline site based workers, (n=35), 
Charge hands (n=1 0) and Foremen (n=8) were selected to take part as safety was directly inherent in 
their daily working lives and directly relevant to them and their co-workers. A total of seven focus 
groups were conducted with 49 participants in total, all of which were male. 
5.3.2. Procedure 
Focus group interviews were carried out in line with recommendations for good interview practice (BPS, 
2004). All participants were verbally briefed on the purpose of the research project, the anonymity of 
the data gathered and their right to withdraw. A copy of the brief can be found in Appendix 1. Focus 
groups were conducted whilst frontline employees were on standby during the winter training sessions. 
5.3.3. Pilot focus groups 
In the first instance a pilot focus group was conducted to understand the following areas, which 
informed subsequent focus group sessions: 
1. How to invite people to maximise participation rates 
2. Assess the appropriateness of the question 
3. To provide an opportunity for the researcher to familiarise themselves with the focus group 
procedure and protocol 
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Focus groups were unstructured in order to develop an uninhibited free flow conversation and to elicit 
open and honest responses from the participants. The aim of the discussion was to explore the aspects 
important to employees, the only question asked was: 
• What do you think affects safety performance in this organisation? 
Responses were then explored in more depth by the researcher. While consideration was given to the 
use of audio recording the focus groups however the methodological advantages that this might offer 
were outweighed by the need to enhance rapport and trust between the researcher and employees at 
this early stage in the research in order to: 
• Increase participation in the focus groups 
• Encourage a natural flow of conversation 
• Encourage the use of terms and terminology naturally used by the employees 
• Allow participants to lead the conversation and let them talk about the matters which were most 
important to them 
The focus groups lasted between 30 minutes to an hour. A research diary was used to keep records of 
each focus group. Diary entries were made immediately after each focus group in order to minimise the 
risk of losing data. The diary was also used to record non-verbal behaviours and inferences. 
While not audio recording the focus groups verbatim but using reflective field notes in this initial study 
may be open to criticism, this approach reflects the following considerations; given that site based 
employees had already expressed a mistrust of management it was important for the researcher to be 
seen as independent and objective. This approach increased participation in the focus groups and 
developed trust between the researcher and employees which lead to open and honest conversations. 
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5.3.4. Data Analysis 
Thematic analysis was considered the most appropriate method of analysis for this exploratory study. 
The rationale for this was based fundamentally on the constructivist paradigm (discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 4), that this process would generate an appropriate level of detail to meet the primary 
purpose of the study, to develop insights and understanding in regard to the context of safety climate 
and safety performance in the sponsor organisation. Additionally to inform the next stages of the 
research the qualitative interviews (Chapter 6) and the quantitative safety climate questionnaire 
(Chapter 7). 
5.3.4.1. Thematic Process 
The analysis of the research diary followed 5 steps as recommended by (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
1. Familiarisation with the data - Familiarisation with the data started when the research diary was 
completed, where conversations, reflections and insights were noted. In addition diary notes 
were re-read several times. 
2. Generating initial codes - Descriptors/labels (codes) were attached to short, meaningful chunks 
of data (pieces of text, sentences and paragraphs). 
3. Searching for themes - The set of initial codes were reviewed to identify any similarities and 
overlaps. Where an overlap was identified, significant consideration was given to merging 
these as constituent facets of higher order codes or themes. 
4. Reviewing themes - All quotations that shared the same codes were collated. The themes were 
then reviewed for any inconsistencies. 
5. Naming the themes - Groups of similar quotations were defined, named given a short 
description. 
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5.3.4.2. Reliability, Validity and Generalisability 
The codes themes generated were checked by other academics in the field (n=2) to gain consensus on 
inter rater reliability. Additionally the results of the analysis, the themes identified by the researcher 
were presented to a sample of the focus group participants (n=8) to check they agreed with these 
themes identified. Both the academic experts and the sample of employees who took part in the focus 
groups agreed with the main themes identified through the thematic analysis. 
5.4. Results 
The focus groups provided a rich insight into site based employees' commentaries on workplace safety 
and the broader perspectives of working for the sponsor organisation and its safety culture. In many 
instances safety issues were embedded within the broader organisational culture and context. A 
substantial number referred to communication and the actions of management and these themes are 
reflected in the safety culture literature (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Flin et aI., 2000; Mearns et aI., 
2001; Cheyne et aI., 2002; Mohamed, 2003; Beus et aI., 2009; Kath et aI., 2010) (see Chapter 2 and 3). 
The results of the analysis are described below: 
1. Communication 
Poor communication was cited as having an effect on safety, consultation in decision making, planning 
and work life balance. They often felt they were given very little information with a lack of feedback 
opportunities. 
1.2. Opportunities to feedback 
Communication was seen as top down, with lack of opportunities to feed back. While sites had regular 
meetings there was no representative from 'management' there, and they often cited there was little if 
no visibility on site from management, this led to a lack of understanding of site when making decisions 
that affected their working practices and safety. Some participants made reference to a safety stand 
down day, where all members of the organisation from site based employees to senior managers took 
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a day off work to meet up and discuss safety issues. This was well received by all site based 
employees as it allowed them an annual opportunity to speak to the directors in person and air their 
concerns but this hadn't happened for a number of years. It also gave all an opportunity to see what 
the organisation's plans and objectives were for the year, what contracts they had won and what they 
would be working on so allowed them to roughly plan their workload for the year. 
1.3. Lack of Face to Face Communication 
A Lack of visibility of management on site was described as an issue. The organisation has grown 
substantially over the last five years and previously the managers and directors were often out on site 
to have a 'chat' with the gangs. There used to be informal get-togethers such as beers after work with 
site managers/engineers and those working in the gangs. These were seen as friends as well as 
colleagues. These opportunities for face to face communication didn't happen anymore and contributed 
a feeling of an 'us and them' culture between site and office based staff. Many felt they are seen as 
'rough lines men out on site' leading to a general feeling of being unappreciated by the organisation 
and low morale. Additionally this was felt to have implications for working practices and safety, with 
decision makers having a poor understanding of site and the associated roles leading to difficult to 
follow safety policies and practices. 
2. Leadership 
Leadership and communication are not exclusively separate factors but interlinked. There was 
perceived to be a lack of consultation in decision making leading to poor planning of projects, which 
had an effect on safety and their workload, work-hours, work-life balance and travel times. Additionally 
many felt that managers were not approachable and responsive to issues that they had raised and that 
many felt that they weren't treated as equals. 
2.1. Accountability and Responsiveness of Managers 
Those who participated in the focus groups were able recounted times when they had raised safety 
issues and concerns or made recommendations to managers for better ways of working and then they 
'fell on deaf ears' and nothing was done about it. This lead to under reporting of safety concerns as 
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many felt there was no point as nothing would be done about it. Some cited times when they had raised 
safety concerns to managers and they were told management were aware of it but to get on with the 
job anyway. They felt that managers didn't honour their promises and commitments made to those on 
site. 
2.2. Fair Treatment 
Another perception was that other parts of the business which were treated better than them for 
example had better PPE and equipment. One focus group recounted an example of when the 
Managing Director had come to site, no one knew who he was and when he asked 'how's it going' they 
saw it as an opportunity to raise their grievances and issues. Following on from this one of the 
Operations Managers came to site and reprimanded the gang branding them as trouble makers. They 
had subsequently been on standby longer than the other gangs and had been sent to the projects 
furthest away adding to their travel time to site. There was also a reported a low level of trust for 
management. 
2.3. Skills Know/edge and Abilities 
Those who participated in the focus groups felt there was a general lack of skills and understanding of 
those that managed the sites, the site project managers and engineers. Historically as it used to be a 
family ran company people were recruited into positions in the company not through formal procedures 
but rather through who you knew in the organisation. This left a large number of employees with a 
general lack of understanding of site and the associated job roles. This had implications in the planning 
process when tendering for jobs and as a consequence the workload and working hours of the 
linesmen doing the job. Additionally there was a feeling that managers were not on site as often as they 
should be and were not approachable or able to offer good support and advice to those carrying out the 
day to day work on site. 
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3. Job Demands 
The demands of the job were cited by the focus group participants as having an effect on safety 
performance. Often having to work long hours with high workloads, working away from home for a 
number of weeks at a time leaving them fatigued and having poor work life balance. 
3. 1. Working HoursIWorkload 
The long working hours and working week were cited as a source of frustration and having a negative 
effect on safety. The nature of the job meant that the gangs have to work and live on site. To keep the 
accommodation costs down most live in caravans on site. A lot of them had to work long days from 6am 
to 7pm and even though they were meant to go home every other weekend, quite often due to time 
pressures they only got to go home one weekend in three. These long working hours and high 
workloads are often linked to poor planning at the procurement stage of the projects. The clients, large 
utilities suppliers, want more for less and this impacts on the costing and time allocation of projects. For 
most the deciding factors for selecting a contracting organisation are cost and time. In order to work on 
the electricity pylon the live voltage on the overhead lines is turned off, these are known as outages. If 
the utilities company or their contractor goes over this allocated time for an outage then there are high 
financial penalties. Poor planning and the clients wanting more for less have big implications for the 
time pressures and workload for the frontline workers. This in tum has a big implication on their home 
life and work life balance. 
Additionally some of the members of the focus group mentioned that they felt they were working 2417 
as they COUldn't go out and have a drink in the evening or visit other places and do what office workers 
do after work due to random drink and drugs testing and trackers in their work vans. Some said if the 
job was behind schedule they were not even allowed a dinner break. 
3.2. Travel Time to Site 
Travel time to and from sites was cited as an issue with work starting at 6am on a Monday morning. A 
large proportion of the linesmen came from the north of the UK and often had to travel hundreds of 
miles down south to sites and were still expected to be there for 6am. This led to a large number driving 
through the night. The high workload, increased time pressures, long working hours/working week and 
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travel distance to site was perceived as having an impact on safety. These factors negatively impacted 
on employees stress levels leaving many feeling very fatigued. 
4. Employee Engagement & Involvement 
Focus group participants felt they were not consulted on decisions that affected their working lives and 
they had a lack of autonomy to carry out their job as they would like. There was a perceived lack of 
recognition for the work they did leading to poor motivation, job satisfaction and organisational 
commitment. 
4. 1. Consuffation in Decision Making 
Participants mentioned the lack of consultation in decision making, whilst planning and costing up 
projects. Those who were responsible for carrying out the projects, the site foremen were not involved 
in the tendering process. Several were able to cite instances when this had caused problems when 
carrying out the project as the number of men and times allocated to carry out the project were 
underestimated leading to 'firefighting' approach. With many working overtime and long hours to get the 
project finished on time. There were a number of examples given where the organisation had lost 
money on a project through bad planning at the procurement stage when the management had not 
factored things in which would take additional time and resources such as poor site access, or 
miscounting the number of electricity pylons to complete the project. This also had implications for site 
based employees work life balance with large numbers working away from home, living and working on 
site for up to three weeks at a time unable to travel home at the weekend due to work commitments. 
Poor planning was often cited as a concern, this left people unable to organise their lives which 
impacted on their home life as their work schedules and whereabouts was frequently only 
communicated to them the day before. Sometimes this information was wrong with teams then having 
to travel long distances to the correct sites. 
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4.2. Autonomy in Decision Making 
The foremen who were in charge of the linesmen felt they had a lack of autonomy in decision making 
about how to carry out the job, when to promote workers to the next grade or at the end of a job to let 
the workers go home when they had finished a project early. 
4.3. Reward and Recognition 
In general there was a perceived lack of appreciation, reward and recognition for the work they did on 
site by management. Participants felt that management had a poor attitude towards them and they 
were talked down to. Often not being thanked for the work done, with little or no positive feedback, only 
to be criticized and reprimanded when something went wrong, with one participant stating 'we just want 
to be loved'. Pay and length of time on standby was cited as a concern. No-one on site had a pay-rise 
for two years at the time of conducting the focus groups, whilst the organisation's increasing profits 
were widely publicised across the business and to the shareholders. 
5. Safety Prioritisation 
All felt safety was important to them individually and as a team on site due to the high risk nature of 
their job, working at height and working with high voltage electricity. Often there were mixed messages 
in regard to safety versus productivity, the corporate message was safety first but the underlying 
message was getting the job done on time. One focus group gave an example of where finishing the 
project a month and half early was widely publicised and recognised throughout the organisation. The 
perception was that that getting the project finished early was encouraged, when this occurred the 
foreman and his gang were looked upon favourably. Several were able to recount examples of where 
they were encouraged to climb the pylon to complete the job as they were behind schedule in poor 
weather, such as rain and wind, which would make the working conditions less safe. 
6. Culture 
Participants referred to the culture of the organisation as a policing one where there was under 
reporting of accidents, near misses and risks due to a fear of reprisal and blame often able to recount 
94 
examples of where they had been indirectly punished for raising general concerns. This was amplified 
by an 'us and them culture' where there was a lack of understanding of site by office based personnel. 
6.1. Us and Them 
Participants referred to 'us and them' culture between office based and site based staff, where the 
office based staff had little understanding for the jobs they did on site and this had implications for the 
decisions made about how to carry out their roles and the PPE and equipment implemented on site. 
This in tum made some of the PPE and equipment not suitable for the job, made the job more difficult 
and some of the safety procedures difficult to understand and follow. 
6.2. Blame/Fear or Reprisals 
There was a fear of being blamed for raising safety concerns. This led to accidents, incidents, near 
misses and safety concems being under reported. Examples were given where concerns were raised 
and those who raised the concerns were threatened with standby or given the jobs furthest away from 
home as a result. Some felt there should be a better grievance procedure so they could report concerns 
without fear of being blamed. 
5.5. Summary of Main Findings 
This study aimed to identify areas perceived as related to safety culture and safety performance by 
frontline site based employees in the sponsor organisation. In addition the results were used to inform 
development of a more standardised set of interview questions to investigate these factors in-depth 
(See Chapter 6). 
Six themes were identified as affecting safety from the point of view from the frontline employees on 
site. These were; Communication, Leadership, Employee Engagement & Involvement, Safety 
Prioritisation, Job Demands and Culture. The study allowed a preliminary understanding of the complex 
nature of the close relationships between these factors. 
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Over the last two years the sponsor organisation had appointed a new Health and Safety team. They 
had spent a considerable amount of time implementing new health and safety policies, procedures and 
a new on-line accident reporting system (as detailed in the previous section). This had a positive 
influence on the safety performance of the organisation with a reduction in RIDDOR's year on year. The 
results of the focus groups suggest the approach to ensure compliance with the health and safety 
procedures could be characterised as top down with little open dialogue and consultation with site 
based frontline workers. This approach was seen by frontline site based employees as being controlled 
with a policing approach to safety compliance. This had wider consequences for the employees and the 
organisation. It had implications for consultation and involvement in decision making, autonomy on how 
to carry out jobs and reduced organisationalleaming due to accidents, incidents and near misses being 
under reported due to a fear of blame. Some of the safety processes, equipment and PPE were seen 
as inappropriate and difficult to follow, through a lack of understanding of site by management who 
implemented these initiatives, which in tum had a negative effect on safety. 
The attitudes of management was seen as an issue which affected site based employees ability to feed 
back safety concems and general issues. A feeling of being treated unfairly and limited reward and 
recognition by the organisation for their efforts resulted in low engagement and moral amongst site 
based employees. Mixed messages with regard to safety versus production were seen to influence 
safety; many felt the underlying message was production first. The lack of visibility of managers on site, 
and a lack of understanding of site in general led to poor planning of projects, which in tum negatively 
affected employee's work pressures, workloads and work life balance and overall organisational 
efficiency. The lack of managers' onsite also contributed to a feeling of an 'us and them' culture. 
5.5.1. Limitations 
The most obvious limitation of the study was not audio recording and transcribing the focus groups 
verbatim, the benefits associated with not audio recording the group interview out weighted the possible 
limitations, this included being able to build a relationship with the participants to illicit open and honest 
responses, particularly as more formal and rigorous approaches were planned for later stages of the 
research. There were advantages to assuming a very informal approach, particularly in the early stages 
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of a project where salient features are unknown to the researcher (Lynn, 1999). Interview schedules 
can work like a filter and limit responses to the subjects identified by the researcher (most likely from 
the subject literature) to be included in the interview schedule which may limit the opportunity to freely 
to explore the topics important to those working in this organisation. Not structuring the interviews gave 
the researcher the advantage of asking probing questions that could not have been predicted and that 
originated from topics under discussion. 
5.5.2. Links to previous research 
The themes identified through the focus groups in the sponsor organisation are similar to previous 
research with regard to the main variables that have the potential to affect safety culture and safety 
performance. The themes generated from the focus groups reflect previous research, in particular 
related to upward communication (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Kath et aI., 2010) and a lack of 
communication of safety issues due to a fear of blame and retribution (Edmondson, 1996). O'Connor 
et al. (2011) in a review of safety climate dimensions in the aviation industry, found communication was 
a key safety climate dimension. The authors conclude that as the aviation industry consists of a number 
of different occupational groups that are not co-located, this creates particular challenges to 
communication as these groups are not able to engage in informal and spontaneous interaction. The 
results of the focus groups suggest a similar scenario where the physical distance of the work sites 
from the office functions creates particular issues for communication, perpetuating an 'us and them 
culture'. 
Management and leadership was also identified as a key influence of safety performance and safety 
culture, this has also been identified by a number of quantitative studies on safety culture (Flin et aI., 
2000; Mearns et aI., 2003; Zohar, 2003; Flin and Yule, 2004). Other elements identified through the 
focus groups reflect social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) as discussed in Chapter 3. Site based 
employees felt a lack of support from the organisation as a whole, leading to low morale, engagement 
and organisational commitment. Previous research has found that perceived organisational support has 
an influence on safety culture (Mearns et aI., 2010) and safety outcomes (Hofmann and Morgeson, 
1999) and that employee engagement and organisational commitment is also related to safety 
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performance (Harter, 2002; Nahrgang et aI., 2010). The relationship between safety climate and safety 
outcomes is mediated by work related attitudes such as organisational commitment (Clarke, 2010). 
The strength of this grounded qualitative approach adopted in this study, is that it was possible to 
derive key insights not just of what's important to safety performance, but also how they impact on 
other outcomes such as organisational efficiency, engagement and organisational commitment. These 
types of in-depth insights are unavailable through quantitative methods (Cooper, 2000) and can provide 
organisations with practical information on the safety culture of their organisations which can in tum 
inform the development of safety policies, practices and safety interventions. The next chapter 
describes the second qualitative study exploring employees' perceptions of the factors that shape 
safety culture and safety performance in the sponsor organisation. The study uses semi structured 
interviews and the questions were informed by the results of this study. 
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Chapter 6: Qualitative Assessment of Safety 
Culture 
6.1. Introduction 
The results of the focus groups with site based front line staff (Chapter 5) suggest that Communication, 
Leadership, Employee Engagement, Job Demands, Safety Prioritisation and Culture are contextual and 
situational factors which appear to have an effect on safety performance. These contextual factors 
could be described as aspects of the overall psychosocial organisational climate which in turn 
influences the safety climate and safety outcomes (Clarke 2010; Nahrgang et aI., 2010). The 
generalisability of these findings could be questioned given that, the focus groups were not recorded 
verbatim and were conducted with site based front line employees only. A more structured approach 
was required to provide further insights to inform the development of the quantitative safety climate 
questionnaire (Chapter 7) that tests the generalisability of these findings. 
6.1.1. Study Aim 
• The purpose of the study was to explore in more depth the perceived factors that affect safety 
performance in the sponsor organisation identified in the focus groups. 
6.1.2. Study Objectives 
• To develop rich insights of the factors that shape safety culture and safety outcomes in the 
sponsor organisation. 
• To identify the main themes to inform the development of a safety climate questionnaire. 
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6.2. Methodological Issues 
As discussed in Chapter 5 there are arguments for and against the individual interview and its capacity 
for eliciting data from participants. Advocates of the individual interview (Fisch hoff, Bostrom, Jacobs 
and Quadrel, 1997; Lynn, 1999) argue that group dynamics may suppress the expression of opinions of 
those individuals who do not feel confident or may be inhibited from expressing their views in a social 
setting. 
The in-depth interviews were conducted with differing levels of personnel across the organisation, 
including senior directors, operational managers and site based employees. The results from the focus 
groups suggested that there was an underlying culture of blame and due to the potentially sensitive 
nature of the topics for discussion, it was decided that one to one individual interviews were the best 
methodological approach to explore the themes highlighted in the focus groups further, as opposed to 
group interviews. By conducting both focus groups with front line site based operational employees 
(Chapter 5) and using more in-depth individual interviews this approach aimed to address most of the 
criticisms of both qualitative methodologies. 
6.2.1. Sample 
6.2.1.1. Negotiating Access 
The Board of Directors agreed that the researcher could have un-restricted access to approach anyone 
within the organisation to take part in the interviews. The researcher worked with the marketing 
manager to put together an article for the internal magazine to inform employees in the organisation 
about the research project and to encourage participation in the interviews (see Chapter 5). 
100 
6.2.1.2. Sample Frame 
It was important to select employees in the organisation who had an influence on, or were involved in, 
safety or operational practices so a purposeful sampling strategy was employed (Patton, 1990). The 
strength of this sampling strategy lies in selecting information-rich cases. Information-rich cases were 
chosen so the researcher could learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the factors that 
affect safety in the organisation (Maxwell, 1997). Table 6 shows the number of participants from each 
department or working group. 
The type of purposeful sampling used was chain sampling. This is a sampling technique used for 
locating information-rich key informants or critical cases (Patton, 1990). The process involved asking 
members of the site based focus groups as well as the Health and Safety department 'Who knows a lot 
about safety practices on site?' and 'Who should I talk to?' By asking a number other employees 
involved in the study who else to talk to, the chain gets bigger and the researcher is able to accumulate 
new information-rich cases. In most cases a few names were mentioned repeatedly to the researcher 
as key people to talk to. The interviews were conducted to the point of redundancy, as the purpose was 
to maximise the information on the factors that affect safety performance in the organisation, so when 
no new information was generated from the interviews sampling was terminated (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). 
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6.2.2. Interview Schedule 
The semi structured interview was used to understand the factors that shape and influence safety 
performance and safety culture identified in the focus group in more depth. The interview schedule was 
semi structured and used mostly open ended questions. The advantage of this is there is more 
flexibility in the order the questions are asked and the answers can be explored by the researcher in 
more detail than in a structured interview (King, 1994). This qualitative method was chosen to build an 
in-depth descriptive account of the factors that influence safety performance in the sponsor 
organisation by those who have a direct or indirect involvement in operational safety. 
In order to conduct the interviews it was necessary to develop a set of questions that would further 
explore the topics identified in the previous study (Chapter 5). To do this a range of information sources 
were drawn upon: 
1. Research findings based on the focus groups conducted with front line operational site 
based employees (See Chapter 5). 
2. Mainstream literature on safety culture (See Chapter 2 and 3). 
3. Consultation with expert advisors including; the Principle Psychologist at the Health and 
Safety Executive, an academic who has conducted numerous research studies on safety 
culture and climate predominantly in the oil and gas industry and the researchers academic 
supervisors. 
These sources were supplemented by the researcher's inSights derived from informal discussions with 
employees across the organisation through the familiarisation process (see Chapter 5). Interviews were 
conducted with employees at differing levels across the organisation the questions were appropriately 
phrased. For example when investigating perceptions of leadership front line site based employees 
were asked about their immediate supervisors (foremen) but foremen were asked about their 
102 
immediate managers (project managers/site engineers). The protocol is provided in Appendix 2. 
Structured questions were asked around the following topics:-
• Safety Leadership 
• Prioritisation of Safety over Production 
• Engagement & Involvement 
• Two-way Communication 
• Organisational Learning 
• Attitude to Blame 
6.2.4. Data Analysis 
Twenty seven interviews were conducted in total; these were between 45 minutes and an hour long. All 
interviews were transcribed verbatim. This resulted in large volumes of textual material. All of this 
material needed to be analysed and interpreted. It was necessary to develop an analytical strategy 
within the interpretive process so that the results are representative and robust. 
A relatively recent development in organisational research has been the application of Template 
Analysis to rich unstructured qualitative data following the primary data collection phase (Crabtree and 
Miller, 1999; King, 2004). Template analysis has emerged from more structured approaches such as 
Grounded Theory and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). King (2004) argues that 
although template analysis makes use of codes and coding of data it is not as prescriptive as Grounded 
Theory and is not wedded to its realist methodology. It can be used across a range of epistemological 
positions and as such can be useful for many research disciplines. When template analysis is used 
within a broadly phenomenological approach it is very similar to IPA. The main difference between the 
two approaches is the use of a 'priorf code in template analysis and the balance between within and 
across case analysis. 
Thematic analysis provides a framework to capture the richness of the data and helps organise the 
data collected into a structure. As the resulting interview transcripts were long with much textual 
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information to analyse, template analysis allowed the researcher to organise the data into priori codes 
and themes, which helped manage and organise the large volumes of data. The template analysis was 
conducted using the following steps recommended by King (2004):-
1) Defining priori themes - The main priori themes were taken from the results of the exploratory 
focus groups, field notes, literature review and expert advisor feedback. As the focus groups had 
generated some areas to be explored at interview there was an assumption that these areas should be 
included. Additionally the importance of leadership, communication, job demands and culture in relation 
to safety culture is well-established (see Chapter 2 and 3) thus these were included in the priori themes 
as these were expected to arise in the data. Using priori themes accelerates the initial coding phase of 
analysis; which can be very time-consuming especially with large amounts of textual information. In 
order to ensure that material that does not relate to the initial priori themes was overlooked and to 
ensure the priori themes developed were actually the most effective way of characterising the data, the 
priori themes were treated as tentative and redefined, added to or removed as the process of analysis 
was conducted. 
2) Transcription - All audio recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. These were then read 
through thoroughly a number of times by the researcher in order to familiarise herself with the text. 
3) Initial coding of the data· The researcher identified the parts of the transcripts that were relevant to 
the research question, 'what are the factors that affect safety culture and safety performance in the 
sponsor organisation'. Those 'chunks' that recurred several times in the data set within and across 
transcripts were defined as a theme, then those that were identified as one of the priori themes were 
coded and attached to the identified section. For those parts of the transcript where there were no 
relevant themes the existing themes were modified and new ones were devised. 
4) Production of initial template· The initial template was developed after a sub-set of five transcripts 
had been coded. The themes identified in the selected transcripts were grouped into a smaller number 
of higher-order codes which described broader themes in the data. This was done by hand. 
5) Template development· The template was then developed by applying it to the full data set, coding 
all relevant segments on it, and modifying it, if there was relevant material which the template did not 
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adequately cover. Whenever the researcher found a relevant piece of text which did not fit well into an 
existing theme the template was changed and added too. 
6) Quality check· The template, codes and analysis were checked by other academics in the field of 
Occupational Safety (n=2) to check quality and ensure that the analysis was not being systematically 
distorted by the researchers own preconceptions and assumptions. The final template can be found in 
Appendix 4. The themes identified can be found in Table 7. 
Table 7: Themes identified through template analysis 
Priori Themes SubThemes 
1 Communication 1.1. Top Down 1.1.1. Lack of Opportunities to 
feedback 
1.2. Poor Communication to site 1.2.1 Lack of Face to Face 
2 Leadership 2.1. Visibility on site 2.1.1. Support and Advice 
2.2. Accountability , 
Approachability and 
Responsiveness 
2.3. Understanding of site 2.3.1. Informed of outcomes of 
accidents and near misses 
2.3.2. Identification of Root 
Causes/Organisational 
Learning 
3 Job Demands 3.1. Poor Planning 
3.2. Working hourslWorking Week 
3.3. Client Demands/Commercial Pressure 
4 Health and Safety 4.1. Importance of Safety vs. Production 
Prioritisation 4.2. Corner cut to get the job done 
4.3. Health and Safety 4.3.1. Correct PPE/Equipment 
Procedures 
5 Employee 5.1. Consultation in decision making 
Engagement 5.2. Reduced Moral 
4.3. Lack of Reward and Recognition 
6 Culture 6.1. Blame/Fear of Reprisals 6.1.2. Under reporting 
6.2 Us and Them 
6.3. Un-fair treatment 
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6.3. Results 
A number of priori themes and sub themes were identified through template analysis. These are 
detailed below. 
1. Communication 
Poor communication was cited by site based, office based and management, as a factor affecting 
safety performance and something the organisation was particularly bad at, it was characterised by 
being top down, with a lack of face to face communication. The participants cited an over reliance on 
emails and a lack of opportunity for site based employees to feedback concerns. The issues relating to 
communication are widely cited in the safety culture literature (DeJoy, 1985; Edmondson, 1996; 
Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999). Edmondson (1996) found that positive safety climates from 
management showing a committed and non-punitive approach to safety, promotes more open, free-
flowing communication about safety-related issues. The freedom employees feel in discussing safety 
issues with their direct supervisors or upward safety communication has been linked to improved safety 
commitment as well as decreased injuries (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996; Hofmann and Morgeson, 
1999). 
1.1. Top Down 
Interviewees described communication in the organisation as top down, embedded in a telling rather 
than consulting way of informing employees in the organisation. This perception was particularly strong 
for site based employees who described how they were told about changes, new ways of working and 
the implementation of new processes rather than being consulted with. The office based employees 
and management interviewed felt more involved with the decisions made by the organisation that 
affected their day to day working than site based employees. 
'Recent example we have just had a whole department restructure, they have sent it out and I don't 
understand what it's on about, it just doesn't make sense at all ... they have not communicated to 
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anybody that is inside this restructure, they have not sat down and told them what it is all about or 
anything which I think is pretty poor. ' [Construction Project Manager] 
1.1.1. Lack of Opportunities to Feedback 
An aspect of the perceived top down communication culture was the lack of opportunities to feedback 
on decisions made about their role, working practices, safety policies and process. Or a lack of 
opportunities to raise any concerns and issues. Senior managers interviewed felt they had more 
opportunities to feedback than site based employees. 
'It's just again they have this attitude where you know I'm going to tell you, you need to wear this PPE, 
you need to do this, and you need to do that, and it's as if they're being dictated what to do and people 
don't listen to their opinion, you know, if there is a difference of opinion which clearly there is on a lot of 
procedures on PPE at least if its discussed and you understand why they are in place, regardless of 
what the reason is, I think you get a better understanding, you get a lot more out of the guys who are 
having to use it.' [Foreman] 
1.2. Poor Communication to Site 
Those interviewed acknowledged communication to site could be improved Significantly. These views 
were more strongly expressed by the site based staff but to some extent by management. The 
organisation had grown in recent years and gone from being a family run organisation to being bought 
out by a global PLC. This added a number of layers of personnel between the board of directors and 
the front line site based employees. Coupled with this were the locations of site which acted as a 
physical barrier to effective communication. As the previous organisation was smaller and had fewer 
employees and layers of management there was much more face to face communication with those 
employees working on site, and other parts of the organisation were more aware of what site based 
employees did. A number of site based employees felt that due to aU the additional policies, processes 
and procedures communication was actually getting worse not better. 
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'I think there could be better communication, between the Health and Safety department and us, the 
communication the understanding from their point of view to our site is not there, do you know what I 
mean the everyday running of it.' [Foreman] 
1.2.1. Lack of Face to Face Communication 
As previously mentioned the organisation had grown significantly over recent years creating more 
departments and organisational layers. Previously there had been much more face to face 
communication through managers visiting site and informal get together, whereas communication was 
now characterised by a lack of face to face communication and an over reliance on e-mails.This was 
particularly problematic for site based staff as only the site engineers and foremen had access to a 
computer. Often due to the remote locations they worked at there were problems with internet coverage 
which meant e-mails were often difficult to access. Site engineers and site foremen were expected to 
read, digest and disseminate the information sent out in e-mails and print out any associate documents 
and pin to the notice boards. 
E-mail was the preferred method of communication in the organisation, with hundreds of e-mails being 
sent to the site engineers and site foremen every day. Some of these were safety related i.e. safety 
alerts (information on incidents that happened in other organisations) but often these were not filtered 
for relevance and sent to everybody on site whether relevant to their role or not. Important information 
regarding safety policy and process updates were e-mailed to the site foremen or site engineers or 
these e-mailstold them where to access them on theintranet. This method of communication was 
perceived to be the least effective way to communicate. Due to the over reliance on e-mails key 
information in regards to safety could easily be missed as due to the time pressures of their workload 
many only scanned their e-mails. Face to face communication was seen as the best way to 
communicate safety information, to ensure that information was digested and understood by site and 
office based employees and more senior management, yet managers said they struggled with having 
time to get out on site. 
'I think a lot of policies are written to cover, and I don't think these policies are rolled out to these guys 
on the site as they should be. There's one thing saying, there is an e-mail saying, oh uploaded onto the 
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intranet is a revamped version a revision of this particular policy, but I mean to be honest with you I 
don't have the time to even look at them, I really don't because there's an e-mail coming in, there's 
problems on site, and if I do that I know other people will do it, but these linesmen, I mean no 
disrespect to them but half of them I mean they don't want to read policies like that, they'd rather it be 
explained in layman's terms so they understand the gist of it, you know but we don't seem to make time 
to do it enough and I'm not sure it should come from me, I think it should come from the department 
above me, and they should probably come and give everybody the same talk together, and then there's 
a basic understanding and everybody know what everybody has been told, what's been discussed and 
its probably on a level playing field, if there is any questions or problems we can raise them there and 
hopefully sort them out. That's the way I'd prefer to see it. ' [Site Engineer] 
I'm not unique but I must get over 100 e-mails every day, 150, purely because of the e-mail traffic, there 
is just so much we're an e-mail culture, we'll e-mail the person next to us rather than speak. I mean I 
understand that actually e-mail is there for that kind of thing, so it was probably never not going to be 
on e-mail but I would hazard a guess that a large percentage of people, unless it is something that 
screams out at you that going to be relevant, they won't read it. It's a terrible admission, but I won't if it's 
not relevant to what I'm doing. ' [Operations Manager] 
Edmondson (1996) has commented that when employees perceive that their concerns are not valid or 
addressed this tends to foster a negative climate that inhibits the willingness of both managers and 
employees to communicate freely and discuss issues and mistakes. The central role of communication 
is related to a more positive safety climate. Poor communication, a lack of opportunities to feedback, a 
lack of face to face can have a range of negative implications for safety on site: it can create 
dissatisfaction and passivity amongst those on site and may be a source of indifference of employees 
to formal communications, and this can hinder their motivation to participate in future safety practices. 
2. Leadership 
Poor leadership was perceived as a key influence on safety performance by those interviewed 
particularly the site based employees. There was reference to a lack of visibility of senior managers on 
site and a perceived lack of support from them. Managers were seen as unapproachable, lacking in 
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accountability and an understanding of site. The perception of those in more hands on operational roles 
in particular was that this actually challenged safe working as there was a lack of learning from 
accidents and incidents at a more senior management level. 
Reference to the central role of the manager's influence on safety climate and safety performance can 
be found in a number of studies of safety culture and climate (Flin et aI., 2000; Sea et al., 2004; 
O'Connor et aI., 2011). Leadership acts as an antecedent to safety climate, safety behaviours and 
outcomes (Christian et aI., 2009; Nahrgang et aI., 2010; Clarke, 2010). Of all the safety climate 
dimensions management commitment to safety is the strongest predictor of work related injuries (8eus 
et aI., 2010). Empirical studies have found that positive relationships between a leader and their 
subordinates results in lower levels of accident involvement, fewer safety-related incidents (Hofmann 
and Margeson, 1999; Michael et al.,2006), increased safety citizenship behaviours (Hofmann, 
Margeson and Gerras, 2003), and higher levels of upward safety communication (Kath et aI., 2010). 
2. 1. Visibility on site 
Visibility of senior manager/directors was frequently cited as an issue affecting safety. This was seen as 
more of an issue for site based employees but even the senior managers interviewed acknowledged 
that they needed to get out to site more. 
IWhen I talk about management I am talking about the senior management, who I never see, I have 
seen them once on the job; in fact I have seen them once out of, I don't know, five years maybe longer.' 
[Front line operational] 
IWell certainly in terms of out on site in the field not enough that's absolutely definite, from myself and 
my management team and people to the side of me as well, it's absolutely recognised and it's 
something that I'm determined to increase, now I don't have to be out there every day, you know I was 
out there in the past in various operational roles where you need to be but it is important and this is 
about leadership and .... walking the talk. It's really about um you know being seen to, undertake that 
leadership, I think the other side of it in terms of promoting the safety message is I think that's and 
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easier to do from this building this office location much easier but nothing replaces actually being there 
in the field talking to the guys it is done insufficiently at the moment. ' [Board Director] 
2.1. 1. Support and Advice 
The site based employees interviewed felt that there was a policing approach to Health and Safety, 
coupled with the low visibility on site of the senior managers; they felt that the Health and Safety team 
only came on site when there was an audit or accident investigation. As many of the Health and Safety 
team and senior managers had not got their relevant training certificates, work permits and had not 
done the job previously they were unable to climb the electricity pylons to really investigate safety 
accidents, incidents and near misses thoroughly. Otten the perception on site was that they were only 
there to point the finger and find something wrong rather than offer support and advice on how to 
resolve the issues. Site based managers felt there was no-one above them to turn to for support and 
advice, when it was needed. 
'They are almost like a bloody police force, but the whole company seems to be full of these bloody 
people who are out to get you, that is the impression that we get on this particular site anyway that 
every time we have an audit that they don't come and advise you, they just tell you what you can't do 
but not how you can get around it, which is bloody stupid you know, I think somebody told * that the 
diesel valve was in the wrong place because it was on top of a hill, he was told to move it, so he moved 
it, but he was never told where to move it you know, you know if a safety officer can't advise you, they 
can only tell you how not to do something but not how to do it, then there is something wrong.' [Front 
line operational] 
'I can't just pinpoint it to support in one area, we have, I think we have problems in support throughout 
the business, our IT department, our HR department, you know, they probably have reasons for it and 
they're maybe stretched and other reasons I'm not aware of, so I mean it's very easy for me to sit and 
point fingers, but sometimes I don't get that backup and support I need from things like that, it's a 
strange thing, it's like after 5 o'clock there's never a person to ring, I know who I can ring, and I know 
who'll answer it, or I can leave a message and they will ring me back, but sometimes I mean I carry my 
phone with me 24fl even when I go on holiday, and I always tell engineers or foreman, I say look I 
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really don't mind if there's a problem ring me, I'll probably have a yes or a no, where it might take you 
three hours to find a yes or a no, and I said I really don't mind that, I'd rather you did that than struggle. 
But I don't get that kind of support up from me.' [Construction Project Manager] 
2.2. Accountability, Approachability and Responsiveness 
Site based employees cited that the managers were not approachable and they felt that their attitude 
towards the site based front line employees could be improved. Those on site felt that when they raised 
safety concerns and general issues, managers were not responsive to these concerns and did not take 
accountability for them. Site based interviewees gave examples where they had raised concerns and 
these had not been addressed and responded too, or if they were responded to it was not done in an 
appropriate time. There was little or no feedback on the issues raised and what was being done to 
address them. Whilst the organisation had some vehicles for raising safety concerns such as the safety 
meetings, as issues raised were not responded to in a sufficient timeframe, this had issues for safety 
working practices with some working against the recommendations set out in the work instructions. Site 
based employees also felt that senior managers did not honour their promises and commitment and 
could cite examples of where managers had agreed to do something for example go home early if a job 
was finished on time and then this was not allowed. This lead to a feeling on site that there was no 
point in raising concerns as they wouldn't be responded to, which lead to under reporting and a lack of 
organisational learning. This perception was reflected in part by middle managers but less so by senior 
managers. 
'I have mixed feelings, I think ultimately they obviously don't want to hurt people and have accidents, 
and they want to keep everything tickety boo, but sometimes I think we need a bit more support and 
information to do our job safer, more effiCiently, but sometimes it's a bit slow to come through and 
usually it results after several discussions, arguments and the rest of it, which I don't particularly like 
doing, but that's the way we have to get it done at the moment. ' [Operations Manager] 
"The top guys, they came down and they asked us you know if there was anything we were unhappy 
with so I complained about the safety harnesses, that they were there solely for stopping people for 
falling off structures and not for working with, it is a work belt, you know to hang your tools on it and you 
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have to work out of them comfortably and you can't do it because everything is round your back side, 
you know you can't do it because it is solely designed really for stopping you falling off the structure and 
I told this to these guys and they said well we will see what we can do, but nothing was done about it 
and I knew it wouldn't be done." [Charge hand] 
2.3. Understanding of site 
Site based employees felt that there was poor understanding of site by those who complied and 
implemented the safety policies and procedures. This had implications for working practices and site 
based employees felt that the Health and Safety team and senior managers who made these decisions 
had very little experience of working on site and doing the job which meant that some of the procedures 
were not appropriate and difficult to follow. 
'I think that they need to spend time out on site to understand things, they put things in place that you 
can clearly see that they have no idea about what they are doing which is quite scary sometimes, like 
the slogans that they put out, the current one is go home safe every day or something, everyone knows 
you have to go home safe every day, things like that is just patronising to site people I think.' [Front line 
operational] 
"I do think that they need to get more involved in what we do on site, then you can work together better 
then instead of them just saying no you're going to do it like this, when in reality sometimes that just 
doesn't work.' [Site Engineer] 
2.3.1. Informed of Accidents and Near Misses 
Those on site felt that they were not well informed of the outcomes of the accidents and near misses 
they reported. They felt that often the information in the accident reports was incorrect and looking for 
somebody to blame rather than understanding the underlying issues and finding solutions. Managers 
felt they were better informed of the outcomes of accident investigations as these were circulated 
electronically. 
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'I said if anything happens on site if you need to come and do an investigation on site I will come with 
you and I did that, and I give them all the answers and the linesman was sat there and I knew because 
I was stood there next to him they gave him the right answers as to what had happened, and there's no 
report come out for it. So then you think well I've made my commitment because people said there's 
not enough support of you know guidance when the SHEQ's come to site to help them, and made a 
point of doing that, and the reporls not even issued, and that is what * was talking about, the conductor 
stripping, that's one that's not closed out because there's not even been a reporl, so f don't even know 
what the outcome is.' [Construction Project Manager] 
2.3.2./dentification of Root Causes/Organisational Learning 
Interviewees felt that the site audits, accident and incident investigations did not fully identify the root 
causes and as a result the organisation did not learn from them and as a consequence did not generate 
appropriate solutions to the safety issues highlighted. This was in part due to a lack of understanding of 
site by those carrying out the investigations. For example as already highlighted many of the Health 
and Safety team and senior managers did not have the right training to climb the electricity pylons, as a 
result could not properly investigate what had happened when a near miss, accident or incident 
occurred. Up on the electricity pylons are where most of the work was completed and where the biggest 
hazards and risks were, including working with high voltage electricity, working at height and adverse 
weather conditions. This perception was more strongly felt by site based operational staff than senior 
management. 
'We did a report and the first report that was done you know it wasn't what it should have been ... I was 
just given a copy of the report that had been prepared .. .But yeah you know there were elements of that 
thing that sort of from an operational perspective it kind of upset me a bit because in the first place 
people weren't fully cognisant of what they were looking at, and in the second place, for example, you 
know the afternoon, it happened about lunch time on say a Wednesday afternoon or something, we 
pulled one of the SHEQ's team off a job in Dundee, he drove, 5, 6, 7 hours down the road to site, and I 
went to see it the next morning and met him on site, you know, site was tidied up by this stage, the 
feeder was still there and all the physical damage and stuff, so I got my harness on, all my stuff on, and 
/ said come on then we'll go up there and have a look to see what we think what happened. And this 
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guy said to me, I can't climb because I'm not on the * approved list, because our client * have got an 
approved list of things. There was two things to say about that, and the circumstances of what had 
happened it shouldn't have mattered who was on what list, and in the second place you know you 
should have been climbing anyway, why drive 5 or 6 hours from Dundee to tell me you can't climb to 
look. ' [Operations Manager] 
'Maybe not on this incidence no, because they didn't fully understand what we were doing so when they 
wrote their investigation report it didn't really reflect any measures you could put in place to stop it, we 
kind of come up with them ourselves on site and pushed it through that way, through my manager. ' 
[Site Engineer] 
Based on the above examples it can be suggested that site based employees don't feel supported by 
the senior managers in the organisation and there is a lack of accountability and action from managers 
when issues are highlighted. When there is organisational support and concern, employees are more 
likely to feel that safety issues are important and that action will be taken, this will help employees feel 
free to raise safety concerns with their managers (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999). 
In line with social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) 'genuine concern of management about their 
workforce' rather than 'tinkering' with policies and procedures are the most effective Health and Safety 
management practices for improved safety performance (Shannon et aI., 1997). A climate (or culture) of 
care and concern, will through the norms of reciprocity make the workforce feel obliged to reciprocate 
with safe behaviours. Those site based employees interviewed suggested better visibility and 
understanding of site would help them feel more supported and develop a more positive leader 
subordinate relationship, this has been linked to a more positive safety climate, for example Thomas et 
a!. (2011) found that executive walk arounds in a healthcare setting improved front line staff's 
perceptions of safety climate. 
3. Job Demands 
Those employees involved in operational delivery cited poor planning as an issue affecting safety 
performance, with poor costing and scheduling of jobs leading to a fire fighting approach. This was 
amplified by the commercial pressures and clients wanting more for less. Site based employees cited 
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long working hours and working weeks as an issue, with many feeling fatigued and having poor work 
life balance. 
Job demands can include high work pressures, an unfavourable physical working environment and 
emotionally demanding interactions (Demerouti et al., 2001; Bakker and Demerouti, 2007). Job 
demands can be inherenHy negative, or they may tum into job stressors when effort is required on the 
part of the employee to meet these demands (Meijman and Mulder, 1998; Bakker and Demerouti, 
2007). Nahrgang, Morgeson and Hofmann (2010) found that in their recent meta-analysis job demands 
contributed to safety outcomes. Other researchers have found that pressure specifically has a negative 
effect of safety culture and safety behaviour (Brown et aI., 2000, Mearns and Flin et aI., 2001). 
3.1. Poor Planning 
Poor planning was cited by both senior management and site based employees as having an effect on 
safety, more so by the site based employees, where this had an impact on their workload, time 
pressures and work life balance. Poor planning when biding for projects and a lack of consultation with 
those who do the job, quite often led to a fire fighting approach, this had consequences for 
organisational learning where a lack of a review process at the end of the project meant that the same 
mistakes and issues were repeated on the next project. Mangers were aware that there needed to be 
better planning as this was having a negative effect on operational performance and profitability. 
'Unfortunately what tends to happen is we move quite quickly through, so we'll complete one project 
and you move onto the next one, without really sort of going into the detail of what happened, lessons 
Jearnt, unfortunately. I [Project Director] 
'We've got a tendering department, and they'll get a job come up for example, and then what will 
happen is, they'll say right okay, they'll put a programme together and resource allocate to it, they've 
got all the rates, the agreed rates with the client, they'll pull that together and then they'll ask a bit of 
advice from everybody, say um, not the right people, not the people who are running the job it will be 
another project manager, and he might say right that is going to take 5 days, that's going to take 10 
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days, 3 days and we should finish around about there, alright no problem, and they base that tender 
around that, then what will happen is it will go back and forth and there is a bit of negotiating, there will 
be 10% knocked off, 20% knocked off, you know the usual and then it'll be yeah we agree to that, there 
terms and conditions get sent in which we don't see we don't know what were signing up for, weill 
don't know what we are signing up for, and then all of a sudden it will be like right who shall we give this 
job too? Um here you are you've got nothing to do now run this job, and you'll be given a job and it's 
like and the programme is wrong, the prices wrong the resource is wrong and you're stuck with it and 
your trying to make it work, you're trying to fire fight all the way through the job you see, and then in this 
example now when we come to my contract reviews why aren't you making 23 percent? Well because 
we are probably doing it the right way you tendered wrong and all. ' [Construction Project Manager] 
3.2. Working hourslworking week 
The site based employees and management suggested there was a long working culture throughout 
the organisation. Those working on site felt that poor planning had an impact on this as not quoting and 
planning for new projects correctly meant that front line operational employees had to work longer 
hours and more overtime at weekends to get the job done. This also had an impact on their work life 
balance. 
'Because of the pressures of delivery we work long hours there is definitely a long hours culture within 
the organisation, with a number of us never working under 60 hours a week, so there is definitely that 
and that kind of puts pressure on you for the day job.' [Project Director] 
'There is a lot of people that work a lot of hours but without any recognition of it, which I is .. . personally 
find it quite tough. ' [Operations Manager] 
3.3. Client Demands/Commercial Pressure 
Senior managers in particular were aware of the increasing commercial pressure and client demands 
and clients wanting more for less. This impacted on the times pressures and workload of those on site 
doing the job. This also had the potential to negatively impact safety performance. 
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'I think in a commercial contracting organisation you will always have that balance, cause you know we 
are not talking about balancing safety and efficiency, all we are saying is do it safely but we need you to 
be efficient, and that pressure to be efficient will only increase, as the commercial pressure we face will 
only increase, so we need to do things smarter and quicker you know work harder and smarter.' [Board 
Director] 
'We tend to shut our eyes to it a little bit and just try and plod on and making profit is harder than it's 
ever been, you know, market is the market, the clients want more for less, our suppliers are squealing, 
we have a lot of small suppliers so we have to be quite ethically minded dealing with people and 
managing cash flow and al/ the rest of it. ' [Project Director] 
From the interviews it appears that poor planning, commercial pressures and high workloads have an 
influence on the safety culture and safety performance of the organisation, where there is pressure to 
meet tight deadlines. This is not uncommon in high hazard industries operating in competitive 
environments (Mearns and Flin et aI., 2001). The consequences of high pressure and increased job 
demands are negative and can be seen as a source of risk to good safety performance. 
4. Health and Safety Prioritisation 
Interviewees reported high individual priority of safety but many site based operational employees 
reported mixed messages when it came to safety versus production. This was amplified by Health and 
Safety procedures which were difficult to follow leading to comers sometimes being cut to get the job 
done. 
Managers' behaviours and actions can, in tum, drive those of others (Cheyne et aI., 2002) and can 
have direct and indirect effects on employees safety behaviour; directly by modelling unsafe behaviours 
and reinforcing them through monitoring and control or indirectly by establishing the norms of safety 
behaviour, through policies and practice. These actions influence the expectations and motivations of 
employees and as a consequence the likelihood that particular safety behaviour will be repeated or 
suppressed (Flin and Yule, 2004). Unsafe practices for example can be reinforced, when there are 
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mixed messages around safety prioritisation over production and when there is pressure on managers 
to meet tight deadlines (Zohar, 2002). Pressure for production has been seen to negatively affect safety 
climate (Mearns et aI., 2001) and increase unsafe behaviour (Clarke, 2006). 
4. 1. Importance of Safety Versus production 
All of those interviewed felt that safety was of high importance to the organisation and at an individual 
and team level to those on site. However the perception of the site based employees and some of the 
office based managers interviewed was there were mixed messages in regard to safety versus 
production. Whilst the official line was safety first many working on site felt that the underlying message 
was production and finishing the job on time. 
'Safety is the message that goes out, but from my perspective I find it very difficult that people can fully 
take that on board when followed quite quickly afterwards we have expectations from, not just from our 
division, but from the group headquarters, their expectations are what they call double digit growth on 
turnover and profIt, year on year, so that's the kind of things they're feeding to the shareholders as one 
of our sort of corporate objectives and strategy, and unfortunately I think that to sort of achieve that kind 
of level of growth you've got to do that through productivity and efficiency you know one of the biggest 
costs is your labour force, now whether that's cutting labour back, whether it be in the office or in the 
field, that obviously you know gets to a point where if you do that too much you could compromise 
safety. So the official line is without doubt safety is first, but I think in practice that's very difficult that 
people can actually take that as being the driver when people are held accountable on how their 
project's performed, it's human nature, you want your project to perform as well as it can, if people's 
bonuses are based more heavily weighted towards the financial orientation rather than Health and 
Safety, albeit safety's in there, and like I say also that just the Group expectation of profit and turnover 
growth. ' [Board Director] 
'Don't let these people fool you that Health and Safety is their prime concern because it isn't, it is profit 
believe you me, its safety first, until your job is running behind' [Charge hand] 
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4.2. Comer cut to get the job done 
Those interviewed acknowledged that corners were probably cut to get the job done. Site based 
employees in particular felt that these comers were cut to get the job done quicker and more efficiently 
not unsafely. 
'I think it's probably they want to get the job finished so they can go home early, that's got to be one. Or 
I think sometimes people look for shortcuts or easy ways out when really I don't think they appreciate 
they're probably only going to save a couple of minutes anyway and in the grand scheme of things it 
makes no difference whatsoever.' [HR & Training] 
'I think so. But never to the point where it's unsafe, we might for example do something as I just said, 
marginally on the wrong side of what you'd feel absolutely comfortable with, but you know if the 
expression cutting comers is kind of perhaps indicative of some sort of do it and damn it sort of attitude, 
then that doesn't happen, no, it doesn't happen because it can't happen, not working the stuff that we're 
at.' [Foreman] 
4.3. Health and Safety Procedures 
Onsite employees stated that some of the Health and Safety procedures were difficult to follow and 
use. The organisation's over reliance on e-mails and lack of face to face communication to explain 
these safety policies and procedures had as a consequence created a poor understanding of them on 
site. 
'If they produce a big document then they should get the people in that need to process and work to 
this document, have a sit down and say this is a new implementation, this is the key that you need to 
look at. Because I have had experience on site, a site engineer working for me and I was going through 
the Health and Safety file with al/ our processes in and he got up and walked out because it was too 
much for him, you know I said look you need to know this but not al/ of it, you need to pick out the bits 
that you are going to have to do, the relevant ones, but you have to have an overview and it's like me 
sitting down and doing a EBOSH course again for two weeks, there was that much information and I 
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can understand why he went out. So just sending a document out and saying this has been updated on 
the intranet, I don't think is good enough because how can you guarantee that that document and that 
information has been taken in and implemented by the people on site, you know it is all sent in an e-
mail.' [Operations Manager] 
4.3.1. Correct PPElEquipment 
Some of those site based employees interviewed felt they did not have the right equipment or PPE to 
do the job safely, or that the PPE and equipment could be improved to help them do the job more 
safely and more efficiently. 
'None of us have worked on 132 before, we'd always worked on the national *, which is a lot bigger, a 
lot slower, now we're working on 132 we've gone from maybe working on one site for one week, now 
we're working on nine sites in one day, with the same amount of people, so it's a lot faster, but they're 
still needing the same equipment to access, or different equipment and it's never really been on this 
project, you know like 4 by 4 vehicles, things like that, the clients tum up in their Land Rovers with their 
ladders, never been used for years because it's obviously subcontracted work now, and they've got 
their welfare facilities and their vans, and they've got a little teapot and all that, and our guys have got 
the old vans what we used to have ... basically if they're moving on nine sites a day then they need to be 
self-sufficient really, even our subcontractors they're all equipped' [Foreman] 
Managers and client expectations clearly playa role in how safety is prioritised. Whilst the 'corporate' 
message is safety first in reality this is influenced by a number of commercial pressures. The 
prioritisation of production is indirectly reinforced by organisational practices and financial incentives for 
rewarding and recognising production, increasing the likelihood that this practice and behaviour will be 
repeated and normalised (Flin and Yule, 2004). 
5. Employee Engagement/Involvement 
Operational employees felt there was a lack of consultation in decisions which had implications for their 
job and ways of working and this led to reduced morale and job satisfaction. A number also stated that 
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there was a lack of reward and recognition for the hard work and long hours they put in to get the job 
finished on time and in budget. Managers acknowledged there could have been more done to reward 
and recognise employees. Employee engagement can be described as the positive state of satisfaction 
and commitment an employee has to an organisation (Khan, 1990). When this translates to safety it is 
the extent of involvement, participation and communication in safety related activities (Hofmann and 
Morgeson, 1999, Neal and Griffin, 2006). Nahrgang, Margeson and Hofmann (2010) classified 
compliance as engagement and found that in their meta-analysis that compliance explained the largest 
variance in safety outcomes. 
5.1. Consuffation and Involvement in Decision Making 
Site based employees felt there was a lack of consultation in decision making. This was exacerbated by 
the poor commutation to site. Decisions were made about procedures and processes without speaking 
to the people that were carrying out the job and this had an effect on the appropriateness of the 
solutions developed and implemented. The lack of consultation when planning projects had an effect on 
front line employee's workload and work life balance. 
'I think they need a lot more, I don't know, a lot more discussions and reasoning behind why it's 
changed, not just to say that's changing from that to that. I mean currently we've got issues on site now 
where really we shouldn't work in a danger zone which is directly the way we're working, and yet the 
only way we can connect our winches is to the pylon line, so basically we're contradicting us own rules. 
And people don't seem to listen, we have guys who are looking into affematives and solutions to sort it 
out, but people just don't seem to listen and it results in frictions to the e-mail trials and all the rest of it, 
it's totally unnecessary, and it deters people from trying and they get frustrated and you know I think 
that's half of the problem, if people would listen to what these guys tell them from site I don't think 
there's be half as many issues as what there is.' [Foreman] 
5.2. Reduced Morale 
Morale was reported by those working on site as low. This was due to the lack of feedback and 
responsiveness of managers and a lack of reward and recognition. 
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'Everybody needs to lift their heads up because, and I don't know how you do that, I don't know how 
you get it back on track because everybody's heads are down, everybody's heads are you know 
dragging on the floor, the foremen, the charge hands, the linesmen, even the likes of me, you know, 
that's just a waste of time' [Construction Project Manager] 
5.3. Lack of Reward and Recognition 
Those interviewed stated that there was a lack of reward and recognition across the business in 
particular for those working on the front line carrying out the job. Additionally most site based 
employees stated that pay and reduced benefits was an issue. 
'We're very good at pointing out when somebody's got it wrong, but really very poor at pointing out 
when somebody's ... and not just about achievement, effort, because there is a lot of hard work goes 
into our business and it kind of goes unnoticed a little bit, which is really disappointing, because people 
won't do it forever.' [Project Director] 
'If you asked the guys, out there guys and girls out there I think you would find that morale is quite low, 
um and that's because there have been no pay rises for two years, no bonuses, people have had 
certain benefits taken away from them, things like even silly little things like tagging your personal calls 
on your mobile phone, that's gone down really badly here' [Construction Project Engineer] 
'The culture here is just probably the hardest thing, we tend to kick quite hard, but we don't tend to 
thank at all.' [Operations Manager] 
From the interviews it seems site based employees were disengaged from the wider organisation. Site 
based employees felt they could have been more involved in decision making. Autonomy and freedom 
to carry out work allows employees to achieve their work goals in terms of both productivity and safety 
outcomes (Nahrgang, Morgeson and Hofmann, 2010). Perceived organisational support which has a 
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relationship with engagement and organisational commitment has been linked to safety climate 
(Mearns et aI., 2010) and safety climate has significant associations with organisational commitment 
and job satisfaction (Clarke, 2010). 
6. Culture 
The operational employees interviewed felt there was a blame culture with many able to recall 
experiences of reprisals for reporting their concerns, this lead to under reporting of accidents, incidents 
and near misses. This was exacerbated by an 'us and them' culture where there was a lack of 
understanding of site and the challenges they faced by the office based staff and management, which 
links into the safety culture research of Reason (1998) which suggests in order to encourage the 
reporting of accidents, incidents and near misses a just culture must be engineered. An effective 
reporting system depends on how an organisation handles blame and punishment. And this lies at the 
heart of any safety culture. Punitive cultures will suppress reporting and organisational learning. A 
negative safety culture has also been linked to poor communication of safety issues (Hofmann and 
Margeson, 1999). 
6. 1. Blame/Fear of Reprisals 
Those interviewed, apart from the senior managers, felt there was a blame culture. This was perceived 
to be more of an issue affecting the safety of site based employees. Fear of reprisals and blame lead to 
under reporting of accidents, incidents and near misses. This was felt by site based employees to be 
exacerbated by a policing approach to safety management. 
'I do still think culturally we struggle with blame, we encourage everybody to reporl on Rivo, but there 
are lots of people that will tell you they've had a really bad experience from reporting on Rivo, so 
actually don't want to do it anymore because they've either got in trouble, or somebody else has got in 
trouble, and it's ended up being a fairly negative experience. So culturally we're a long way off what 
we're trying to achieve around reporting being a positive experience.' [Operations Manager] 
'Because if you question anything you're shot... well not shot down as such, but I feel like you're seen 
as a bit of a troublemaker if you question anything that they ... we have a site audit as you probably 
know, once a month, if I don't agree with something that they pick up on, or if I want to question it, they 
don't like it, they don't like it.' [Front Line Operational] 
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6.2. Under reporting 
Those interviewed felt that there was some level of under reporting of incidents and near misses 
particularly on site. The perception was that this was due to the negative experiences they had from 
reporting safety issues in the past. 
'It used to be a company where anyone could phone anyone and ask a favour, ask for help, and 
whatever an issue, but now I know we do promote a no blame culture but underlying I think that's 
exactly what it does, you know, and that's why some people are a bit hesitant to come forward and 
probably report things and discuss things because they think there's going to be some kind of 
repercussions.' [Construction Project Manager] 
6.3. Us and Them 
Those interviewed felt there was an 'us and them' culture between site and the office based employees. 
This contributed to a lack of understanding by senior management and the Health and Safety team off 
site and the front line employee's roles. 
'You know there's a them and us scenario out on site and in here because the lads on site are 
delivering stuff and working all soris of hours, seven days a week, mostly, just to deliver stuff. And you 
know they see things back here as some people sitting around pushing pens and having coffee breaks 
two or three hours long and stuff. So you know there's a danger for them and us thing, you know' 
[Operations Manager] 
'The office managers think that they are the company and we are nothing out here you know we are 
nothing out here just rough blokes who work on site.' [Frontline Operational] 
6.4. Unfair Treatment 
Site based employees felt they were not treated fairly, as equals or when compared to other parts of 
the business. 
125 
'You have the lads onto you, why haven't we got this, why do we not get the same as them, you know, 
and then of course the managers above me where they're saying, oh well the lads can't go at this time, 
they need to stay till this time, and you're thinking you know if they do the work, in my eyes if you get a 
good day's work out of them fine by me.' [Foreman] 
It is clear from the in-depth insights generated from these interviews that the sometimes sensitive 
information would have been difficult to obtain quantitatively. Limited understanding of the risks and 
hazards out on site means that safety initiatives developed are not always appropriate. It also means 
that the organisation's accident and near miss statistics were under reported, thus questionable. Under 
reporting of accidents has been well documented in the safety literature (Glazner et aI., 1998; Pransky 
et al., 1999; Leigh et aI., 2004; Rosenman et aI., 2006, Probst and Estrada, 2010). Probst and Estrada 
found that 71% of experienced accidents went unreported. Individual-level under reporting of accidents 
has been linked to a fear of reprisals or a loss of benefits (Webb et aI., 1989; Pransky et aI., 1999; 
Sinclair and Tetrick, 2004; Van der Post et aI., 2004); 
6.4. Summary of Main Findings 
The aim of the interviews was to gather in-depth inSights into staff perceptions with regard to safety 
culture and safety performance that could be quantified in the next stage of research through the 
quantitative safety culture questionnaire. The process of gaining an in-depth understanding about the 
sponsor organisation's safety culture involved one to one interviews (n=27) with representatives from 
site based employees (n=13) and office based middle and senior managers (n=14). 
There were differences in the nature of work of site based managers and senior managers. The results 
of the interviews in part reflected these differences. The main challenges for the managers related to 
balancing corporate and client expectations and dealing with increasing demands for delivering the 
same services at a lower cost and time scale than their competitors in order to win contracts. The site 
managers were more concerned with the challenges of delivering the project on time and within budget. 
Whilst the different groups viewed the challenges to safety slightly differenHy, however there were some 
commonalities in the results. 
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Template analysis resulted in the description of six priori themes; Communication, Leadership, Job 
Demands, Health and Safety Prioritisation, Employee Engagement & Involvement and Culture and 24 
sub themes considered relevant to the characteristics of safety culture. Communication was the most 
frequently cited area for improvement and the biggest influences on safety culture and safety 
performance, by all levels of employees, from front line operational employees to the board of Directors, 
closely followed by leadership and priority of safety over production, although this was more strongly 
felt by site based employees. The lack of employee engagement and involvement and blame culture 
was most strongly perceived by site based employees, however there was less awareness of this at a 
senior level. 
The results of the interviews closely mirror the results of the focus group. The themes identified from 
the analysis of the focus groups discussions formed the basis for the initial template (King, 2004) used 
to analyse the one to one interviews. For that reason the priori themes are the same, however due to 
the interviews being more in-depth and transcribed verbatim more sub themes were identified. 
6.4.1. Strengths and Limitations 
The primary advantage of in-depth interviews is that they provide much more detailed information than 
quantitative methodologies (Cooper, 2000). Given that the researcher had been through a 
comprehensive familiarisation process, many of the individuals interviewed were already aware of the 
research project and some had met the researcher, thus due to the relationship developed with the 
employees open and honest discussions ensued. It was particularly important that employees felt they 
could trust the researcher and information given was anonymous as the focus groups identified a 
culture of blame and fear of reprisals. Whilst individual interviews have been criticised (Lynn, 1999), by 
employing both group interviews (Chapter 5) and more in-depth individual interviews this combined 
qualitative approach aimed to address most of the criticisms of both qualitative methodologies. 
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Chapter 7: Quantitative Assessment of Safety 
Culture 
7.1. Introduction 
The quantitative study of the triangulated approach, the development of the safety climate 
questionnaire, is outlined in this chapter. The questionnaire development, the methods and 
administration process are described. The chapter further details the hypothesis testing and the 
statistical analysis of the results. Finally the chapter concludes with a brief summary of the overall 
findings. The overall results will be discussed in more detailed in the next chapter (Chapter 8). 
7.1.1. Aim 
To identify and measure the constructs that shape safety culture, and safety performance outcomes in 
the sponsor organisation. 
7.1.2 Objectives 
• To develop a questionnaire to address the above aim, to be completed by the sponsor 
organisation's employees. 
• To explore the psychometric properties of the influences on safety culture and safety 
outcomes. 
• To provide the sponsor organisation with results with which to benchmark the success of any 
future safety interventions against. 
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7.2. Method 
The following section outlines the method of the quantitative study reported in this chapter. 
7.2.1. Questionnaire Development 
The themes identified in the qualitative studies (Chapter 5 and 6) along with the theoretical insights 
from the review of the literature (Chapter 3) were used to inform the questionnaire development. The 
most dominant themes included Communication (upward communication), Leadership (the relationship 
with the immediate supervisor and perceived support from the organisation), Job Demand (safety 
climate), Employee Engagement & Involvement (employee engagement and organisational 
commitment), Safety Priority (safety climate) and Culture (safety climate). The main themes identified 
were well researched areas with existing validated measures. There are a number of existing scales to 
measure these phenomena particularly safety culture/climate and these have been established across 
many different industries. It was deemed prudent to make use of these existing questionnaires in the 
current study. These include; 
• Safety Climate Toolkit ( Cox and Cheyne, 2000) 
• Safety Communication (Hofmann and Morgeson 1999) 
• Perceived Organisational Support (Eisenberger et al. 1986) 
• Leader Member Exchange (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995) 
• Employee Engagement (Harter, 2002); and 
• Organisational Commitment (Allen and Meyer, 1990). 
The questions most relevant to the themes identified in the qualitative studies were selected from each 
measure. This created a composite questionnaire with 78 questions in total. Questions relating to self-
reported accident near misses were also included. A full list of the questions selected from each 
measure are included in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Questions included in the safety climate questionnaire 
Measure Questions 
Upward Safety I feel comfortable discussing safety issues with my immediate 
Communication Manager/Supervisor 
(Hofmann and The organisation encourages open communication about safetY 
Morgeson, 1999) The organisation openly accepts ideas for improving safety 
There is good quality communication here about safety issues which affect 
me 
I receive praise for working safely 
Employee I know what is expected of me at work 
Engagement & While at work, I receive reaular recognition or oraise for doing a good job 
Involvement I have the materials and eauioment I need to do my work right 
(Harter et al., 2002) At work, my opinions count 
My fellow employees are committed to doino QualitY work 
In the last year, I have had the opportunities at work to learn and orow 
I am involved in the decisions made about how to carry out mv job 
I am involved with the decisions made about safety issues at work 
Leader-Member My immediate Manager/Supervisor understands my job-related problems and 
Exchange needs 
(Graen and Uhl-Bien, My immediate Manager/Supervisor recognises my potential 
1995) My immediate Manager/Supervisor would use his/her power to help me solve 
work related problems 
My immediate Manaoer/Supervisor would 'bail me out' at his/her expense 
I defend and justify my immediate Manager/Supervisor's decisions when 
he/she is not there to do so 
Perceived The organisation values my contribution to its success 
Organisational The organisation fails to appreciate any extra effort from me 
Support (Eisenberger The organisation would ignore any complaint from me 
et aI., 1986) The oroanisation really cares about my well-being 
Even if I did the best job possible, the oroanisation would fail to notice 
The organisation cares about my general satisfaction at work 
The organisation shows very little concem for me 
The organisation takes pride in my accomplishments at work 
Organisational I do not feel like part of a family in this organisation as a whole 
Commitment I feel a strong sense of belonging to this organisation as a whole 
(Allen and Meyer, This organisation as a whole does not deserve my loyaltv 
1990) I am proud to tell others where I work 
I would be happy to work here until I retire 
Safety Climate 
(Cox and Cheyne, 
2000) 
Management Senior Management only acts to improve safety after accidents have 
Commitment occurred 
Corrective action is always taken when Senior Management is told about 
unsafe practices 
In my workplace Senior Management turn a blind eye to safety issues 
In my workplace my immediate Manager/Supervisor show interest in my 
safety 
130 
My immediate Managers/Supervisor express concern if safety procedures are 
not followed 
Priority of Safety Senior Management clearly consider the safety of employees of high priority 
Safety rules and procedures are carefully followed in this organisation 
Senior Management considers safety to be equally as important as 
production 
Safety Rules Sometimes it is necessary to depart from safety requirements for 
productivity's sake 
Some health and safety rules and procedures are not really practical 
Some safety rules and procedures do not need to be followed to get the job 
done safely 
Supportive We often give tips to each other on how to work safely 
Environment I am stronalv encouraaed to report unsafe conditions 
A no-blame approach is used to persuade those acting unsafely that their 
behaviour is inappropriate 
I can influence health and safety performance in this organisation 
Personal Priority of Safety is the number one priority in my mind when completing a job 
Safety Personally I feel that safety issues are not the most important aspect of my 
job 
I understand the safety rules for my job 
Work Environment Operational targets often conflict with safety measures 
Sometimes conditions here hinder my ability to work safely 
Sometimes I am not given enough time to get the job done safely 
There are always enough people available to get the job done safely 
This is a safer place to work than other companies I have worked for 
Self-Reported How many accident have you had while working for this organisation? (An 
Accident accident can be defined as any event which results in injury, and/or damage 
and/or loss.) 
Self-Reported Near How many near misses have you had while working for this organisation? (A 
Misses near miss can be defined as any event which had the potential to cause injury 
and/or damage and/or loss but which was avoided by circumstance.) 
7.2.2. Pilot 
The draft questionnaire was piloted in three phases. First it was circulated to two directors and the 
safety director of the sponsor organisation (n=3) for review. Second it was circulated to a cross section 
of the site foremen and project engineers (n=5) for comment. Finally paper copies were given to a team 
of frontline workers to complete (n=10) during their winter training. The researcher was present during 
the final phase to receive any verbal feedback and comments were noted. 
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These processes suggested a number of revisions to the draft questionnaire, these were: 
• Changes to the language of the questionnaire to make clear if it was asking about senior 
management or immediate supervisor. In the sponsor organisation there was a clear distinction 
in the organisation between supervisors and managers. Supervisors were responsible for the 
immediate management of front line staff, whereas managers/ment were perceived as anything 
above this level. 
• Additional categories added to the demographic questions in terms of 'what area of the 
business do you work in?' 
• Minor changes to the language used for the questions, to make it more appropriate to the 
sponsor organisation. 
7.2.3. Item Scaling 
A 5-point Likert scale was used with anchor points of 'Strongly Agree'; 'Agree'; 'Neither Agree nor 
Disagree'; 'Disagree'; 'Strongly Disagree'. The five points weights from 5, to 1 respectively. Research 
has shown that Likert scale have a strong potential to produce distributions that can be treated as 
interval data (Carifio, 1978). Five and 7-point scales are the most commonly used in psychometric 
measures of safety culture and climate. Colman et al. (1997) and Dawes (2008) have demonstrated 
that empirically, 5 and 7 point scales produce ostensibly equivalent results thus in keeping with other 
safety culture measures and for simplicity and 5 point scales was used. 
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7.2.4. Measures 
The final questionnaire consisted of statements that measured six separate constructs, Safety Climate, 
Upward Communication, Employee Engagement & Involvement, Leader Member Exchange and 
Perceived Organisational Support. Additionally a question relating to self-reported accidents and near 
misses was included to measure safety outcomes. The participants used a 5-point Likert scale to 
report whether or not they agreed with each statement (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). A 
copy of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix 5. The questions included in the questionnaire are 
displayed in Table 8. The constructs and measures are as follows: 
7.2.4.1. Upward Safety Communication 
Upward safety communication was measured using a 5-item scale of 'communication' which was 
adapted from Hofmann and Morgeson's (1999) study. Upward communication refers to degree to which 
employees feel free to raise safety concerns with their immediate supervisor. Reliability analysis using 
cronbach alpha, showed that the 5-item scale demonstrated good internal consistency (a = .83). 
7.2.4.2. Employee Engagement and Involvement 
Employee Engagement and Involvement was measured using a 7-item 'Employee Engagement' scale. 
Five items were adapted from Harter et al. (2002). Employee engagement refers to the extent 
employees are intrinsically motivated to attain excellence in their work. Two additional items on worker 
involvement, which were identified through the qualitative focus groups and interviews, were added to 
scale. These were. 
• I am involved in the decisions made about how to carry out my job 
• I am involved with the decisions made about safety issues at work 
Reliability analysis showed that the 7-item scale demonstrated good internal consistency (a = .80). 
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7.2.4.3. Leader-Member Exchange 
Leader-member exchange (LMX) was measured using a 7-item measure of 'supervisor support' taken 
from Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) study on leadership and employee relationships. LMX is acted out 
through a process of social exchange with subordinates. Subordinates develop a mutual preference 
and trust in exchange for leaders' concem for their safety and well-being. Reliability analysis indicated 
good internal consistency (a = .88). 
7.2.4.4. Perceived Organisational Support 
Perceived organisational support (POS) was measured using an 8-item measure of 'organisational 
support,' which was adapted from the Survey of Perceived Organisational Support (SPOS; Eisenberger 
et aI., 1986). POS refers to individual employees beliefs concerning the extent to which an organisation 
values them, contributions and cares about their well-being. Four of the items were worded negatively 
and as such were reverse scored. The reliability analysis showed excellent internal consistency (a = 
.91). 
7.2.4.5. Organisational Commitment 
Organisational Commitment was measured using a 5-item measure of 'organisational commitment' 
which was adapted from Allen and Meyer's (1990) study. Organisational Commitment refers to 
employees' involvement and identification with their employing organisation. Two of the items were 
worded negatively and were reverse scored. Reliability analysiS showed good internal consistency (a = 
.86). 
7.2.4.6. Safety Climate 
Safety climate was measured using a total of 24 items adapted from Cox and Cheyne (2000) Safety 
Climate Toolkit (see Chapter 4). The specific dimensions of safety climate measured were 
'Management commitment', 'Priority of safety', 'Safety rules' (Safety rules and procedures), 'Supportive 
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environment', 'Personal priority and need for safety' (Personal priority for safety) and 'Work 
environment'. Reliability analysis indicated good intemal consistency for all the dimensions included in 
the safety climate measure (a = .88). 
Management commitment was measured using a 6-item measure and defined managers as 'immediate 
supervisors' or 'senior managers/ment'. Two of the items were worded negatively and were reverse 
scored. Reliability analysis showed good internal consistency (a = .75). 
Priority of safety was measured using a 3-item measure. Reliability analysis indicated good internal 
consistency (a = .83). 
Safety rules and procedures were measured using a 3-item scale. All three items were worded 
negatively and were reverse scored. Reliability analysis indicated good internal consistency (a = .73). 
Supportive environment was measured using a 5-item measure. One of the items was worded 
negatively and was reverse scored. Reliability analysis indicated moderate internal consistency (a = 
.59). This is consistent with the original safety climate toolkit development where Cox and Cheyne 
(2000) report that internal consistency as a = .61 (see Table 9). 
Personal priority of safety was measured using a 3-item scale. One item was worded negatively and 
was reverse scored. Reliability analysis indicated poor internal consistency (a = .59). This is consistent 
with the Safety Climate Toolkit (Cox and Cheyne, 2000) where the internal consistency is reported as 
a = .61 (see Table 9). 
Work Environment was measured using a 5-item scale. Four of those items were negatively worded 
and reverse scored. Reliability analysis indicated good internal consistency (a = .74). 
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Comparisons of the reliability coefficients demonstrates consistent reliability across the safety climate 
dimensions included in this questionnaire in this study, and the original safety climate measure 
developed as part of the Safety Climate Toolkit (Cox and Cheyne, 2000). 
7.2.4.7. Self-Reported Accidents and Near Misses 
Self-reported accidents were measured using the HSE definition of accidents (HSE, 1995). The 
questions used were: 
• How many accidents have you had while working for this organisation? (An accident can be 
defined as any event which results in injury, and/or damage and/or loss.) 
Self-reported near misses were measured using the HSE definition of near misses. The question was 
as follows: 
• How many near misses have you had while working for this organisation? (A near miss can be 
defined as any event which had the potential to cause injury and/or damage and/or loss but 
which was avoided by circumstance.) 
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7.2.5. Participants 
The sample frame was all the employees in the sponsor organisation (n=40B). Two hundred and fifty 
five completed the questionnaire: a 63% response rate. However a total of 50 left some sections 
unanswered reducing the completion rate to 51 %. Further analysis of those that failed to complete the 
questionnaire is detailed in Table 10. Analysis showed 10 failed to complete the demographic data 
section. Questions included; 'How many years have you worked for the company?', 'Where are you 
based?', and 'Which area of the business do you work in?' The question 'What is your current role 
within the business' was clearly stated as optional. The purposed of this was to make sure that if 
respondents felt they were identifiable from their response to this question they could leave it blank. 
Over a third skipped this question (n=B2) meaning it was not a usable category for analysis. One 
possible explanation for participants failing to complete this section was that through answering these 
questions they may have felt they would have been identifiable. 
Table 10: Response rate of questionnaire measures 
Demo- Safety Upward Employee graphic POS LMX Climate Comm Engagement Data 
Completed 245 236 224 207 207 205 





The organisation had historically generated low response rates from site based employees, Table 11 
shows that 44% of the respondents were on site and 66% were from Head Office, Newton (supply 
chain and distribution) and design. What the response rates demonstrate is that non completion rates 
are relatively similar across the four locations. Of the 205 employees that completed the questionnaire 
76% were male, 24% female (this was representative of the employee population) with a mean length 
of service of 5.8 years. 
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Table 11: Frequency of non-completed questionnaires by location 
Demo- Safety Upward Employee LM Total Start graphic Climate Comm POS Engage- X OC non-Data ment c o m ~ l e t e e
Onsite 113 110 108 103 97 97 95 95 18 
Head 57 55 52 49 46 46 46 46 11 Office 
Newton 17 15 14 14 14 14 14 14 3 
Design 68 65 62 58 50 50 50 50 18 
7.2.6. Safety Climate Dimension Consistency 
The safety climate questionnaire (Cox and Cheyne, 2000) part of the Safety Climate Toolkit (for more 
information see Chapter 4) was amended to suit the purposes of this study. As some minor changes 
had been made to the safety climate dimensions, with some questions being omitted or reorganised it 
was important to see if the psychometric properties of the dimensions were still comparable. This was 
done in two ways; firstly by comparing the reliability coefficients of the safety climate questionnaire 
dimensions in the current study compared with Cox and Cheyne (2000) safety questionnaire 
dimensions (see Table 9). Comparisons of the reliability coefficients demonstrate consistent reliability 
across the safety climate dimensions for both questionnaires. 
Second principal components analysis (PCA) of the mean scores of each safety climate dimension was 
conducted with a Varimax Rotation. The Varimax rotation identified 6 clear factors with factor weights 
of .88 to .99 with some relatively minor cross loadings. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified 
the sampling adequacy for the analysis to .79, which meets the recognised expectations (Field 2009). 
From the results it can be assumed (Cox and Cheyne, 2000) the model developed in the offshore 
industry extends across other high hazard industries, such as the sponsor organisation and factor 
structure and scale reliability (see Table 9) suggest that the dimensions, per se describe the same 
model (see Table 12). 
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Table 12: Principle component analysis of safety climate dimensions with varimax rotation 
C o m ~ o n e n t t
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Safety Rules .95 
Work Environment .96 
Supportive Environment .94 
Personal Priorities .99 
Safety Priority .90 
Senior Management Commitment .88 
7.3. Analysis of Results 
The first section outlines the results of the analysis to identify the antecedents of safety climate in the 
sponsor organisation. The second section outlines the results of the analysis to identify the safety 
outcomes in the sponsor organisation. The sections will where appropriate outline the relevant 
statistical tests used and the rationale for doing so. 
7.3.1. Analysis of Possible Psychosocial Antecedents of Safety Climate 
Statistical analysis of the safety climate antecedents employed an appropriate variety of techniques 
including bivariate correlations between predictor and outcome, as well as examination of standardised 
coefficients of a regression equation with all five predictors, Upward Communication, Employee 
Engagement, Perceived Organisational Support, Leader Member Exchange and Organisational 
Commitment. The analysis of these antecedents and their relationship to safety climate are detailed in 
the next section. 
7.3.2. Hypothesis and Analysis 
A number of hypotheses in relation to were tested using bivariate correlations. Results of these are 
displayed in Table 13. 
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Hypothesis 1: Upward Communication is positively related to safety climate. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted to assess the relationship between upward 
communication and safety climate. Preliminary analyses showed the relationship to be linear and the 
variables were normally distributed as assessed by Shaprio-Wilk test (p > .05). There were no outliers. 
There was a strong positive correlation between upward communication and safety climate r (210) = 
.77, P < .001, with upward communication explaining 59% of the variation in safety climate. There was 
a statistically significant relationship between upward communication and safety climate supporting 
Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived Organisational Support is positively related to safety climate. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship between Perceived 
Organisational Support (POS) and safety climate. Preliminary analyses showed the relationship to be 
linear with one variable safety climate normally distributed, as assessed by Shaprio-Wilk test (p > 0.05), 
and there were no outliers. There was a strong positive correlation between Perceived Organisational 
Support (POS) and safety climate r (206) = 0.69, P < .001, with perceived organisational support 
explaining 47% of the variation in safety climate. There was a statistically significant relationship 
between P ~ S S and safety climate supporting HypotheSiS 2. 
HypotheSiS 3: Employee Engagement is positively related to safety climate. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship between employee 
engagement and safety climate. Preliminary analyses showed the relationship to be linear, one 
variable, safety climate to be normally distributed, as assessed by Shaprio-Wilk test (p > .05), and there 
were no outliers. There was a strong positive correlation between engagement and safety climate r 
(206) = 0.63, P < .001, with employee engagement explaining 59% of the variation in safety climate. 
There was a statistically significant relationship between Employee Engagement and safety climate 
supporting Hypothesis 3. 
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Hypothesis 4: Leader Member Exchange is positively related to safety climate. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship between LMX and safety 
climate. Preliminary analyses showed the relationship to be linear one variable, safety climate to be 
normally distributed, as assessed by Shaprio-Wilk test (p > .05), and there were no outliers. There was 
a strong positive correlation between LMX and safety climate r (203) = .57, P < .001, with LMX 
explaining 32% of the variation in safety climate. There was a statistically significant relationship 
between LMX and safety climate supporting Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5: Organisational Commitment will be positively correlated to safety climate. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship between organisational 
commitment and safety climate. Preliminary analyses showed the relationship to be linear one variable, 
safety climate to be normally distributed, as assessed by Shaprio-Wilk test (p > .05), and there were no 
outliers. There was a strong positive correlation between organisational commitment and safety climate 
r (203) = 0.61, p < .001, with organisational commitment explaining 37% of the variation in safety 
climate. There was a statistically significant relationship between Organisational Commitment 
supporting Hypothesis 5. 

















POS Engagement LMX 
.68** 
.54** .62** 
.75** .60** .49** 
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7.3.3. Multiple Linear Regression 
Multiple linear regression analysis was run to examine the predictive relationship of safety climate from 
upward communication, POS, LMX, Employee Engagement and Organisational Commitment. 
Hypothesis 6: Upward Communication, POS, Employee Engagement, LMX and Organisational 
Commitment will be significant predictors of safety climate. 
The assumptions of linearity, independence of errors, homoscedasticity, unusual points and normality 
of residuals were met. These variables significantly predicted Safety Climate F (5, 199) = 79.81, P < 
.05, adj. R2 = .65. Three of the variables, upward communication, POS, Engagement and LMX added 
significantly to the prediction, p < .05. Organisational Commitment was not statistically significant. 
Regression coefficients and standard errors can be found in Table 14. Results partially support 
Hypothesis 6. 
Table 14: Regression Coefficients Psychosocial Climate Antecedents of Safety Climate 
Variable a 
Intercept .84 
Upward Communication .35 
POS .12 
Employee Engagement .08 
LMX .08 














*p<.05; B = unstandardised regression co-efficient, SEa = Standard Error of the coefficient 
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7.3.4. Estimating the Relative Importance of Predictors of Safety Climate 
Hypothesis 6 was also investigated using relative weight analysis. Multiple linear regression is one of 
the most commonly used statistical tools for addressing issues related to prediction, such as identifying 
a set of predictors that will maximise the amount of variance explained in the outcome variable. 
However research has documented how indices commonly produced by multiple regression analyses 
fail to correctly partition variance to the various predictors when they are correlated (Darlington, 1968). 
A supplementary approach is relative weight analysis (Fabbris, 1980; Johnson, 2000) which allows for 
more accurate variance partitioning among correlated predictors. 
Standardised regression weights can be seen as flawed measures of importance because of the inter-
correlations amongst the predictors. Relative weight analysis (Fabbris, 1980; Johnson 2000) resolves 
this by using a variable transformation approach to create a new set of predictors that are orthogonal to 
one another. This is achieved by regressing the dependent variable of these new transformed 
predictors, producing a series of standardised regression coefficients. These regression coefficients are 
then rescaled back to the original variables by combining them with the standardised regression 
coefficients obtained by regressing the original predictors on their orthogonal counterparts. This 
produces an estimate of relative importance for each predictor variable (Johnson, 2000). As the weights 
are generated by an orthogonal transformation of the original predictors, they no longer suffer from the 
problems associated with multicollinearity. The individual weights also sum to the overall model R2 and 
can be expressed as a percentage of predictable variance associated with each predictor. 
Information regarding a variable's contribution to predictable variance is useful when considering the 
practical utility of a variable (Cortina and Landis 2009). Relative weight analysis can be seen as a 
useful supplement to multiple regression because it provides information not readily available from the 
indices typically produced from the analysis. Relative weight analysis allows a more comprehensive 
understanding of how various predictors combine in a multiple regression equation as it explains how 
much of the variance in safety climate can be attributed to each predictor variable. 
The relative weights for all variables (Upward Communication, POS, Employee Engagement. LMX and 
Organisational Commitment) were calculated (see Table 15). In addition confidence intervals were 
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computed. Tests of significance were conducted in line with the procedure described in Tonidandel et 
al. (2009). This procedure involves comparing the weight produced by a predictor known not to be 
important in the population that is a randomly generated variable. Then bootstrapping these confidence 
intervals around the difference between the two weights is used to evaluate statistical significance 
across the entire population (see Table 15), the relative weight associated with upward communication 
was significantly larger than the weights for, POS, Employee Engagement, LMX, and Organisational 
Commitment. Similarly, POS was significantly more important than Employee Engagement, LMX and 
Organisational Commitment. 
Table 15: Relative Weight Results for Psychosocial Antecedents of Safety Climate 






























In line with the initial regression results upward communication, POS, Employee Engagement, LMX 
were all Significantly important predictors of safety climate accounting for 37 percent, 20 percent, 16 
percent, 13 percent and 14 percent (respectively) of the predictable variance in safety climate. 
However contrary to the initial regression results Organisational Commitment was also a Significantly 
important predictor accounting for 14 percent of the predicable variance in safety climate. Thus using 
these analyses all variables (upward communication, POS, Employee Engagement, LMX and 
Organisational Commitment predicted safety climate and for that reason Hypothesis 6 was supported 
(see Figure 10). 
144 
Psychosocial Climate 
Upward Communication (37%) 
POS (20) 
Employee Engagement (16%) 
LMX (13%) 
Organisational Commitment (14%) 
Safety Climate 
Figure 10: Illustrative diagram of Psychosocial Climate Predictors of Safety Climate 
7.3.5. Summary of Findings 
As can be seen from the hypothesis testing, with regard to the psychosocial antecedents of safety 
climate, all variables show a significant relationship with safety climate. Regression results show 
Upward communication, POS, Employee Engagement and LMX significantly predict safety climate but 
not Organisational Commitment. Further analysis using relative weight analysis, shows that 
Organisational Commitment is also an important predictor of safety climate. Upward communication 
accounts for the largest percentage of predictable variance in safety climate (37%) followed by POS 
(20%), Employee Engagement (16%), Organisational Commitment (14%) and lastly LMX (13%). 
7.4. Analysis of Possible Subcultures 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was ran to examine if there were any statistically significant differences in safety 
climate, upward communication, POS, LMX, Engagement and OC between where staff are based; on 
site, head office, Newton (supply chain and distribution) or Design. Results are summarised in Table 
16. 
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Hypothesis 7: There will be a statistically significant difference in safety climate between the different 
locations staff are based. 
Safety Climate score was statistically significantly different between the different locations staff were 
based, X2(3) = 50.24, P < .001.Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure 
with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Safety Climate score was statistically significantly 
different between the Head Office and on site (p <.001) and Head Office and other (p <.001) locations. 
There was a statistically Significant difference between safety climate at the different sites. Results 
partially support Hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 8: There will be a statistically significant difference in upward communication between 
where staff are based 
Upward communication score was statistically significantly different between the different locations staff 
were based, X2(3) =11.48, p <.05. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) 
procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. The Upward Communication score 
was statistically significantly different between the on site and design (p <.05) and there was not a 
Significant between on site and head office at (p < .05) locations. Results partially support Hypothesis 8. 
Hypothesis 9: There will be a statistically significant difference in POS between where staff are based 
POS score was statistically significantly different between the different locations staff were based, X2(3) 
= 33.90, p <.001. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. POS score was statistically significantly different 
between the on-site and design (p <.001) and head office and on site (p < .001) locations. Results 
partially support Hypothesis 9. 
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Hypothesis 10: There will be a statistically significant difference in Engagement between where staff 
are based 
Engagement score was statistically significantly different between the different locations staff were 
based, X2(3) = 19.92, P < .001. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure 
with a Sonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Engagement score was statistically significantly 
different between the on-site and head office (p <.001) and design and on site (p <.05) locations. 
Results partially support Hypothesis10. 
Hypothesis 11: There will be a statistically significant difference in LMX between where staff are based 
LMX score was statistically significantly different between the different locations staff were based, X2 (3) 
= 19.92, P <.001. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a 
Sonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. LMX score was statistically Significantly different 
between the on site and head office (p <.001) and design and on site (p <.05) locations. Results 
partially supported Hypothesis 11. 
Hypothesis 12: There will be a statistically significant difference in OC between where staff are based 
Organisational Commitment score was statistically Significantly different between the different locations 
staff were based, X2(3) =20.23, P <.001. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) 
procedure with a Sonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. OC score was statistically significantly 
different between the on-site and head office (p <.001). Results partially support Hypothesis 12. 
147 
Table 16: Pairwise comparisons of work locations 
Safety Upward POS Employee LMX Organisational Climate Communication Engagement Commitment 
Head Office -
Design 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 .59 
Head Office -
.86 1.00 Newton 
1.00 .37 .18 1.00 
Head Office -
.00* .03* Onsite 
.00** .00** .00** .00** 
Design -Newton 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Design - Onsite .00** .05 .00** .02* .01* .08 
Newton - Onsite .16 .69 .14 1.00 1.00 .86 
*p<.05; **p<.OO1 
7.4.1. Summary of Findings 
Each variable, Safety Climate, Upward Communication, POS, Employee Engagement, LMX and 
Organisational Commitment demonstrates a significant difference between head office and on site. 
There is also a significant difference between Design and on site for Safety Climate, POS, Employee 
Engagement but not Upward Communication or Organisational Commitment. There was no Significant 
difference between any of the variables and Head office and Design, or Head Office and Newton, or 
Newton and on site. 
Office based functions (Head office and Design) demonstrate different safety climates and psychosocial 
climates (POS, Employee Engagement, LMX) when compared to site functions. Head office and the 
design services was mostly made up of professional and semi-professional white collar workers. On 
site was mostly made up of blue collar manual workers and Newton, the supply chain and distribution 
function was made up of a mixture of both. These findings can be interpreted as evidence of the 
existence of different subcultures between white collar and blue collar functions in the sponsor 
organisation. Caution should be drawn when interpreting these results, as whilst the numbers for those 
based at head office is almost equal for male (n=27) and females (n=28) on site had also had the 
largest proportion of male employees (n=103) when compared to females (n=7) so these gender 
difference may have influenced the results and were not controlled for in the analysis. Never the less 
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the gender differences in this organisation could be seen as representative of the gender differences in 
the blue and white collar workforce on the whole, with the construction industry being a male dominated 
industry (Barrios and DiDona, 2013). 
7.5. Safety Outcomes 
The following section will present the results of the analysis related to the second research questions 
'What are the factors that shape safety performance in the sponsor organisation?' Safety performance 
was measured by two safety outcomes, self-reported accidents and near misses. The appropriate 
statistical tests and the rational for their use are detailed in this section. The results for the analysis of 
the five factors, Safety Climate, Upward Communication, POS, LMX and Organisational Commitment 
and safety outcomes are presented. The section goes on to present the results of further analysis of 
each safety Climate Dimension in relation to safety outcomes. The section concludes with brief 
summary of these results. 
7.5.1. Statistical Analysis of Count Data 
The occurrences of accidents and near misses are typically infrequent and sporadically experienced by 
employees in an organisation. This means that there are usually large numbers of zeroes in the data. 
Many of the employee population will have never have had an accident or near miss whilst working for 
an organisation. In other words, the underlying distribution of the occurrences of accidents and near 
misses for most of the employee population during their length of service is positively or rightly skewed. 
Conventional multiple linear regression models, which rely on normal assumption, lack the distributional 
properties necessary to describe adequately count variables such as accidents and near misses during 
length of service (e.g. Abdel-Aty and Radwan, 2000). 
The majority of studies exploring the organisational factors related to occupational accidents usually 
employ linear regressions between the explanatory factors and the dependent variable (e.g. accident 
rate or near miss rates). However, the application of classic linear regression models generates 
149 
inconsistent estimates because the number of occupational accidents or near misses is not a 
continuous variable and consequently cannot be assumed to be normally distributed. Rather it is a 
discrete count variable. As a result, these linear regression models are not appropriate to make 
probabilistic statements about accidents and near misses and the statistics derived from these models 
are questionable (Breslow, 1984). 
Neider and Wedderburn (1972) developed their Generalised linear Models (GLM) specifically to 
overcome these limitations. There are two key differences between classic linear models and GLM. 
Firsdy, GLM allows scope for the dependent variable to follow any exponential distribution including the 
normal distribution. Second, there is a more flexible relationship between the dependent and the 
explanatory variable through the introduction of a link function and variance function (Fahrmeir and 
Tutz, 1994). The variance function is the relationship between the mean and the variance of the 
dependent variable that calculates the variance under non-normal conditions. The link function 
describes the (usually) non-linear relationship between the mean of the dependent variable and the 
linear right hand side (of the equation). The link function links the response to the linear predictor. 
7.5.2. Safety Outcomes 
Traditionally, count variables such as accidents and near misses have been estimated using the 
Poisson regression, a method that belongs to GLM. The Poisson regression needs the variance of the 
sample to be equal i.e. an absence of over dispersion and this is not actually the case with the most 
event variables, such as accidents and near misses (Breslow, 1984). 
To deal with the over dispersion problem in count data, one commonly used distribution is the Negative 
Binomial distribution. In this model, the parameter that defines a Poisson process depends on a 
random variable. The Negative Binomial model allows the data to follow a Poisson distribution, but 
assumes that a degree of non-observable heterogeneity exists. Thus, if the mean and the variance are 
not equal, the negative binomial regression introduces a dispersion parameter that follows a gamma 
(alternative) distribution to accommodate the over dispersion. 
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7.5.2.1. Accidents Reported 
As can be seen in Graph 1, the dependent variable, accidents reported distribution is skewed. The 
incidence of zero counts are over dispersed n=59. The unconditional mean of the DV (reported 
accidents) variable is 0.46 which is much lower than its variance 1.60. As the data is over-dispersed 
and the conditional variance exceeded the conditional mean the Negative Binomial model is used. 
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Hypothesis 13: Safety Climate, Upward Communication, LMX, POS, Employee Engagement and 
Organisational Commitment are significantly related to number of accidents reported. 
151 
Table 17. The table provides several indices of the goodness-of-fit of the model. These measures can 
be used to compare models. The deviance (748.14) is evaluated as Chi-Square distributed with the 
model degrees of freedom (198). Goodness-of-fit measures and the deviance, show this model is 
significantly worse from a full model (or a saturated model) and is non-significant. If the tests had been 
statistically significant, it would indicate that the data does not fit the model well. The omnibus test 
(likelihood ratio chi-square) provides a test of the overall model comparing this model to a model 
without any predictors (a "null" model). The current model is a significant improvement over such a 
model (p=.000). 















The results of the negative binomial regression analyses can be found in Table 18. In each of the 
models Upwards Communication, Safety Climate, LMX, POS, Employee Engagement and 
Organisational Commitment are included as predictors and length of service is controlled for, as this is 
likely to affect the whole data set. The longer the length of service the higher the likelihood is of having 
an accident or near miss. 
The results of The Negative Binomial for accidents reported are presented in Table 18. Results reveal 
that upward communication significantly predicts accidents reported (p<.001) and the direction of the 
relationship is negative, suggesting poorer upward communication increases accident reporting. The 
exponential is .04 suggesting a decrease in upward communication increases the probability of an 
accident being reported by 28.57. 
Safety climate significantly predicts accidents reported (p<.001). The direction of the relationship is 
positive suggesting the more positive the safety climate the more accidents reported. The exponential 
is 4225.50 suggesting for every unit increase in safety climate the probability of an accident reported 
increases by 4225.49. 
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P ~ S S significantly predicts accidents reported (p<.001). The direction of the relationship is positive, 
suggesting the higher the POS the more accidents reported. The exponential is 15.27 suggesting a unit 
increase in POS increases the probability of an accident being reported increases by 15.27. 
LMX significantly predicts accidents reported (p<.001) . The direction of the relationship is negative 
suggesting the less positive the supervisor relationship the more accidents reported. The exponential is 
0.74 suggesting for every unit decrease in LMX the probability of an accident reported increase by 1.36. 
Organisational Commitment significantly predicts accidents reported (p<.001). The direction of the 
relationship is negative suggesting poorer organisational commitment the more accident reported . The 
exponential is .71 suggesting the probability of an accident being reported increases by .29. Employee 
Engagement does not significantly predict accident reported . Results partially support Hypothesis 13 
(see Figure 11). 
Safety Climate (+) 
Upward Communication (-) 
POS (+) 
LMX (-) 
Organisational Commitment (-) 






































The dependent variable, near misses reported distribution is skewed. The incidence of zero counts are 
over dispersed n=211. See Graph 2. The unconditional mean of the near misses reported variable 2.54 
is much lower than its variance 7.13. As the data is over-dispersed and the conditional variance 
exceeded the conditional mean the Negative binomial is used to analyse the data, for that reason a 
Negative binomial model was used test Hypothesis 14. 
Hypothesis 14: Safety climate, upward communication, LMX, POS, Employee Engagement and 
Organisational Commitment are significantly related to number of near misses reported. 
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The table 19 provides several indices of the goodness-of-fit of the model. These measures can be 
used to compare models. The deviance (4768.53) is evaluated as chi-square distributed with the model 
degrees of freedom (198). Goodness-of-fit measures and the deviance results show this model is 
significantly worse from a full model (or a saturated model) and is non-significant. If the tests had been 
statistically significant, it would indicate that the data does not fit the model well. The omnibus test 
(likelihood ratio chi-square) provides a test of the overall model comparing this model to a model 
without any predictors (a "null" model). The current model is a significant improvement over such a 
model (p =.000) . 
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The results of the negative binomial for near misses reported presented in Table 18, reveal that upward 
communication significantly predicts near misses reported (p<.001). The direction of the relationship is 
negative, suggesting the poorer upward communication the more near misses reported. The 
exponential is .69 suggesting that for every unit decrease in upward communication this increases the 
probability of reporting a near miss by 1.45. 
Safety climate significantly predicts near misses reported (p<.001). The direction of the relationship is 
positive suggesting a positive safety climate increases near miss reporting. The exponential is 72.23, 
this suggests for every unit increase in safety climate this increases the probability of reporting a near 
miss by 72.23. 
POS also significantly predicts near miss reporting (p<.001). The direction of the relationship is positive, 
suggesting a perceived supportive environment increases near misses reported. The exponential is .63 
this suggests the for every unit increase in POS the probability of a near miss being reported is 
increased by .63. Employee Engagement. LMX or Organisational Commitment does not significantly 
predict near misses reported. Hence HypotheSiS 14 is partially supported (see Figure 12). 
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Safety Climate(+) 
Upward Communication (-) 
POS (+) 
Figure 12: Illustrative Diagram of the Predictors of Near Misses Reported 
7.5.3. Summary of Findings 
Near Misses 
Reported 
The results show that upward communication, Safety Climate, POS show a significant relationship with 
both accidents and near misses reported (while controlling for length of service). LMX and 
Organisational Commitment show a significant relationship with accidents reported only. Upward 
communication reported demonstrates a negative relationship with accidents and near misses reported, 
this suggests that poor upward communication leads to more accidents and near misses reported . POS 
demonstrated a positive relationship suggesting the more supported employees feel by the organisation 
the more accidents and near misses are reported . LMX and Organisational Commitment demonstrate a 
negative relationship with accidents reported suggesting the less positive the supervisor employee 
relationship and the lower the employee's commitment to the organisation the more accidents reported. 
Safety climate is the strongest predictor of both of reported accidents and near misses and this 
relationship is positive suggesting that the more positive the safety climate the more accidents and near 
misses reported. However the exponentials (probabilities) for safety climate and accidents and near 
misses reported are very large, these next section aims to explain these results further by analysing the 
relationship of each safety climate dimension to safety outcomes (reported accidents and near misses). 
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7.6. Safety Climate Dimensions and Safety Outcomes 
As the previous analysis revealed some unusually large exponentials in relation to safety climate and 
accidents and near misses reported (see Table 1B). The safety climate measure was broken down 
further into the different dimensions included in the safety climate questionnaire; these were Senior 
Management Commitment (perceptions of senior manager's commitment to safety), Safety Priority 
(perceptions of the priority safety over production in the organisation), Safety Rules (individual 
compliance to safety rules), Supportive Environment (Perceptions of support to report safety issues 
without fear of blame), Personal Priority (Individual priority of safety), Work Environment (perceived job 
demands). 
Hypothesis 15: The different safety climate dimensions (Senior Management Commitment, Safety 
Rules, Supportive Environment, Personal Priority and Work Environment) will be Significantly related to 
reported accidents. 
The goodness-of-fit of the model is shown in Table 20. The table provides several indices of the 
goodness-of-fit of the model. These measures can be used to compare models. The deviance 
(2121.901) is evaluated as chi-square distributed with the model degrees of freedom (201). Goodness-
of-fit measures and the deviance show this model is significantly worse from a full model (or a saturated 
model) and is non-significant. If the tests had been statistically Significant, it would indicate that the data 
does not fit the model well. The omnibus test (likelihood ratio chi-square) provides a test of the overall 
model comparing this model to a model without any predictors (a "null" model). The current model is a 
significant improvement over such a model (p=.OOO). 
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The results of the negative binomial for the breakdown of safety climate and reported accidents 
presented in Table 21, reveals that Senior Management commitment is a significant predictor of 
accidents reported (p< .001). The direction of this relationship is negative, suggesting poorer 
management commitment leads to more reported accidents. The exponential is 2.615, suggesting that 
for every decrease in management commitment the probability of reporting an accident increases by 
0.38. 
Safety Priority is also significantly related to the number of accidents reported (p<.001). The direction of 
this relationship is positive suggesting that the higher the priority of production over safety the more 
accidents reported. The exponential is 116.06, suggesting that for every increase in safety in the priority 
production over safety the probability of a reported accident is increased by 116.06. 
Personal Priority significantly predicted accidents reported (p<.001). The direction of the relationship is 
positive suggesting that the more an individual prioritises safety the more accidents are reported. The 
exponential is 60.81, suggesting that for every unit increase in an individual's personal priority of safety 
the probability of accident reported is increased by 4.1. 
Work Environment is a significant predictor of accidents reported (p<.001). The relationship is positive 
suggesting the higher the job demands the more accidents reported. The exponential is 182.38 
suggesting that for every increase in job demands and work pressure the probability of accidents 
reported increases by 182.38. 
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Safety Rules and Supportive Environment did not show a significant relationship with accidents 
reported. Only the safety climate dimensions, Senior Management Commitment, Personal Priority and 
Work Environment demonstrated a significant relationship to accidents reported, but not Safety Rules 
and Supportive Environment thus the Hypothesis 15 is partially supported (see Figure 13). 
Safety Climate 
Management Commitment (-) 
Safety Priority (+) 
Personal Priority (+) 
Work Environment (+) 
Accidents Reported 
Figure 13: Illustrative Diagram of Safety Climate Dimensions that Predict Accidents Reported 
Table 21: Negative binomials for safety climate dimensions and reported accidents and near misses 
Reported Accidents Reported Near Misses 
Model 8 Exb(8) 8 Exp(8) 
Senior Management Commitment -10.55** 2.62 -8.90** .000 
Safety Priority 4.75** 116.07 6.10** 446.82 
Safety Rules .47 1.60 1.60** 4.974 
Supportive Environment .902 2.46 -2.64** .071 
Personal Priority 4.11 ** 60.80 -1.41 ** .25 
Work Environment 5.21** 182.38 -.31* .74 
*p<O.05; **p<.O.OO1 
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Hypothesis 14: The different safety climate dimensions (Senior Management Commitment, Safety 
Rules, Supportive Environment, Personal Priority and Work Environment) will be significantly related to 
reported near misses. 
Table 22 provides several indices of the goodness-of-fit of the model. These measures can be used to 
compare models. The deviance (1349.109) is evaluated as chi-square distributed with the model 
degrees of freedom (204). The Goodness-of-fit measures and the deviance show this model is 
Significantly worse from a full model (or a saturated model) and is non-significant. If the tests had been 
statistically Significant, it would indicate that the data do not fit the model well. The omnibus test 
(likelihood ratio chi-square) provides a test of the overall model comparing this model to a model 
without any predictors (a "null" model). The current model is a significant improvement over such a 
model (p=.OOO). 















The results of negative binomial for the breakdown of safety climate dimensions and near misses 
reported, controlling for length of service is presented in Table 21. The results reveal that Senior 
Management Commitment significanHy predicts the number of accidents reported (p<.001). This 
relationship is negative suggesting that the poorer management commitment to safety the more near 
misses reported. The exponential is .000 suggesting that for every decrease in management 
commitment the probability of a near miss being reported increases by 1. 
Safety Priority significanHy predicts near misses reported (p<.001). The direction of this relationship is 
positive, suggesting that the higher the prioritisation of safety the more near misses reported. The 
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exponential is 446.817 suggesting that for every unit increase in safety prioritisation over safety the 
probability of a near miss being reported increases by 0.002. 
Safety Rules significantly predicts the number of near misses reported (p<.001). The direction of this 
relationship is positive suggesting the higher regard for individual safety compliance the more near 
misses reported. The exponential is 4.974 suggesting that for every increase regard for individual 
compliance increases the probability of a near miss being reported increases by 4.97. 
Supportive Environment significantly predicts (p<.001) the number misses reported. The direction of 
this relationship is negative suggesting the less supported employees feel to report safety issues 
without fear of blame the more near misses are reported. The exponential is .07, suggesting that for 
every decrease in supportive environment the probability of a near miss being reported is increased by 
1.40. 
Personal Priorities significantly predicts near misses reported (p<.001). The direction of this relationship 
is negative suggesting that the more individual employees prioritise safety the less near misses are 
reported. The exponential is .25 suggesting that for every decrease in individual priority of safety the 
probability of a near miss being reported increases by 4.08. 
Work environment significantly predicts near misses reported (p<.05). The direction of this relationship 
is negative suggesting the lower the job demands the more near misses are reported. The exponential 
is .737, suggesting that for every decrease in job demands the probability of a near miss being reported 
increases by 1.35. 
All safety climate dimensions, Senior Management Commitment, Safety Rules, Supportive 
Environment, Personal Priority and Work Environment demonstrated a significant relationship to near 
misses reported so the results support Hypothesis 14 (see Figure. 14). 
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Safety Climate 
Management Commitment (-) 
Safety Priority (+) 
Safety Rules (+) 
Personal Priority (-) 
Work Environment (-) 
Near Misses 
Reported 
Figure 14: Illustrative Diagram of Safety Climate Dimensions that Predict Near Misses Reported 
7.6.1. Summary of Findings 
When the results of the safety climate measure are broken down into the different dimensions of safety 
climate, Senior Management Commitment, Safety Priority, Personal Priority and Work Environment all 
significantly predict both accidents and near misses reported. Safety rules and Supportive Environment 
significantly predict near misses reported only. 
Management Commitment shows a negative relationship with accidents and near misses reported , 
suggesting that poor Management Commitment leads to more accidents and near misses reported . 
Safety priority demonstrates a negative relationship suggesting that the higher safety is prioritised the 
more accidents and near misses are reported. For Personal Priority and Work Environment the 
relationships are the opposite direction for accidents and near misses reported. Suggesting that more 
individuals prioritise safety the more accidents are reported, but the less near misses reported. The 
higher the job demands and work pressures the more accidents reported but the less near misses 
reported. Personal Priorities and Supportive Environment showed a significant relationship with near 
misses reported and the direction of these relationships were negative suggesting the less individuals 
prioritised safety more near misses were reported and the less supported employees felt to raise safety 
concerns without blame the more near misses reported. 
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7.7. Summary 
Results of the analysis show, in regard to safety climate antecedents, upward communication, POS, 
Employee Engagement and LMX are significant predictor safety climate. Further analysis shows that 
Organisational Commitment is also an important predictor of safety climate. Upward communication 
accounts for the largest percentage of predictable variance in safety climate (37%) followed by POS 
(20%), Employee Engagement (16%), Organisational Commitment (14%) and lastly LMX (13%). 
Between group analysis showed a significant difference for all the variables (Upward Communication, 
Safety Climate, POS, Employee Engagement, LMX and Organisational Commitment) between the 
office based (white collar) and site based (blue collar) locations. This can be taken as evidence of 
different subcultures between office and site based functions. 
With regard to safety outcomes (accidents and near misses), upward communication, Safety Climate, 
POS show a significant relationship with both accidents and near misses reported (while controlling for 
length of service). LMX and Organisational Commitment show a significant relationship with only 
accidents reported. When the results are broken down into the different safety climate dimensions, 
Senior Management Commitment, Safety Priority, Personal Priority and Work Environment show a 
Significant relationship with both accidents and near misses reported. Safety Rules and Supportive 
Environment show a significant relationship with near misses reported only. An interesting picture 
emerges when the directions of these relationships are examined with many the opposite direction of 
the way, one would anticipate and previous research would support. 
The next chapter discusses these findings in more detail, how these findings support or refute the 
conclusions of previous research on safety climate antecedents and outcomes. The chapter then 
outlines the theoretical contributions of the thesis, its strengths and limitations. The chapter concludes 
by outlining the practical implications and directions for further research. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
8.1. Overview 
The purpose of this Chapter is to consider in depth the results detailed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. This 
chapter will commence with a summary of the main study findings of the qualitative studies (Chapter 5 
and 6) and the quantitative study (Chapter 7). A key focus will be on those findings demonstrating the 
particular theoretical contribution to knowledge in the area of safety culture and safety performance 
research. The chapter concludes by considering the strengths, limitations of the studies, directions for 
future research and the implications for practical applications. 
8.1.1. Summary of Qualitative Findings 
The qualitative evidence collectively offered an insight into not only the key influences on safety climate 
and safety outcomes in the sponsor organisation, but also how the variables identified were related to 
the organisational context they were embedded in. Results of the focus groups and interviews (Chapter 
5 and 6) identified Communication, Leadership, Job Demands, Health and Safety Prioritisation, 
Employee Engagement/Involvement and Culture, were identified as the main themes. Unsurprisingly 
the focus group and interview resulting themes mirror each other. However the interviews allowed the 
themes identified through the focus groups to be explored in more depth with participants from front line 
site based employees, middle and senior management. The analysis identified an additional 24 
subthemes. The main themes are described below. 
1. Communication - Poor communication was cited by site based and office based employees including 
management as a factor influencing safety performance and something that the sponsor organisation 
was poor at. This was characterised by being top down, with a lack of face to face communication and 
an over reliance on e-mails, with particularly poor communication to site, the fact that sites were based 
a significant distance from the head office functions, only exacerbated this and acted as a barrier to 
communication. 
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2. Leadership - Poor leadership was also cited influence on safety performance particularly by the site 
based employees. With regard to senior managers there was reference to a lack of visibility on site and 
a perceived lack of support. Managers were seen as unapproachable, lacking in accountability and 
having a poor an understanding of site. The perception of those in more hands on operational roles in 
particular was that this negatively affected safe working practices. Site based employees felt they were 
not well informed of the outcomes of accidents and incidents reported. Managers felt more informed of 
the outcomes of accident investigations. A number also felt that accident investigations did not 
adequately identify root causes leading to reduced organisational learning. 
3. Job Demands - Employees involved in operational delivery cited poor planning as an issue affecting 
safety performance, poor costing and scheduling of projects when bidding for contracts, leaving them 
under resourced leading to a 'fire fighting' approach. This was amplified by commercial pressures. 
Managers were more aware of the client demands i.e. wanting more for less. Site based employees 
cited long working hours and working weeks impacted negatively impacted on tiredness levels and 
work life balance. 
4. Health and Safety Prioritisation -Interviewees reported high individual priority of safety. However site 
based operational employees reported mixed messages when it came to safety versus production. The 
corporate message was safety first, but the underlying message was production first. These messages 
were seen as less ambiguous by senior managers who reinforced the safety first message. This was 
indirecUy reinforced by financial incentives being attached to production for managers. Health and 
safety policies and procedures were seen as difficult to follow and understand leading to corners 
sometimes being cut to get the job done and operational staff suggested they did not have the best 
PPE for the job. 
5. Employee Engagement & Involvement - The operational employees felt there was a lack of 
consultation in decisions which had implications for their job and ways of working. This led to reduced 
morale job satisfaction. Operational employees stated there was a lack of reward and recognition and 
the long working hours negatively affected safety, this lack of recognition was acknowledged by senior 
management but to a lesser extent. 
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6. Culture -The front line operational staff interviewed felt there was a blame culture with several able 
to recall experiences of reprisals and negative consequences for reporting their concerns this led to 
under reporting of accidents, incidents and near misses. This was exacerbated by an 'us and them' 
culture where there was a lack of understanding of site by the office based functions. Both managers 
and operational employees made reference to an 'us and them' culture do to the substantial growth of 
the organisation over recent years. 
Communication was one of the main themes identified in the qualitative studies. O'Connor et al. (2011) 
recognised communication as a key dimension included in safety climate measures in the aviation 
industry. The authors suggest that this is of particular importance as different occupational groups work 
together but are not co-located. This creates particular challenges for communication, as these groups 
are not able to engage in informal and spontaneous interaction. Parallels can be drawn with the 
industry the sponsor organisation operates in where operational workers are based on sites remote 
from office functions, certainly the results of the qualitative studies purport to this. Other researchers 
have found a link between upward communication (the degree to which employees are able to raise 
safety concerns and safety climate (Kath et aI., 2010) and accidents (Hofmann and Margeson, 1999). 
Leadership another key theme identified in the qualitative studies has received attention in the safety 
climate literature, where leadership and management attitudes have been identified as a key dimension 
of safety climate (Flin et aI., 2000; Seo et aI., 2004; 0 Connor et aI., 2010) and have been found to be a 
robust predictor of safety outcomes (Christian et aI., 2009; Beus et aI., 2010). 
The other two themes Safety priority and Job demands, are closely linked and the relationship between 
work pressures, job demands and safety climate has been well established (Mearns and Flin et aI., 
2001; Zohar, 2003; Nahrgang et aI., 2010). Pressure for production has a negative effect on employee 
safety (Landsberg is et al., 1999) and the more an organisation places a greater emphasis on 
production the more employees perceive that safety is secondary to the demands of production 
(Janssen et aI., 1995). 
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Employee engagement & involvement was another identified theme. There is some evidence to link 
employee engagement to safety outcomes (Harter et aI., 2002; Nahrgang et aI., 2010). If engagement 
is broadly conceptualised as work related attitudes then organisational commitment and job satisfaction 
have also shown a relationship with safety outcomes (Clarke, 2010). 
The final theme was Culture; negative safety climates characterised by punitive approaches to safety 
management and blame, reduce communication about safety concerns and in turn negatively affect 
safety behaviours, safety compliance and accident rates (Edmondson, 1996; Reason, 1998; Cheyne et 
aI., 1998; Zohar, 2003). 
The results suggest the main themes, Communication, Leadership, Safety Priority, Job Demands, 
Employee Engagement & Involvement and Culture are not dissimilar to other research in the field in 
regard to the main variables that have been identified as having the potential to influence safety culture 
and safety outcomes. 
The results of both of the qualitative studies allowed in-depth exploration of the organisational culture, 
the policies, practices, values and beliefs the sponsor organisation and its employees held about 
safety. This information and the key themes identified were able to inform the development of the 
quantitative study a safety climate questionnaire. Despite the ambiguity and confusion around the 
definitions of safety climate and culture (Flin, 2000) it could be argued that using both a qualitative and 
quantitative approach enabled the researcher to explore both safety culture and safety climate in the 
sponsor organisation. 
8.2. Summary of Quantitative Findings 
This section provides an overview of the findings of the quantitative study (Chapter 7). The key findings 
will be presented in relation to the research question for the thesis, 'what are the factors shaping safety 
culture and safety performance in the sponsor organisation?' 
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8.2.1. Psychosocial Antecedents of Safety Climate 
There is a significant relationship between all psychosocial organisational variables LMX, POS, 
Employee Engagement, Organisational Commitment and Safety Climate. All variables, Upward 
Communication, LMX, POS Employee Engagement, except Organisational Commitment, significantly 
predict safety climate. Further analysis (Relative weight analysis) shows that Organisational 
Commitment is also an important predictor of safety climate. Upward Communication accounts for the 
largest percentage of predictable variance in safety climate (37%) followed by POS (20%), Employee 
Engagement (16%), Organisational Commitment (14%) and lastly LMX (13%). These findings support 
previous research which has shown a relationship between safety climate and upward communication 
(Hofmann et aI., 2003), POS (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999,; Gvekye and Salminen, 2007; Mearns et 
al., 2009) Employee Engagement (Nahrgang et aI., 2010) and Organisational Commitment (Clarke, 
2010). 
8.2.2. Safety Climate Sub Cultures 
When this is broken down by location; on site, head office, supply chain and logistics and design, and 
these locations are compared there are significant differences between; head office and on site, design 
and onsite for safety climate, POS, Employee Engagement and LMX. There was a significant difference 
between head office and on site for Upward Communication and Organisational Commitment only. The 
design and head office personnel can be typically described as white collar workers whereas the site 
based staff can be described as blue collar workers, as their role predominantly involved manual 
labour. This supports the results of the qualitative study where employees referred to an 'us and them 
culture' between office based and site based staff. The results also reflect that of previous research 
which refers to different sub cultures in the sponsor organisations (Clarke, 2000). 
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8.2.3. Safety Climate and Safety Outcomes 
This section will describe the results of the analysis of safety climate and safety outcomes (accidents 
and near misses reported). The safety climate dimensions and their relationship to safety climate 
outcomes will be discussed, linking these findings to previous research. 
Interestingly when looking which variables predict self-reported accidents and near misses, whilst 
controlling for length of service there are some apparent unexpected differences. As expected safety 
climate is the strongest predictor of self-reported accidents and near misses but unlike other findings 
this relationship is positive suggesting that a positive safety climate increases the probability of 
accidents and near misses reported. A large number of studies have demonstrated that perceptions of 
safety climate are negatively correlated with accidents (Griffin and Neal, 2000; Hofmann and Stetzer, 
1996; Clarke, 2006; Christian et aI., 2009; Beus et al., 2010). These findings demonstrate the opposite 
relationship i.e. the more positive the safety climate the more accidents and near misses reported. 
When the safety climate dimensions are analysed separately in their relation to safety outcomes 
(accidents and near misses reported) the results appears to reflect some of the findings of the safety 
climate literature. Management Commitment (how committed management are to safety), Safety 
Priority (the priory the organisation gives to safety over production), Personal Priority (individual priory 
of safety), Work Environment Gob demands and pressure) show a significant relationship with both 
accidents and near misses reported. Safety Rules (safety compliance) and Supportive Environment 
(how supported employees feel to report safety concerns) demonstrate a significant relationship with 
near misses reported only. 
Management Commitment shows a negative relationship with accidents and near misses reported, 
suggesting that poor Management Commitment increases the probability of accidents and near misses 
being reported. This result links to previous research which shows that management commitment is a 
robust predictor of safety outcomes (Beus et aI., 2010; Michael et aI., 2005). Bridges (2000) found that 
when employees perceive low levels of management commitment to safety near misses are under-
reported. 
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Safety priority appears to be the safety climate dimension with the largest influence on the probability of 
accidents and near misses being reported. Safety priority demonstrates a positive relationship 
suggesting that the more safety is prioritised over production the less chance accidents and near 
misses are reported. Pressure for production has been identified as a key safety climate dimension 
(Flin et aI., 2000; Sec et aI., 2004; O'Connor, 2011), this links into previous research examining under 
reporting of accidents and production pressure. Probst and Graso (2013) found high levels of 
production pressure lead to more accidents but fewer are reported to the organisation. 
Interestingly for Personal Priority and Work Environment the relationships are the opposite direction for 
accidents and near misses reported. The higher the job demands and work pressures the more 
accidents reported but the less near misses reported. These results suggest that more individuals 
prioritise safety the more accidents are reported, but the less near misses reported. Personal Priority for 
safety can be described as how much an individual prioritises safety. The results are explained in the 
context of previous research linking risk taking to safety outcomes (Brown et aI., 2000). 
Work Environment shows a significant relationship with accidents reported and the direction of the 
relationship is positive demonstrating that high job demands are related to an increased probability of 
accidents reported. This result supports previous research which has demonstrated that high job 
demands are related to increased injuries and accidents (Mearns and Flin et aI., 2001; Zohar, 2003; 
Nahrgang et aI., 2010). Work environment demonstrated a significant relationship with near misses 
reported, however the direction of this relationship is negative, the opposite of accidents, suggesting 
the poorer the work environment the greater the probability of near misses being reported. This finding 
supports previous research. Goldenhar et al., (2003) found a significant relationship between job 
demands and near misses reported, when examining the relationship between job stressors, injury and 
near misses in construction workers. Morrow and Crum (2004) also found support for increased job 
demands, namely fatigue inducing factors and increased reporting of close calls in their study of truck 
drivers. Kath et aI., (2010) also found job demands had a positive association with safety 
communication suggesting that workers are more likely to discuss safety concerns with their 
supervisors when job demands interfere with safety. 
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The results show safety rules significantly predicts near misses reporting and the direction of this 
relationship is positive, i.e. the more an individual complies with safety rules the higher the probability of 
a near miss being reported. Safety compliance refers to the core activities that individuals need to carry 
out to maintain workplace safety. These behaviours include adhering to standard work procedures and 
wearing personal protective equipment (Neil and Griffin, 2006). Safety compliance as a safety outcome 
has received some attention in the safety literature (Rumundo, 2000, Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996; 
Brown et aI., 2000; Probst, 2004; Clarke, 2006; Neil and Griffin, 2006). Conversely previous research 
has shown that safety compliance is negatively correlated with accidents and near miss rates (Neil and 
Griffin, 2006; Probst, 2004). The results do support previous findings that demonstrate a relationship 
with compliance and near misses although the direction of this relationship is the opposite of previous 
findings. This can be explained in the context of safety citizenship behaviours (Hofmann and Morgeson, 
1999) that is, reporting near misses and safety concerns in a positive safety behaviour aimed at helping 
the organisation learn from hazards, hence those who comply with safety rules are also more likely to 
report safety concerns. 
8.2.4. Psychosocial Climate and Safety Outcomes 
This section will describe the results of the analysis of the psychosocial climate variables, upward 
communication, POS, LMX and Organisational Commitment and safety outcomes (accidents and near 
misses reported). This section will link the findings to previous research on the antecedents of safety 
outcomes. 
Upward communication was shown to be a significant predictor of reported accidents and near misses 
and the relationship was negative i.e. poor upward communication decreased the probability of an 
accident or near miss being reported. These findings are in line with previous research which has found 
a negative relationship with poor upward communication and accidents reported (Hofmann and 
Morgeson, 1999). 
The results also demonstrated a significant relationship between POS and accidents and near misses 
reported and this relationship is positive; suggesting the more supported employees feel by the 
organisation the greater the probability of accidents and near misses being reported. There is limited 
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research examining the relationship between P ~ S S and accidents. However these findings are contrary 
to previous findings which demonstrated high P ~ s s results in fewer accidents (Hofmann et aI., 2003). 
LMX significantly predicts accidents reported and the direction of the relationship is negative suggesting 
the less positive the supervisor relationship the more accidents reported. LMX did not show a 
significant relationship with the number of near misses reported. These findings support previous 
research which has demonstrated the more positive the leader subordinate relationship the less 
accidents reported (Michael et al., 2006). 
Organisational commitment significantly predicts accidents reported but not near misses. The direction 
of the relationship is negative suggesting poor organisational commitment results in an increased 
probability of accident being reported. There is some research linking organisational commitment to 
safety climate (Mearns and Hope 2005; Mearns et aI., 2010) but only one study to date has attempted 
to examine the relationship between organisational commitment and safety outcomes. Clarke, (2010) 
found organisational commitment was found to mediate the relationship between safety climate and 
safety outcomes. The findings of this study suggest there is a direct link between organisational 
commitment and safety outcomes (accidents). Engagement did not show a significant relationship with 
reported accidents or near misses reported. 
The quantitative study generated some interesting findings. The examination of the safety climate 
antecedents for the most part supported previous findings on the psychosocial antecedents of safety 
climate, yet some variables such as organisational commitment and employee engagement have little 
research linking them to safety climate. Not much research to date has explicitly addressed the 
relationship between organisational attributes and safety climate and outcomes, and some of the 
results in relation to safety outcomes demonstrate some contradictory relationships. These results and 
their theoretical contributions are discussed in more depth in the following section. 
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8.3. Interpretation of Key Findings and Theoretical Contributions 
The analysis of the psychosocial safety climate antecedents show that upward communication, P ~ S , ,
Employee Engagement, LMX and Organisational Commitment predict safety climate, this supports 
previous findings (Hofmann et al., 2003; Gyekye and Salminen, 2007; Mearns et aI., 2010; Nahrgang et 
aI., 2010; Clarke, 2010). The findings in relation to safety outcomes (reported accidents and near 
misses) are less clear cut. Upward communication and organisational commitment demonstrate a 
predictive relationship with accidents and the direction of the relationship is positive, this supports 
previous research findings (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Clarke, 2010) 
The other factors which significantly predict accidents and near misses reported are related to previous 
findings (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996; Brown et al., 2000; Rumundo, 2000; Griffin and Neal, 2000, 
2006; Mearns and Flin, et aI., 2001; Zohar, 2002, 2003; Goldenhar; 2003; Probst, 2004; Michael et aI., 
2005,2006; Clarke, 2006; Christian et aI., 2009; Beus et aI., 2010; Nahrgang et aI., 2010; Kath et aI., 
2010). However the direction of this relationship is not the direction you would expect in light of 
previous findings. For example when compared to the other five dimensions that demonstrate a 
Significant relationship with safety outcomes; upward communication, P ~ S , , LMX and Organisational 
Commitment, Safety Climate is the biggest predictors of the probability of an accident and near miss 
being reported. However the direction of this relationship is positive, this means that the more positive 
the safety climate the higher the probability of accidents and near misses being reported. 
Another counter intuitive finding is that P ~ S S is predictive of accidents and near misses reported but the 
direction of this relationship is positive i.e. the higher the P ~ S S the greater the probability of accidents 
and near misses reported. Previous findings demonstrate the opposite high P ~ S S is related to lower 
accidents rates (Hoffman et aI., 2003). There are two possible explanations of these findings: 
1) The methodology is flawed, the results are unique to this particular organisation/industry or the 
research results are atypical. There were various steps taken throughout the thesis to ensure 
methodological rigour (See Chapter 4). Adopting a triangulated methodology, combining both 
qualitative and quantitative studies reduces the limitation of single method bias. The results of the 
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qualitative studies also demonstrate some similar findings and provide contextual insights for 
interpretation of the results, which will be discussed later. In addition factor analysis scores of the 
dimensions included in the safety climate measure used in the quantitative study (Chapter 7) compare 
to the original safety climate questionnaire (included in the Safety Climate Toolkit) (Cox and Cheyne, 
2000) demonstrating constancy across this particular industry. 
2) On reflection, the methodology adopted was fit for purpose (Gilner and Morgan, 2000) and there is 
no reason for the sponsor organisation or the industry it operates in to be fundamentally different from 
any other industry sector. Another explanation is in relation to the measure of safety outcomes. 
Accidents and near miss data was collected as subjective self-report data not objective data from the 
organisation's accident database. Previous research has demonstrated these statistics are not 
comparable, with high levels of under reporting. For example Probst and Estrada (2010) found 
employees fail to report 71% of all work-related injuries to the company. The findings suggest that 
rather than measuring the occurrence of accidents and near misses, collecting self report accident and 
near miss data is actually a measure of a psychological and social phenomenon - reporting behaviour. 
These results can be explained through the theory of social exchange (Blau, 1964). 
8.3.1. Reporting Behaviour as a Social Exchange 
Social Exchange Theory (Blau, 1964) implies that if one party acts in a way that benefits another party, 
an implicit commitment for future reciprocity is produced (Gouldner, 1960). Social exchange theory 
proposes that favourable treatment or resources received from others are more highly valued when 
employees believe them to be based on discretionary action rather than specifically mandated 
(Eisenberger et al., 1997). Rhoades and Eisenberger (2002) concluded from the results of their meta-
analysis that employees' general beliefs that their organisation values their contributions and is 
concemed about their well-being are associated with high levels of affective commitment to the 
organisation, less withdrawal from active participation, and increased job performance and 
organisational citizenship behaviours (OCB). 
Organisational citizenship behaviours are essentially discretionary behaviours (undertaken by 
employees) which go beyond an individual's job-role but improve the functioning of the organisation 
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(Organ, 1988). A meta-analysis by Podsakoff et al. (2000) has shown that discretional actions such as 
OCBs have significant benefits for organisations in terms of their social environments and actual 
production levels. Furthermore, it has been shown that positive perceptions of organisation support and 
leader subordinate relationships (Remus et aI., 2007) can result in employees showing increased 
organisational citizenship behaviours and commitment towards the organisation (Coyle-Shapiro, 2002). 
Safety related exchanges can also be conceptualised from an exchange perspective (Hofmann and 
Stetzer, 1996). Safety research has broadened organisational citizenship behaviours to behaviours 
related to workplace safety, these are referred to as safety citizenship behaviours (Hofmann et al., 
2003; Turner et aI., 2005). Safety citizenship behaviours are similar to organisational citizenship 
behaviour except they focus on improving safety performance (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999). 
Some researchers in the field of safety have become interested in how the social exchange process 
helps shape safety related perceptions and safety behaviour and examined perceptions of 
organisational support (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Meams and Hope, 2005; Mearns and Reader, 
2008; Mearns et aI., 2010), the leader subordinate relationships (Hofmann et aI., 2003; Michael et aI., 
2006; Kath et aI., 2010), upward communication (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Kath et aI., 2010) and 
organisational commitment (Clarke, 2010; Mearns et aI., 2010) Social exchanges between both the 
organisation and their supervisor have shown a relationship with safety outcomes including accidents, 
safety communication, safety citizenship behaviour and compliance (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999, 
Hofmann et aI., 2003, Mearns and Reader, 2008; Kath et aI., 2010). 
If as hypothesised reported accidents and near misses are actually measuring the psychological and 
social phenomenon of reporting behaviour, hence it is logical to assume accident and near miss 
reporting are actually safety citizenship behaviours. Reporting accidents and near misses can 
improving safety performance, as the information in regard to accidents can increase organisational 
learning and in tum inform the develop future safety solutions. If the accident or near miss is not 
reported by the employee then valuable knowledge is lost and this could prevent the organisation from 
identifying dangerous organisational, situational, or behaviour patterns and preventing improvements in 
the overall organisational health and safety. The findings suggest that reporting behaviour can be 
enhanced through positive employee perceptions of perceived organisational support (POS). The 
results of the qualitative studies support this hypothesis, with many reporting a lack of perceived 
support by management and the wider organisation lead to under reporting of accidents and near 
misses. Suggested models of the social exchange relationships are detailed below (Figure 15 and 16). 
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The aspects of the social exchange relationships identified in the studies will be discussed in more 
detail in the following sections. 
Psychosocial Climate 
Upward Communication (-) 
POS(+) 
LMX(-) 
Organisational Commitment (-) 
Safety Climate 
Management Commitment (-) 
Safety Priority (+) 
Personal Priority (+) 
Work Environment (+) 
Safety Citizenship Behaviour 
Accidents Reported 
Figure 15: Suggested Model of the Psychosocial Climate, Safety Climate Reported Accidents Social 
Exchange relationships 
Psychosocal Climate 
Upward Communication (-) 
POS(+) 
Safety Climate 
Management Commitment (-) 
Safety Priority (+) 
Safety Rules (+) 
Personal Priority (-) 
Work Environment (-) 
Safety Citizenship Behaviour 
Near Misses Reported 
Figure 16: Suggested Model of the Psychosocial Climate, Safety Climate Reported Accidents Social 
Exchange Relationship 
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8.3.2. Perceived Organisational Support 
The aspect of the social exchange perspective which occurs at an organisational level is defined 
Perceived Organisational Support (POS). Eisenberger et al. (1986) described POS as 'global beliefs 
concerning the extent to which the organisation values their contributions and cares about their 
wellbeing' (p.501). This social exchange is solely the employer's side of the contribution (Coyle-Shairo 
and Conway, 2005). POS has been linked to a number of positive safety outcomes. Mearns and Hope 
(2005) found evidence that POS leads to lower levels of unsafe behaviour, Gykye and Saminen (2007) 
found that the higher POS improve employee's safety perceptions, and safety compliance. Hofmann 
and Morgeson (1999) found reciprocal actions resulting from high POS included raising safety concerns 
or increased upward communication, organisational citizenship behaviour, organisational commitment 
and safer behaviours. Mearns and Reader (2008) found high support at both an organisational and 
supervisor levelled to more safety citizenship behaviours. 
The results of the quantitative study show that POS predicts safety climate which supports previous 
findings (Hofmann et aI., 2003; Gyekye and Salminen, 2007). POS predicts both accident and near 
misses reported, however the direction of this relationship is positive, suggesting the more employees 
feel supported by the wider organisation the higher the probability of accidents and near misses being 
reported. The direction of this relationship is the opposite to the anticipated relationship given that high 
POS has been linked to better safety behaviours, safety compliance and more safety citizenship 
behaviour (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Mearns and Reader, 2008). 
As outlined in the previous section the principles of social exchange (Blau, 1964) and reciprocity theory 
(Gouldner 1960) can provide an explanation of the results. If the employees feel they are supported by 
the organisation, their contributions are valued, they will be treated fairly and the organisation is 
genuinely concerned for their wellbeing they are more likely to reciprocate by reporting accidents and 
near misses. Reporting accidents and near misses as already suggested can be conceptualised as 
safety citizenship behaviour. Thus an employee who feels the organisation shows genuine concern for 
their wellbeing will feel free to raise safety concerns. Mearns and Reader (2008) found that care and 
concern for workers wellbeing led to reciprocal behaviours in terms of increased safety citizenship 
behaviour. Some of the questions included in safety citizenship measure were 'I report near misses' 'I 
report minor accidents' 'I report hazardous working conditions' the authors themselves note that this 
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may be measuring reporting behaviour. Thus these results would demonstrate that POS is positively 
related to reporting behaviour, supporting the findings of the quantitative study. 
8.3.3. Safety Climate 
Safety researchers have demonstrated the relationship between safety climate and accidents and 
injuries (Clarke, 2006; Christian et aI., Beus, 2010). The findings of the quantitative study show that 
safety climate is the largest predictor of accidents and near miss reporting when compared to the other 
significantly predictive variables (upward communication and POS). This finding supports previous 
research which has demonstrated the negative safety climates are predictive of greater accidents and 
injuries (Clarke, 2006; Christian et aI., Beus, 2010) conversely the direction of this relationship is 
positive i.e. the more positive the safety climate the greater the probability of more accidents and near 
misses being reported. If as already suggested accidents and near misses reporting are seen are 
safety citizenship behaviours which safety climates have been shown to moderate (Hofmann et aI., 
2003) then these results would support previous research. Previous research has found that accidents 
are under reported in organisations that have poor safety climates (Probst and Estrada, 2010). 
When the safety climate dimensions are examined separately, Safety Priority, the extent to which 
safety is prioritised over production is the largest predictor of the probability of an accident or near miss 
being reported. The direction of this relationship is positive i.e. the more the organisation prioritises 
safety the more accidents and near misses are reported. Pressure for production has been identified as 
one of the main safety climate dimension in reviews of safety climate measure (Flin, 2000; Seo et aI., 
2004). Research has identified pressure for production as a factor that is negatively associated with 
safety performance (Zohar 1980; Mearns et aI., 1997; Glendon and Litherland, 2001; Janssens et aI., 
2005). Janssens et al. (1995) found that organisations that place a greater emphasis on production, the 
more employees perceive that safety is secondary to demands of production. Probst and Graso (2013) 
examined the relationship between production pressure and accident reporting. The authors conducted 
a study of 212 copper mining workers and found that production pressure was significantly associated 
with more negative reporting attitudes and a greater number of negative consequences from reporting 
accidents. Results also showed that individuals who perceived high levels of production pressure not 
only experienced more accidents overall, they also reported fewer of them to the organisation. 
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The results of the qualitative studies provide some insights into these findings. Often whilst the 
corporate message is safety first, the underlying message is get your job done on time and in budget. 
The sponsor organisation is a contractor for major energy companies and if the jobs run over time there 
are large financial penalties imposed on the organisation, site supervisors were rewarded and 
recognised for getting the job completed on time and senior managers' bonuses were attached to 
performance. Conversely many site based operational employees were able to recount examples 
where there had been negative consequences, reprisals and blame for raising safety concerns. This led 
to withholding of information about accidents and near misses. It is not surprising that the subordinates 
would reciprocate their leaders with the expected behaviour. 
Interpreting these results in terms of social exchanges, employees take their cues from the wider 
organisation and their managers as to how safety is valued over production and is prioritised in the 
organisation and respond with the appropriate behaviours. If safety is highly prioritised this increases 
the probability of reporting behaviour. This behaviour is then reinforced by positive or negative 
consequences of reporting the accident or near misses. 
8.3.4. Leader Member Exchange 
The findings of the study show that leader member exchange predicts safety climate, this supports 
previous findings. Hofmann et al. (2003) demonstrated a link between LMX, safety citizenship, role 
definitions and this was moderated by safety climate. Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) found that LMX is 
an antecedent to safety communication, safety commitment and accidents. Immediate supervisors 
have been found to influence the safety culture and safety performance of the organisation (Zohar, 
2002). The findings of the quantitative study in relation to safety suggest the poorer LMX relationship 
the greater the probability of accidents reported. Michael et al. (2006) found that high quality LMX was 
negatively related to self-report safety-related events. The research on LMX and safety climate 
suggests safety climate provides the cues that help workers identify appropriate behavioural 
reciprocation for positive LMX relationships (Hofmann et aI., 2003). 
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The results of the qualitative studies provide some contextual insights to these findings. Many identified 
that poor leadership was seen as a key driver of safety performance. Managers were seen as 
unapproachable, unaccountable with a lack of action or feedback on safety concerns raised. This led to 
under reporting of safety issues, accidents and near misses. The qualitative results suggest that there 
was culture of blame and fear of reprisals, leading to under reporting of safety issues. The gangs and 
their Foreman lived and worked together on site, in caravans for the duration of the project and many of 
the gangs had worked in the organisation for many years leading to very strong working relationships. 
Results of the pairwise comparisons show a significant difference in LMX between white collar (office 
based) and blue collar (site based workers). So it could be hypothesised that strong leader member 
relationships actually motivated employees to conceal accidents to avoid their team being 'under the 
spotlight' getting punished or blamed. 
lohar has highlighted the impact that supervisor behaviour can have upon worker actions immediate 
supervisors set the norms of behaviour which influence safety and safety performance (lohar, 2000; 
lohar and Luira, 2004). So it can be suggested that the norm of behaviour on site where there are 
positive leader subordinate relationships is to under report and conceal report accidents to protect 'us' 
from the wider organisation 'them'. The quality of the leader's subordinate relationship predicts the 
probability of accidents being reported but high quality relationships may actually impeded accident 
reporting, in terms of social exchange employees may reciprocate a positive relationship with 
supervisors by reporting less accidents. 
8.3.5. Communication 
Upward communication (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996) is the degree of freedom employees feel to 
discuss safety issues with management. Quantitative results suggested that upward communication 
accounts for the largest predicted variance (37%) in safety climate and there is a Significant difference 
in upward communication between site based blue collar workers and office based white collar workers. 
Results also suggest upward communication predicts reported accidents and near misses and the 
direction of this relationship is negative i.e. the poorer the upward communication the greater the 
probability of accidents and near misses being reported. These findings are in line with previous 
research which has shown that poor communication is linked to increased accidents (Hofmann and 
Morgeson, 1999). Positive safety climates, resulting from management demonstrating a committed and 
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non-punitive approach to safety management. promotes a more open communication and a free-
flowing exchange of information about safety-related issues. whereas in negative safety climates. 
workers are wary of raising safety issues for fear of retribution. blame and punishment (Edmondson. 
1996). 
The results of the qualitative studies highlighted that communication was an issue across the whole 
organisation and key issue affecting safety. Those on site suggested that communication was 
exacerbated by a culture of blame and reprisals and a lack of action or feedback on issues raised. 
Certainly when looking at the results of the qualitative and quantitative results as a whole. it would 
suggest that due to the positive relationships with their immediate supervisors coupled with the poor 
safety climates characterised by blame. workers will most likely look for the easiest way to placate 
management and the wider organisation in order to escape getting the blame. This communication 
style has been shown to reduce the free flow of information over time (Gibb. 1961; Eadie. 1982; 
DeSalvo and Zurcher. 1984; Mas. Alexander and Turner. 1991). 
Clarke (1998) found that employees' intentions not to report safety incidents was linked to their 
perception that management would take no notice. and Mullen (2005) found that employees were more 
likely to invest time and effort into raising a safety issue when they thought managers were open to 
suggestions. Upward communication can be seen as the reciprocal side of the social exchange 
relationship. If management are open to. and listen to employee safety concerns and act on them. this 
serves as positive reinforcement for employees to report safety concerns and so should foster more 
reporting behaviour. 
S.3.6. Employee Engagement and Organisational Commitment 
The quantitative results show that employee engagement and organisational commitment predict safety 
climate but only organisational commitment predicted accidents reported. There have only been limited 
studies linking staff engagement to safety outcomes (Harter et al.. 2002. Nahrgang et al.. 2010). There 
is no research examining the direct link between employee engagement and safety climate. given the 
limited evidence linking engagement and the lack of clarity around the concept and its measures. it is 
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not surprising that the quantitative study did not generate a significant link between engagement and 
safety outcomes (reported accidents and near misses). 
Organisational commitment is clearly defined as a concept, there is more research linking it to 
organisational outcomes (Allen and Meyer, 1990). Organisational commitment (Meyer, 1997) has been 
shown to have a Significant influence on a range of work behaviours, including compliance with 
procedures (Shore and Wayne, 1994) and organisational citizenship behaviours (Organ and Ryan, 
1995). The quantitative findings link with previous research by Mearns and Hope (2005), who found 
that stronger organisational commitment increased compliance with safety rules and regulations and 
Clarke (2010) in a meta-analysis of psychological climate (see Chapter 3), worker attitudes and safety 
outcomes found that more positive safety climate was associated with greater organisational 
commitment. Organisational commitment partially mediated the effect of safety climate on safety 
behaviour. 
8.3.7. Summary 
The results of the qualitative studies would suggest that the degree of support employees perceive from 
their organisation and their supervisor, perceptions of safety climate, upward communication and 
organisational commitment influence reported accidents and near misses. Social exchange theory 
(Blau, 1964) and reciprocity theory (Gouldner, 1960) provide a useful theoretical explanation of the 
findings. Closer examination of the studies on citizenship behaviour (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; 
Mearns and Reader, 2008) suggest that safety citizenship behaviour may actually be reporting 
behaviour and it is reporting behaviour that is being measured in this context. 
The qualitative study results provide some valuable contextual insights into these findings and suggest 
that if employees that don't feel supported by management and the wider organisation they may 
withhold information about accidents and near misses. Employees pick up cues from the organisation 
and their manager about what behaviours are valued and respond accordingly. Extrinsic motivators 
such as rewards and punishment reinforce these behaviours and contribute to accident and near miss 
reporting or under reporting. 
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8.5. Strengths, Limitations and Future Research 
There are a number of potential strengths and limitations of the studies included in this thesis. The 
strengths and limitations will be discussed in this section along with directions for future research. The 
use of self-reported measures for safety outcomes can be criticised for being subjective (Clarke, 2000), 
however the under-reporting of accidents has been well documented in the safety literature (Glazner et 
aI., 1998; Pransky et aI., 1999; Leigh et aI., 2004; Rosenman et aI., 2006). Probst and Estrada found 
that 71% of experienced accidents went unreported by employees to the organisation. Individual-level 
under reporting of accidents has been linked to fear of; reprisals, loss of benefits or job loss (Sinclair 
and Tetrick, 2004; Probst, 2006; Probst and Graso, 2013). A lack of management commitment to safety 
and negative safety climates have also shown to be related to under reporting (Clarke, 1998; Probst 
and Estrada, 2010). Often in macho cultures such as the sponsor organisation, there is general 
acknowledgment that accidents and injuries are an occupational hazard (Pransky et aI., 1999). 
The qualitative studies suggested in the sponsor organisation there is poor safety culture, low levels of 
management commitment to safety and under reporting of accidents and safety incidents due to fear of 
reprisals and blame. In addition the industry the sponsor organisation operates in can be described as 
a macho working environment. Self-reported measures of accidents and near misses can be seen as 
less objective. Hence the use of self-reported measures of accident and near miss in the sponsor 
organisation was seen as a more accurate way of capturing data on near miss and accidents, given the 
contextual insights into factors affecting reporting behaviour identified through the qualitative studies. 
Further studies could collect both objective accident and near miss data from organisational accident 
databases and self-report measures. These measures could be examined to assess the level of under 
reporting and which psychosocial organisational and safety climate factors increased or suppressed 
accident reporting. 
The quantitative study was cross sectional and data from the survey measures was collected at one 
point in time. This means that how these social exchanges and organisational psychosocial variables 
affect safety climate and safety outcomes over time was not able to be investigated (Bauer and Green, 
1996).This limits the extent to which definitive claims can be made about causal processes. Very few 
studies have examined safety climate and safety outcomes over time (Neal and Griffin, 2006). Future 
184 
research could examine these social exchange relationships over time, to see whether psychosocial 
organisational climate and safety climate predict subsequent changes in safety outcomes. 
The research was conducted in one organisation in the construction industry, again limiting the 
generalisabilty of the findings. Further research could examine whether these findings are replicated in 
other companies in the same industry, and whether these findings translate across industries. 
A possible strength of the thesis is the adoption of a multi-method, triangulated methodology. Whilst 
this methodology is advocated in the safety literature (Cooper, 2000) very few studies examining safety 
climate and safety performance use this approach. Gilner and Morgan (2000) suggest that 
methodology should be fit for purpose. Using a triangulated, multi-method approach allowed in-depth 
contextual insights into the factors affecting safety culture and safety performance. The safety climate 
questionnaire allowed for these findings to be tested quantitatively. The contextual insights derived from 
the focus groups and interviews helped shed light on the quantitative findings, in terms of the social 
exchange relationships. Without these insights some of the results would have remained puzzling and 
possibly interpreted differently. Further research could replicate this methodological approach in other 
organisations and industries. The final section of the discussion chapter outlines the practical 
implications of the research findings. 
S.6. Practical Implications 
As well as the theoretical contributions outlined in the previous chapters, the results of the studies have 
some practical implications, for the organisation and wider industry. These are outlined and discussed 
in this section. 
The results suggest that not only safety climate but the wider psychosocial organisational climate 
factors shape accident and near miss reporting behaviour. This behaviour can be described as safety 
citizenship behaviour (Hofmann et aI., 2003), which is influenced by the social exchanges between the 
employee and the organisation. The support an organisation and its management show for the 
employees and the quality of these exchange relationships influences reporting behaviour. This is an 
important contribution as there is common idea in industry that the best way to improve safety 
outcomes is through providing safety specific training or behavioural based interventions to front line 
workers (Huang et aI., 2007). Training and interventions which focus on improving the wider 
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psychosocial climate factors, such as leadership, organisational commitment and communication will 
have a positive effect on overall reporting behaviour. Developing a supportive environment which 
values safety and reporting behaviour will increase accident and near miss reporting. 
The findings suggest that front line leaders and the climates they help create can have a significant 
impact on their subordinates reporting behaviours. Although there is evidence that leadership 
interventions are effective in changing leader behaviour, most of these have focused on 
transformational leadership or safety specific leadership (Avolio and Shamir, 2002; Mullen and 
Kelloway, 2009). There is little guidance available on leadership interventions that focus on a wide 
range of leader behaviours. The current findings suggest that to improve safety culture and increase 
reporting behaviour and leaders would benefit from developing their leadership skills to become more 
supportive as opposed to just developing safety specific leadership skills. 
Upward communication, the degree to which employees feel free to raise safety concerns appears to 
account for the largest variance in safety culture and has a significant impact on the probability of an 
accident and near miss being reported. Qualitative results suggest there was a lack of visibility of senior 
managers on site and a lack of action and feedback from the safety concerns raised. In order to 
improve upward communication, organisations should create opportunities for front line site based 
operational personnel to feedback their safety concern and receive feedback on these. An intervention 
which has proved successful in the healthcare setting (Thompson, 2011) is executive walk arounds. 
Where senior executives 'walk the floor' in hospitals and interact with front line workers. This has been 
shown to reduce patient safety incidents and improve safety climate. Regular site visits from senior 
management, should allow employees to feel more supported, increase upward communication and in 
tum increase accident and near miss reporting. 
8.7. Summary 
Adopting a multi-method triangulated methodology enabled the development of in-depth quantifiable 
insights into safety performance which WOUldn't have been achieved with a single methodology. It 
appears that the support organisations show for their employees and the quality of these exchange 
relationships both from the organisation and their managers, the degree of upward communication and 
the commitment employees have towards the organisation influences both safety climate and reported 
accidents and near misses. These findings suggest that the nature of social exchanges in organisations 
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plays an important role in understanding safety climate and safety behaviours. Management and 
organisational characteristics, such as supportive environments, positive leader subordinate 
relationship across the organisation, and opportunities for employees to communicate their safety 
concerns are important enablers with respect to the development of an efficient safety culture and 
safety outcomes. Appropriate social exchanges within an organisation may lead to benefits in terms of 
positive safety reporting behaviours. These have significant practical benefits for the organisation in 
terms of learning from safety incidents, allowing a more accurate picture of the organisation's safety 
performance to be developed. A clear picture of an organisation's safety performance is key for 
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Appendix 1: Verbal Introduction 
Hello, my name is Ceri Jones, I'm a Postgraduate research at the Institute of Work Health and 
Organisations. The research area I work in is health and safety. We have been asked by • to look at 
the organisations current safety performance and understand how we can improve it. One of the 
ways we are doing this is to speak to number of employees in ., like yourselves to try and 
understand how and why accidents occur in order to be able to prevent them in the future. 
I need to make it very clear to you that we are independent of BNL and its management. All 
information you give me and anything that is discussed in this room will NOT be feed back to 
management and will only be used as part of the wider research study along with information from 
other employees throughout the company. No one will be identifiable as all information given to me 
through these interviews will be anonymised. The only exception to this is if you tell me something 
which may pose a risk of causing serious harm to yourself or others. 
Several steps will be taken to protect your anonymity and identity. The typed interviews will NOT 
contain any mention of your name, and any identifying information from the interview will be 
removed. The typed interviews will also be kept in a locked filing cabinet at the University of 
Nottingham, and only those researchers involved in the study (who are sworn to confidentiality) will 
have access to the interviews. All information will be destroyed after 5 years time. 
Taking part is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time, you don't have to take part if you don't 
want to but I would be very grateful if you could as it would help my understanding of why 
accidents, incidents and near misses occur in order to help prevent employees getting injured and 
hurt in the future. 
I just want to remind you again that information given to me today will NOT be reported to • 
management and your details will be anonymised. All information given to me today will form part 
of the wider research study only. At no time, however, will your name be used or any identifying 
information used in the reporting of this research study. 
Any Questions? 
Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
What is * like as a company? 
What's good about working for * ? 
What could be better? 
1.1 Safety Roles and Responsibilities 
Are you clear about your own role and responsibilities re health and safety - what are 
they 
What do you perceive management's responsibilities to be and what do you perceive 
workers' responsibilities to be 
1.2 Management Visibility 
How involved are "management" (e.g. Band Managing Director/ others) with day to day 
health and safety (e.g. inspections/ audits/ safety tours/ risk assessment/ planning?) 
What could be improved? 
1.3 leadership and commitment to health and safety 
HoW important is health and safety to * as a company 
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How would you describe the leadership that management provide on health and safety -
do they lead by example? 
How do management demonstrate their commitment to health and safety? 
What could be improved? 
2 Prlorltlsatlon of Health and Safety over production 
What is the official * line on the importance of safety versus production - is this 
message consistent throughout the management and supervisory chain 
Would you stop work for safety reasons - would management support you in doing this? 
Any examples where you have done this 
Do you have jobs/ tasks that are difficult to do safely? 
Do you have some health and safety procedures which are difficult to follow? 
Do you ever cut corners to get the job done? 
Are management/ supervisors ever aware that corners are being cut and procedures are 
not being followed but do nothing about it? 
What could be improved? 
: , ', .'. ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ . . ,: ~ ~1..: _ ; 
, . . ~ ~ , · t t " , .. ', .. _ ' . ~ ~ .... : ... ~ ~ : , " ' . t t ., 
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What arrangements are there within * to involve you in health and safety matters (e.g. 
Citizens forum/ health and safety meetings etc.) 
Are you involved in risk assessments, method statements/ developing safe systems of 
work? 
If you had a suggestion on how health and safety could be improved, how would you 
raise this? 
How would you characterise worker involvement in this company (i.e. telling vs. selling 
vs. consulting vs. participating) 
How would you rate your involvement in health and safety matters (high - medium -
low?) 
What could be improved? 
. ." ~ ~ . ~ ~ , 
. , . j: ~ ~ ,." . 
. . 
Safety Information Communication 
What information do you get about health and safety (e .g. hazards and risk controls/ 
changes to law or company policy/ incidents and near misses/ outcomes of safety audi ts 
and inspections?) 
How do you get information about health and safety (i .e. notice boards/ Intranet or IT 
systems/ newsletters/ training/ toolbox talks/ method statement briefings/ site 
inductions?) 
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What is the most effective way for you to receive safety information? 
What is the least effective way for you to receive safety information? 
Do you get the information about health and safety that you need to do your job safely? 
What arrangements are there for reporting safety concerns? 
What could be improved? 
Approachability and responsiveness of management 
If you were concerned about a safety issue could you raise it with your manager(s?) 
How responsive would they be? 
5 Organisational Learning 
Incident and Near Miss Investigation 
How are accidents investigated - is there a formal accident investigation procedure 
Who gets involved in accident investigation? 
Are you informed of the outcomes? 
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Are remedial actions usually taken after an accident - and do you generally think they 
are appropriate, or inadequate, or over the top 
Does the company learn from incidents that happen elsewhere in the construction 
industry? 
Does the company investigate and publicise near misses and put in place preventative 
measures - any examples 
Pro-active measures of health and safety 
Does * learn from the findings of safety inspections/ audits/ climate surveys (examples?) 
What could be improved? 
Raising Safety concerns 
Are you able to raise safety concerns or report near misses freely and without fear of 
being blamed? 
Allocating blame in accident investigations 
Do you think accident investigation in this company treats people fairly (i.e. just culture 
vs. blame culture/ disciplinary action & sacking) 
Do you think accident investigation is good at identifying underlying causes and 
contributory factors e.g. lack of training or pressure to get the job done 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form 
Consent Form 
Study Title: Promoting Safety Performance 
Interviewer: Cerllones - Postgraduate research at the Institute of Work Health 
and Organisations (IWHO) at the University of Nottingham 
Overview 
I'm a Postgraduate research at the Institute of Work Health and Organisations (IWHO). 
The research area I work in is health and safety. We have been asked by * to look at the 
organisations current safety performance and understand how we can improve It. One of 
the ways we are doing this is to speak to number of employees in BNL, to try and 
understand how and why accidents occur in order to be able to prevent them in the 
future. 
Everything discussed as part of this interview will NOT be feed back to BNL management 
and will only be used as part of the wider research study and collated with information 
from interviews with other employees throughout the company. No one will be 
identifiable as all information given through these interviews will be anonymous. The 
only exception to this is if something is discussed which may pose a risk of causing 
serious harm to yourself or others. 
Several steps will be taken to protect your anonymity and identity. The typed interviews 
will NOT contain any mention of your name, and any identifying information from the 
interview will be removed. The typed interviews will also be kept in a locked filing 
cabinet at the University of Nottingham, and only those researchers involved in the study 
(who are sworn to confidentiality) will have access to the interviews. All information will 
be destroyed after 5 years time in accordance with the data protection act. 
The Right to Withdraw 
Taking part is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time, you don't have to take part if 
you don't want to but by taking part in the interviews you can help the researchers at 
IWHO develop and understanding of how and why aCCidents, incidents and near misses 
occur In order to help prevent employees getting injured and hurt in the future. 
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Questions 
If you have any questions you can ask the interviewer (Ceri Jones) now or at anything 
during the interview. If you have any further queries once this interview has been 
conducted then you can contact Ceri Jones at:-
Institute of Work, Health & Organisations, 
University of Nottingham, International House, Jubilee Campus, 
Wollaton Road, 




In order to partiCipate in this research project, you will need to give your informed 
consent. By signing this informed consent statement you are indicating that you 
understand the nature of the research project and your role in that research and that 
you agree to partiCipate in the research. Please consider the following pOints before 
signing: 
• I understand that I am participating in a research project. 
• I understand that my identity will not be linked with my data, and that all 
information I provide will remain anonymous and kept in accordance with the 
data protection act. 
• I understand that I have been provided with an explanation of the research in 
which I am participating in and have been given the name and telephone number 
of an individual to contact if I have questions about the research. 
• I understand that partiCipation in research is not required, is voluntary, and that, 
after any individual research project has begun, I may refuse to partiCipate 
further. 
Sy signing this form I am stating that I am over 18 years of age, and that I understand 
the above information and consent to participate in this research. 
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Slgnature: ______________________ ___ Today's Date: __________ _ 
Print your First Name: _____ ,Print your Last Name: ________ _ 
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Appendix 4: Template 
Priori Themes Sub Themes 
1 Communication 1.1. Top Down 1.1.1. Lack of Opportunities 
to feedback 
1.2. Poor 1.2.1 Lack of Face to Face 
Communication 
to site 





2.3. Understanding 2.3.1. Informed of outcomes 
of site of aCCidents and near 
misses 
2.3.2. Identification of Root 
Causes/Organisational 
Learning 
3 Job Demands 3.1. Poor Planning 
3.2. Working hours/Working Week 
3.3. Client Demands/Commercial Pressure 
4 Health and 4.1. Importance of Safety vs. Production 
Safety 4.2. Corner cut to aet the job done 
Prioritisation 4.3. Health and 4.3.1. Correct 
Safety PPE/Equipment 
Procedures 
5 Employee 5.1. Consultation in decision making 
Engagement 5.2. Reduced Moral 
4.3. Lack of Reward and Recognition 
6 Culture 6.1. Blame/Fear of 6.1.2. Under reporting 
Reprisals 
6.2 Us and Them 
6.3. Un-fair treatment 
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Appendix 5: Safety Climate Questionnaire 
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1. Safety Climate Survey 
The University of Nottingham and * are undertaking a number of initiatives aimed at raising health and safety 
standards. The company has decided to focus on employee attitudes and perceptions as one of these initiatives. We 
are conducting a confidential survey, aimed at all levels of employees working here. 
To help with this task we would like you to complete the following questionnaire, your confidentiality is assured. We 
ask only for basic job information in order to help interpret the results. The questionnaire is relatively simple to 
complete , it should take about 30 minutes. It asks about your attitudes to safety issues, as well as any suggestions 
you might have to improve things. 
Please try and answer all of the questions, being as open and honest as you can . The conclusions will be fed back t 
you once the survey has been completed and the results have been analysed. 
All responses are anonymous and no individual will be identified in any report or feedback to the company. 
Many thanks for your help. 
If you have any questions you can ask Project Manager Ceri Jones at:-
The Institute of Work, Health & Organisations, 
University of Nottingham, International House, Jubilee Campus, 
Wollaton Road, 
Nottingham NG8 1 BB, UK 
e-mail : Iwxcj@nottingham.ac.uk 
Tel : 07971517306 
* 1. In order to participate you will need to give your informed consent. By ticking the 
boxes you are indicating that you understand the nature of the survey and that you 
agree to participate in the research. Please tick the following points if you agree to take 
part. 
o I understand that all in formation I provide will remain anonymous and kep t in accordance with the Data Protection act (1998) 
o I understand tha t I have been provided with an explanation of the survey in which I am pa rti cipating in and have been given th e 
name and telephone number of an indiv id ual to contact if I have questions about the resea rch 
o I understand that parti cipation in the survey is voluntary and th at I can withdraw at any time 
• 




* 2. How many years have you worked for the company? 
Number of Years 
* 3. What area of the business do you work in? 
o Finance 
o Tender/Bids Department 
o Support Services 
o Supply Chain 
o Broadcast 
o Rigging Services 
o Design 
o Transmission 
o Other (please specify) 
I 
* 4. Where are you based? 
o On-si te 
o Head Office 
o Newton 
o Other (please specify) 
[ 
5. What is your current role within the business? (Optional) 
[ 
*6. Have you ever had an accident; major, minor or LTA (loss time accident) whilst 
working for this organisation? 
(An accident can be defined as any event which results in injury, and/or damage and/or 
lOSS.) 
o Yes 
1. How many accidents have you had whilst working for this organisation? 
How Many Accidents? 
2. When was your last accident in this organisation? 
o In the last week 
o In the last month 
o In the last 1 to 3 months 
o In the last 3 to 6 months 
o In Ihe lasl 6 months 10 a year 
o Over a year ago 
* 3. Have you ever had a near miss whilst working for this organisation? 
(A near miss can be defined as any event which had the potential to cause injury and/or 
damage and/or loss but which was avoided by circumstance.) 
o Yes 
1. How many near misses have you had whilst working for this organisation? 
How Many Near Misses? 
2. When was your last near miss? 
o In the last week 
o In the last month 
o In the last 1 to 3 months 
o In the last 3 to 6 months 
o In the last 6 months to a year 
o Over a year ago 
3. Are there any comments or suggestions you would like to add? [ d 
• 
5. Management Commitment 
* 1. Senior Management only acts to improve safety after accidents have occurred 
Indicate your level of 













* 2. Corrective action is always taken when Senior Management is told about unsafe 
practices 
Indicate your level of 













* 3. In my workplace Senior Management acts quickly to correct safety problems 
Indicate your level of 











* 4. In my workplace Senior Management turn a blind eye to safety issues 
Indicate your level of 















* 5. In my workplace my immediate Manager/Supervisor show interest in my safety 
Ind icate your level of 













* 6. My immediate Managers/Supervisor express concern if safety procedures are not 
followed 
Indica te your leve l of 

















* 1. I feel comfortable discussing safety issues with my immediate Manager/Supervisor 
Indicate your level of 











*2. The organisation encourages open communication about safety 
Indicate your level of 











* 3. The organisation openly accepts ideas for improving safety 
Indicate your level of 

















* 4. There is good quality communication here about safety issues which affect me 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree Strongly Disagre 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 0 0 
agreement with the 
statement 
* 5. I receive praise for working safely 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Disag ree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 0 0 
agreement with the 
statement 
6. Are there any comments and suggestion you would like to add? 
[ J 
• 
7. Priority of Safety 
* 1. Senior Management clearly consider the safety of employees of high priority 
Indicate your level of 











* 2. Safety rules and procedures are carefully followed in this organisation 
Indicate your level of 















* 3. Senior Management considers safety to be equally as important as production 
Indicate your level of 















8. Safety Rules and Procedures 
* 1. Sometimes it is necessary to depart from safety requirements for productivity's 
sake 
Indicate your level of 











* 2. Some health and safety rules and procedures are not really practical 
Indicate your level of 















* 3. Some safety rules and procedures do not need to be followed to get the job done 
safely 
Indicate your level of 

















9. Supportive Environment 
* 1. We are not encouraged to raise safety concerns 
Indicate your level of 






Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
* 2. We often give tips to each other on how to work safely 
Indicate your level of 






Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
* 3. I am strongly encouraged to report unsafe conditions 
Indicate your level of 






Nei ther Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
o o 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
o o 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
o o 
* 4. A no-blame approach is used to persuade those acting unsafely that their 
behaviour is inappropriate 
Indicate your level of 











* 5. I can influence health and safety performance in this organisation 
Indicate your level of 



















* 1. I am involved in the decisions made about how to carry out my job 
Indicate your level of 











* 2. I am involved with the decisions made about safety issues at work 
Indicate your level of 
agreement with the 
statement 















11. Personal Priorities and Need for Safety 
* 1. Safety is the number one priority in my mind when completing a job 
Indicate your level of 












* 2. Personally I feel that safety issues are not the most important aspect of my job 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree Sirongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 0 0 
agreement with the 
statement 
3. I understand the safety rules for my job 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 0 0 
agreement wi th the 
statement 
4. Are there any comments and suggestion you would like to add? [ J 
• 
12. Work Environment 
* 1. Operational targets often conflict with safety measures 
Indicate your level of 






Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
* 2. Sometimes conditions here hinder my ability to work safely 
Indicate your level of 













* 3. Sometimes I am not given enough time to get the job done safely 
Indicate your level of 











* 4. There are always enough people available to get the job done safely 
Indicate your level of 











* 5. This is a safer place to work than other companies I have worked for 
Indicate your level of 
























13. Organisational Support 
* 1. The organisation values my contribution to its success 
Indicate your level of 











* 2. The organisation fails to appreciate any extra effort from me 
Indicate your level of 






Nei ther Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
* 3. The organisation would ignore any complaint from me 
Indicate your level of 






Nei ther Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
* 4. The organisation really cares about my well-being 
Indicate your level of 















* 5. Even if I did the best job possible, the organisation would fail to notice 
Indicate your level of 











* 6. The organisation cares about my general satisfaction at work 
Indicate you r level of 






Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
* 7. The organisation shows very little concern for me 
Indicate your level of 













* 8. The organisation takes pride in my accomplishments at work 
Ind icate your level of 















Strong ly Disagre 
o 
Strong ly Disagree 
o 








9. Are there any comments and suggestion you would like to add? 
J 
• 
14. Employee Engagement 
* 1. I know what is expected of me at work 
Indicate your level of 













* 2. While at work, I receive regular recognition or praise for doing a good job 
Indicate your level of 











* 3. I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 
agreement with the 
statement 
* 4. At work, my opinions count 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 
agreement with the 
statement 
* 5. My fellow employees are committed to doing quality work 
Indicate your level of 















* 6. In the last year, I have had the opportunities at work to learn and grow 
Indicate your level of 
















Strongly Dlsagr e 
0 






15. Supervisor Support 
* 1. My immediate Manager/Supervisor understands my job-related problems and 
needs 
Indicate your level of 






Nei ther Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
* 2. My immediate Manager/Supervisor recognises my potential 
Indicate your level of 






Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
o 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
o o 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
o o 
* 3. My immediate Manager/Supervisor would use his/her power to help me solve work 
related problems 
Indicate your level of 













* 4. My immediate Manager/Supervisor would "bail me out" at his/her expense 
Indicate your level of 













* 5. I defend and justify my immediate Manager/Supervisor's decisions when he/she is 
not there to do so 
Ind icate your level of 











Strong ly Disagree 
o 
* 6. I have a good working relationship with my immediate Manager/Supervisor 
Ind icate your level of 
agreement with th e 
statement 









7. Are there any comments and suggestion you would like to add? 
[ ~ ~
Strong ly Disagree 
o 
• 
16. Organisational Commitment 
* 1. I do not feel like part of a family in this organisation as a whole 
Indicate your level of 











* 2. I feel a strong sense of belonging to this organisation as a whole 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 0 
agreement with the 
statement 
* 3. This organisation as a whole does not deserve my loyalty 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 0 
agreement with the 
statement 
* 4. I am proud to tell others where I work 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 0 
agreement with the 
statement 
* 5. I would be happy to work here until I retire 
Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Indicate your level of 0 0 0 0 








Strong ly Disagree 
0 
Sirongly Disagr e 
0 
6. Are there any comments and suggestion you would like to add regarding how to 
improve any of the areas covered in this survey? 
[ j 
Thank-you for taking the time to complete the survey, your continued support and input is very much appreciated! 
If you have any questions regarding the survey, please contact Ceri Jones at Iwxcj@nottingham.ac.uk or on 
07971517306 
